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Resumen en Castellano
En el trabajo de investigacio´n realizado para la obtencio´n del grado de Doctor en Economı´a,
estudio dos preguntas emp´ıricas utilizando diversas te´cnicas de la Microeconometr´ıa.
Dichas preguntas son: 1. Como se puede incrementar la participacio´n escolar de nin˜os
pertenecientes a familias pobres, que viven en pa´ıses en desarrollo y, adicionalmente, han
abandonado sus estudios? 2. Pueden los nin˜os afectar comportamientos de salud preventiva
de sus padres? Los dos primeros cap´ıtulos de la presente Tesis esta´n abocados a responder
la primer pregunta, mientras que en el tercer cap´ıtulo, en un trabajo conjunto con M. Lucila
Berniell y M. Dolores de la Mata, respondemos a la segunda pregunta.
Cap´ıtulo 1: Did PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?
Objetivo: En este trabajo cuantifico el efecto causal que las becas escolares entregadas a
trave´s de PROGRESA han tenido sobre la participacio´n escolar de nin˜os que han abandon-
ado la escuela en el an˜o anterior a la implementacio´n de dicho programa. Estos nin˜os se
enfrentan a la decisio´n de regresar a la escuela, decisio´n que puede implicar costos diferentes
a los que deben afrontar aquellos nin˜os que actualmente concurren a la escuela. Por esto,
podemos esperar que existan efectos diferenciales de las becas escolares PROGRESA sobre
la participacio´n escolar de nin˜os que concurren regularmente a la escuela y de aquellos que
han abandonado sus estudios.
Metodolog´ıa: Inicialmente PROGRESA fue´ implementado como un experimento natural,
esto es, se eligio´ de forma aleatoria (con una loteria) las localidades que recibir´ıan la ayuda
de este programa en la primer fase. Todas las familias residentes en dichas localidades
(localidades tratamiento) y designadas como pobres (designacio´n realizada utilizando un
ı´ndice de pobreza) comenzaron a recibir la ayuda en Octubre de 1998. En el resto de local-
idades (localidades control) se restraso´ la implementacio´n del programa hasta Septiembre
del an˜o 2000. Esta forma de implementacio´n experimental introduce una fuente de variabil-
idad exo´gena en el monto de la beca que permite estimar la relacio´n causal entre el monto
de la beca y la probabilidad de asistir a la escuela utilizando estimadores de diferencias, o
diferencias-en-diferencias.
Para estimar el efecto que las becas PROGRESA han tenido sobre la participacio´n escolar
de nin˜os que se encuentran fuera del sistema educativo, utilizo un contexto de regresio´n
que me permite controlar por las diferencias existentes en caracter´ısticas observables entre
nin˜os que viven en localidades tratamiento y en localidades control. Con el objeto de evitar
realizar supuestos sobre diferencias en la distribucio´n de caracter´ısticas inobservadas entre
tratados y controles, en la estimacio´n de los para´metros causales de intere´s, utilizo un
modelo Correlated Random Effects Probit Model.
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Conclusiones: Encuentro evidencia de la existencia de un efecto diferencial de las becas
PROGRESA sobre la participacio´n en la educacio´n secundaria de nin˜os que han abandonado
la escuela y nin˜os que concurren habitualmente a clase. En particular, existe un efecto
mayor para varones que han abandonado sus estudios que el efecto sobre aquellos varones
que se encuentran actualmente en la escuela. Por el contrario, las becas PROGRESA no
afectan la decisio´n de regresar a la escuela para mujeres que han completado los estudios
primarios, mientras que el efecto en mujeres que se encuentran dentro del sistema educativo
es positivo.
Cap´ıtulo 2: The school reentry decision of poor girls. Structural estimation
and policy analysis using PROGRESA database.
Objetivo: Como una continuacio´n natural del ana´lisis realizado en el primer cap´ıtulo, en
este trabajo evalu´o la efectividad de diversas pol´ıticas pu´blicas disen˜adas para incrementar
la participacio´n escolar de nin˜as pertenecientes a familias pobres.
Metodolog´ıa: Estimo los para´metros estructurales de un modelo dina´mico de decisiones
educativas utilizando te´cnicas de Ma´xima Verosimilitud. El modelo dina´mico de compor-
tamiento que utilizo sigue en gran parte el modelo propuesto por Attanasio, Meghir, and
Santiago (2005). En su trabajo, estos autores permiten a los individuos elegir entre dos
alternativas mutuamente excluyentes: ir a la escuela o trabajar. En mi modelo, los individ-
uos pueden elegir entre tres alternativas: ir a la escuela, trabajar o quedarse en casa. Esta
tercer alternativa resulta crucial para las nin˜as, ya que el 88% de nin˜as que han abandon-
ado sus estudios no trabajan por un salario, sino que se encuentran en casa, probablemente
ayudando a sus madres en la atencio´n de los nin˜os ma´s pequen˜os de la familia, y en tareas
dome´sticas.
Luego de obtener los para´metros estructurales del modelo, los utilizo para simular tasas de
participacio´n escolar de mujeres, bajo diferentes escenarios de pol´ıticas: recibir las becas
PROGRESA, recibir becas que implican el doble del monto provisto por las becas PRO-
GRESA, disponer de una escuela secundaria en la localidad de residencia, y disponer de
acceso gratuito a centros de d´ıa para los nin˜os ma´s pequen˜os de la familia.
Conclusiones: Las becas PROGRESA no aumentan la participacio´n escolar de nin˜as que
han abandonado sus estudios. Tampoco son efectivas otros esquemas de becas que provean
a estas nin˜as con un monto mayor de dinero. La disponibilidad gratuita de un centro de
d´ıa para los nin˜os ma´s pequen˜os de la familia incrementa solo marginalmente la partici-
pacio´n escolar de estas nin˜as. Entre las pol´ıticas analizadas, la ma´s efectiva en incentivar
a nin˜as que han abandonado los estudios a regresar a la escuela es disponer de una es-
cuela secundaria en la localidad de residencia. Esto genera una reduccio´n no solo en los
iii
costos monetarios de transporte, sino tambie´n en los costos de tiempo de traslado entre la
localidad de residencia y el lugar donde se encuentra la escuela.
Cap´ıtulo 3: Spillovers of Health Education at school on parental health
lifestyles.
Objetivo: La ensen˜anza de Educacio´n para la Salud se ha ido generalizando en los u´ltimos
an˜os debido principalmente a su reconocimiento como un arma eficiente en la prevencio´n de
enfermedades que en la actualidad son categorizadas como epide´micas, como la obesidad
y las afecciones cardiovasculares. Este particular tipo de educacio´n tiene como objetivo
mejorar el estado de salud de los estudiantes. Sin embargo, el estado de salud y los com-
portamientos de salud preventiva de otros miembros de la familia del estudiante pueden ser
afectados. En este trabajo cuantificamos el efecto causal sobre la frecuencia de actividad
f´ısica de padres de nin˜os que esta´n recibiendo clases de Educacio´n para la Salud.
Metodolog´ıa: Entre los an˜os 2000 y 2006 se realizaron importantes reformas en la ensen˜anza
de Educacio´n para la Salud en Estados Unidos. Estos cambios no han sido uniformes entre
estados, diferencia´ndose en el momento de la reforma, la cantidad de cursos introducidos y el
nivel de rigurosidad con que estos cursos son impartidos. La heterogeneidad en las reformas
entre estados nos provee de un quasi-experimento al introducir una fuente de variacio´n
exo´gena que nos permite estimar la relacio´n causal entre la frecuencia de actividad f´ısica
de un padre y el hecho de que su hijo reciba Educacio´n para la Salud en la escuela. Para
estimar el efecto de intere´s, utilizamos diferencias-en diferencias-en diferencias, o Triple
Diferencias.
Conclusiones: Encontramos evidencia de la existencia de un efecto positivo del hecho de que
un nin˜o reciba Educacio´n para la Salud en la escuela sobre la frecuencia de actividad f´ısica
de su padre, mientras que su madre no se ve afectada. En particular, la implemetacio´n
de Educacio´n para la Salud en las escuelas primarias incrementa la probabilidad de que
los padres de los nin˜os que concurren a estas escuelas realicen actividad f´ısica 7 veces por
semana en 18.6 puntos porcentuales.
Consideramos que hay al menos dos canales que explican estos resultados. Primero, el
hecho de compartir informacio´n en la familia. El nuevo flujo de informacio´n que ingresa
a la familia a trave´s del nin˜o que recibe Educacio´n para la Salud, es ma´s probable que
afecte a aquellos individuos que tienen un stock de informacio´n ma´s bajo. Siguiendo esta
hipo´tesis, aquellos padres con un nivel educativo menor sera´n ma´s afectados, hipo´tesis que
hemos podido sustentar con nuestros resultados. Si, adicionalmente, aceptamos que los
padres tienen menos informacio´n que las madres en cuanto a los beneficios para la salud de
realizar actividad f´ısica, nuestros resultados tambie´n son compatibles con la hipo´tesis antes
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planteada. Segundo, la Educacio´n para la Salud puede afectar directamente la frecuencia
con la que los nin˜os realizan actividad f´ısica, y, a trave´s de los cambios en el comportamiento
del nin˜o, tambie´n afectar el comportamiento de sus padres. Como lo muestran las encuestas
de uso de tiempo realizadas en Estados Unidos, las madres pasan el doble del tiempo
cuidando de sus hijos, que los padres. Pero son estos u´ltimos los que pasan ma´s tiempo
realizando activdades recreacionales con sus nin˜os. Esto incluye tambie´n el tiempo en el
que realizan actividad f´ısica. Esto hace a los padres, ma´s que a las madres, susceptibles de
ser influenciados por el cambio en el comportamiento de sus hijos.
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Chapter 1
Did PROGRESA send dropouts
back to school?
1.1 Introduction
The key role of education as an anti-poverty and pro-growth policy via the effect of education
on the accumulation of human capital is widely recognized by both policy makers and the
economic literature. Not surprisingly, policies aimed at increasing education have received
a great deal of attention over the last 50 years.
Government policies can influence educational choices by affecting the three main factors
that determine school enrollment and completion: demand, supply, and educational policy.
On the demand side, policy makers have decreased direct costs by reducing or eliminating
tuition or transport costs. Thet have also implemented cash transfers programs aimed
at decreasing opportunity costs of wage income and/or home production forgone. Young
people may also leave school for supply side reasons such as the availability or quality
of education. Increasing the availability of primary and secondary schools and improving
the quality of the education by reducing class size and strengthen the qualifications of
teachers, have long been included in educational policy portfolios. On the institutional
side, governments have been increasing the number of years of compulsory education. In
most countries children have to attend school until the age of 16 years old, and many
countries are imposing compulsory education until the secondary school level.
Over the last two decades there has been a widespread use of programs aimed at fostering
the accumulation of human capital in the developing world. The increasing use of anti-
poverty programs has been accompanied by comprehensive evaluations about the actual
effectiveness of these programs. This has occurred not only because of the intrinsic interest
in these programs but also because anti-poverty programs represent an important financial
effort, both by governments and international institutions which often provide additional
funds.
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This paper focuses on a Mexican anti-poverty program for rural communities, called PRO-
GRESA (Education, Health and Nutrition program), first implemented in 1997 by the
Mexican Federal Government. The program comprise three major areas one of which, the
subject of this paper, is education. In particular, program beneficiaries are given financial
aid conditional on school attendance. This paper analyzes the effects of such grants on
school enrollment for two different groups of beneficiaries, dropouts and non-dropouts. The
identification of these effects relies on the randomized assignment of the program benefits.
The evaluation of the program was conducted by the Mexican Federal Government and
by external local and international evaluators such as the National Institute of Public
Health (INSP, Mexico), Research and Advanced Studies Center in Social Anthropology
(CIESAS, Mexico), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and Research and
Educational Documentation Center (CIDE, Spain)1. The evaluation efforts have resulted
in an extensive literature by authors like Orazio Attanasio, Jere R. Behrman, David Coady,
Costas Meghir, T. Paul Schultz, Emmanuel Skoufias, Petra Todd and Kenneth Wolpin,
among others. In this literature authors estimate average treatment effects (ATE) exploiting
the randomized assignment of the program. Their results prove the success of PROGRESA
in increasing enrollment rates for those children who received the grants, and they agree in
that this positive effect is higher on girls and on children who attend secondary school.
Although the ATE can be a good general characterization of the overall (average) effect, it
is obvious that any program will have a different impact on different individuals. Some of
them will benefit a lot whereas others will not. Therefore, it is also important to take into
account individual heterogeneity.
The main contribution of this paper is to track the differential effect of the program on
individuals that dropped out of school before the program started. These children are facing
a re-enrollment decision that may imply higher direct and/or indirect costs of schooling than
the costs faced by the average child. Moreover, dropouts are different from the average child
in some observable characteristics related to the schooling decision. Thus, we can expect a
different effect of the program on them. The methodologies applied are difference estimation
and maximum likelihood estimation of a reduced form equation of education choice. For
both cases the randomized design of PROGRESA is exploited. The outcome is the causal
effect of the education component of this program.
The estimated marginal effects provide evidence on the existence of differences between
the impact of PROGRESA grants on the overall target population and their impact on
the children who face a re-enrollment decision. The rise in boys school attendance caused
by PROGRESA grants is higher for dropout boys in both levels of education, primary and
secondary school. However, for girls in secondary school who dropped out in 1997 or before,
1Corresponding web pages: Federal Government: www.oportunidades.gob.mx; INSP, www.insp.mx;
CIESAS, www.ciesas.edu.mx; IFPRI, www.ifpri.org; CIDE, www.mec.es/cide/
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the grant has a negligible effect on their decision to reentry in school. Among dropouts
in secondary school the impact of PROGRESA grants is lower for girls even though they
receive more money than boys.
The structure of the paper is as follow. Section 2 presents the main features of the program
and a brief review of the literature evaluating PROGRESA. Section 3 discuses factors that
influence the enrollment decision and presents differences to the re-enrollment decision made
by dropouts. Section 4 describes characteristics of the PROGRESA data base. It provides
some main statistics that focus on the differences between dropouts and non-dropouts. In
Section 5 results for the difference estimation of the effects of the program are presented for
both groups and are analyzed separately. Section 6 introduces a reduced form equation for
the schooling decision including PROGRESA education grants variables. Section 7 presents
maximum likelihood estimates of a probit model for schooling decision, comparing results
for non-dropouts and dropouts. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with its main results
and some suggestions for future research.
1.2 The PROGRESA program and its education component
The Education, Health and Nutrition program, PROGRESA, was implemented by the
Federal Government of Mexico in 1997, with the aim of helping the poorest families in
rural communities. A fundamental characteristic of the program is that aid is conditioned
on a specific behavior of the beneficiary. This conditionality tries to guarantee that the
program does not lead to undesired outcomes, such as distortions in work decisions, and
that it successfully accomplishes its initial objectives.
The program comprises actions in three major areas: education, health and nutrition.
The education component includes monthly grants for children of a family qualified as
beneficiary. They need to be less than 18 years old, enrolled in school between the 3rd year
of primary school and the 3rd year of junior secondary school, and to fulfill a minimum
attendance requirement. The grants are not based on academic achievement. A child
who does not pass a grade is still eligible for the grant in the following year. But if the
child fails the same grade twice, she/he losses eligibility. The grant increases by years of
schooling. In the junior secondary level the grant is slightly higher for girls, since there
exist evidence that in poor families girls are more likely to dropout of school and that
they also tend to dropout earlier than boys. Additionally, beneficiaries receive an annual
grant for school supplies. The health component of the PROGRESA program consists of
a basic package of free health services, nutritional supplements, and informative talks on
health, nutrition, fertility, and hygiene. Special attention is paid to pregnant women and
children younger than five years. Finally, the nutrition component of the program supplies
beneficiary families with a monthly monetary payment intended to improve amount and
diversity of food consumption and thus increase the nutritional status, in particular of
3
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children. This aid is independent of residence, and size, and composition of the family. All
aid is given to the mother of the family as there exist evidence that mothers are better than
fathers at allocating family resources.
A family is qualified as being poor and thus eligible for the program according to a single
index. This index contains information on family income and housing like presence of
running water, etc.2
Some numbers can provide a better understanding of the extent and significance of PRO-
GRESA as an anti-poverty policy. In 1997 the program reached 6,357 communities, giving
aid to 300,705 families. This implied transfers of 34 million USD (approx. 340 million
Mexican pesos). After two years of being implemented the program included nearly 2.6
million families in 72,345 communities in all 31 Mexican states. It reached around 40%
of all rural families and nearly 12% of all families in Mexico. Total annual transfers of
the program in 1999 were around 710 million USD, equivalent to 0.15% of Mexican GDP.
40% were educational transfers, 42% food transfers and 18% was spent on health transfers.
Among the total annual cash transfers of 578 million USD, food transfer accounted for 49%.
The remaining 51% went to education. In 1999 the program distributed 273 million USD
in education grants3.
Given the financial importance of PROGRESA, Mexican authorities have intended to eval-
uate the program since its beginning, not only to measure results and impacts but also to
provide information that allow for a redesign of policies. Accordingly, in 1997 and 1998 a
high quality data set was collected in 506 communities where the program was to be im-
plemented, and several surveys were carried out afterwards. In October 1998, the program
was implemented in 320 randomly selected communities (treated communities) while in the
remaining 186 communities (control communities) the implementation was postponed until
December 19994. In Figure 2.1 below, I present the timing of the program.
2For a complete analysis of the targeting see Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999a) and Skoufias, Davis,
and Behrman (1999b).
3For more details on PROGRESA costs see Coady (2000).
4The quality of the randomization has been extensively documented in Behrman and Todd (1999), who
conclude that, at least at community level, the implementation of the random assignment was performed
successfully.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the PROGRESA program
The evaluation of the program was conducted by the Mexican Federal Government and
by external local and international evaluators such as the National Institute of Public
Health (INSP, Mexico), Research and Advanced Studies Center in Social Anthropology
(CIESAS, Mexico), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and Research and
Educational Documentation Center (CIDE, Spain). The evaluation efforts have resulted in
an extensive literature by authors like Orazio Attanasio, Jere R. Behrman, David Coady,
Costas Meghir, T. Paul Schultz, Emmanuel Skoufias, Petra Todd and Kenneth Wolpin,
among others.
This paper is closely related to Schultz (2004). In his paper Schultz presents an extensive
evaluation of the education component of PROGRESA. The author performs pre-program
comparisons to check the randomization of the design, and he calculates difference and
difference-in-difference estimators by gender and grade which allow him to quantify the
program’s causal effect. To validate difference estimations he shows results of maximum
likelihood estimation of a reduced form equation of the school enrollment decision. He
concludes that the program has effectively reached its goal since he finds positive and large
post-program differences in enrollment rates of comparably poor children in treatment and
control communities.
Other related relevant papers are Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) and Todd and
Wolpin (2006), who follow a structural approach to evaluate PROGRESA. They can thus
simulate the effects of counterfactual programs and they can identify alternative subsidy
schemes with a greater impact on schooling decisions.
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) estimate the structural parameters of a standard
model of education choices that considers schooling as an individual decision. Similarly to
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Schultz (2004), they find that PROGRESA has a positive effect on the school enrollment of
children, especially after the completion of primary school. They also show that a revenue
neutral change in the program that increased the grants for junior secondary school children
while eliminating the ones for primary school children, would have a substantially larger
effect on enrollment of secondary school children, while having only minor effects on the
enrollment of primary school children.
Todd and Wolpin (2006) estimate a dynamic behavioral model of parental decisions about
fertility and children schooling. Their paper differs from Attanasio, et al in two main
aspects. Todd and Wolpin (2006) model schooling as a family decision. They use data
from the control group prior to the experiment in the validation and estimation of the
model, i.e. they use only pre-program information in the estimation of the parameters of
interest. They then apply the model to analyze the effectiveness of alternative policies to
increase enrollment rates.
1.3 Enrollment vs. re-enrollment decision
1.3.1 Influential factors for the enrollment decision
From an economic point of view, the school enrollment decision is taken based on the
private price of schooling. The total price of schooling includes tuition fees, direct costs of
attending school, such as clothing, books, materials and transportation costs but also the
opportunity cost if attending school. Since in Mexican rural communities public schools are
mostly tuition-free, the main component of the price of schooling is the opportunity cost of
time. A student could devote her/his time spent at school to other activities, such as paid
work, farming, or any other productive activity at home. PROGRESA directly reduces the
price of schooling through grants and aid for school supplies. From this reduction in the
price of schooling, we would expect a positive effect of the program on enrollment rates.
The main component of the opportunity cost of schooling is the rural wage a child can
earn as farming or home production activities are difficult to measure in monetary terms.
Unfortunately only a small fraction of communities report such information. As a proxy
we consider the agricultural wage for adult male.
In communities with high salaries we expect that children are less likely to go to school,
because they face a higher opportunity cost. Additionally, medium and large cities have
more developed labor markets that usually offer higher wages. So we expect a child residing
near a metropolitan area or near the main city of her/his municipality to be more likely to
dropout of school and to work instead.
Transportation cost are an important direct cost of schooling for children attending ju-
nior secondary school. Only in 25% of all communities under study have a proper junior
secondary school. A reasonable proxy for this cost is the distance from the community
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where the child resides to the nearest one that has a secondary school. In all the communi-
ties studied there exist at least one primary school, so we can set transportation costs for
primary school children equal to zero.
Given that a child’s schooling is a family decision, it is necessary to analyze family charac-
teristics that may influence this decision. There is a general agreement that more educated
parents are more likely to send their children to school. If the father lives at home and
works we expect his children to be more likely to go to school, as the financial situation of
the family is more stable. Health and work status of the head of the household are also
relevant for a child’s schooling decision. If the head of the household was unemployed or ill
for some weeks before the children should have been enrolled at school it is likely that the
children are sent to work.
1.3.2 The re-enrollment decision
The focus of this paper is not the overall population but those children that are making
a re-enrollment choice, i.e. dropouts. Drop-outs are those who have made the decision of
not attending school at some point in time and were not enrolled in October 1997, before
the implementation of PROGRESA. These children were not receiving enough incentives
to go to school, to improve their educational level, and to contribute finally to human
capital accumulation and the development of their communities. Regarding the aim of
PROGRESA, dropouts are thus an important target of the program.
Is there any reason to think that PROGRESA education grants could have a different
impact on enrollment rates of dropouts than on those of non-dropouts? A hypothetical
answer to this question can be made based on observable differences between both groups.
In particular, we can look at information provided by the pre-program census (October
1997) and interpret it referring to the conclusions from the previous subsection. Some
numbers are given in Table 1.1 below.
As I expect values of some variables to be different for different levels of schooling and
gender, data is presented separately for primary and secondary school children and for girls
and boys. The primary school sample includes all children aged 6 to 18 who have completed
0-5 years of schooling and are thus qualified to enroll in primary school grades 1 to 6. In
the secondary school sample I considered all children aged 11 to 18 who have completed
at least 6 years of schooling and are thus qualified to enroll in junior or senior secondary
school.
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Table 1.1: Difference in averages and proportions of selected variables between Drop-outs
and Non-dropouts (pre-program census)
Variable name Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 4.2*** 3.7*** 8.0*** 3.7*
Mother’s schooling (years) -1.5*** -1.3*** -1.0*** -1.0***
Percentage of children with
father living at home -3.4** -5.8*** 0.9 -0.1
Number of siblings enrolled
at school -1.7*** -1.6*** -1.2*** -1.3***
Distance to secondary school (km) 0.92*** 0.64*** 1.11*** 0.74***
Distance to metropolitan area (km) -17.6*** -19.3*** -22.8*** -31.4***
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%. *** Statistical significance = 1%.
The statistical significance of the differences is tested using tests for equality of means and proportions.
Having a more educated mother increases the probability of enrollment for non-dropouts.
The positive effect of parents’ education on the education of their children is well known.
Additionally, the proportion of children of families with the father living at home is higher,
making them more likely to attend school (at least in primary school). Non-dropouts face
lower direct cost of schooling since they live closer to a secondary school.
On the other hand, dropouts reside closer to metropolitan areas and the main cities of
their municipalities. Drop-outs reside in communities with higher wages. These facts imply
a higher opportunity cost of schooling leading to a lower probability of re-enrollment for
dropouts. Moreover, a higher proportion of them belong to a poor family, making them
more likely to work and not to attend school.
Additional information is given in the surveys that were carried out after PROGRESA
started. In particular, these surveys ask why the child was not enrolled in school. For
dropouts the answers are: “There was not enough money” (47%), “She/he did not like
going to school” (26%), “The school was very far away” (9%), and “Her/his help was
needed at work or at home” (4%). Clearly the main reason for not attending school are
financial restrictions at home making the alternative of working even more attractive.
Summing up, there exists enough evidence to conclude that dropouts have more incentives
to work rather than to attend school compered to non-dropouts. Given the higher oppor-
tunity cost of schooling that dropouts face and since the grants are a monetary incentive5,
I expect the effect of the program on dropouts to be larger than on the average child.
5The monthly agricultural wage is around $ 500, but a child actually earns less than this amount. A
secondary school child’s grant is approximately $ 250. These numbers show how important PROGRESA
grants are as an additional source of family income.
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Thus, the proposed hypothesis based on observable characteristics is that the program
has a stronger effect on the schooling decision of dropouts. However, we do not know in
which direction any unobservable characteristic of the child, like ability or ambition, could
affect the schooling decision and if it could affect the schooling decision of dropouts and
non-dropouts in a different way.
1.4 Data base and descriptive statistics
Since in this paper I analyze the grants’ impact conditional on the schooling decision chil-
dren have made before the implementation of the program, only post-program information
can be used. From the education component of the PROGRESA post-program surveys (Oc-
tober 1998, May 1999 and November 1999) a matched panel sample for children aged 6 to
18 can be obtained. This panel includes 74,427 observations, 45,666 (61%) in the treatment
group (individuals residing in a community where PROGRESA grants were implemented
in September 1998) and 28,761 (39%) in the control group.
Before going into detail on the description of the data base, three comments should be
made. First, there exists a maximum amount of aid a household can receive by means of
the education component of the program. Those maximum amounts are updated every
six month (as it happens with grants). When the maximum is reached each child receives
only a percentage of the grant. Unfortunately, the exact amount each child receives is not
reported in the data base. For this reason what can be measured is only the effect on
school enrollment of the “potential grant”. Using this measure for the effect of the program
we may overestimate the “actual grant” effect. If the child’s family is not receiving the
maximum amount the potential grant coincides with the actual grant. In the PROGRESA
data base the average number of children in a family is 4. This makes it very likely for a
family to attain the maximum amount of aid.
The second comment is about the treatment group. Around 5% of those children fulfilling
the requirements to obtain the grant are not receiving it6. The reason for this is not
available in the data base. The grant amount for them is set to zero.
Finally, the variable reflecting the stock of education (years of schooling completed) presents
some inconsistencies along the waves of the surveys. 29% of the observations show some
of these inconsistences. For this reason I perform a hand-correction of the variable “stock
of education” using the information available in five waves, that cover information on four
academic years. For all observations to be corrected I have at least two consistent combina-
tions of enrollment-age-schooling, and I correct the remaining points making it compatible
with that sequence. In all cases I preserve the information related with enrollment to school
and the age. Given the exogenous variation generated by the random assignment of the
6The exact numbers are 5.62% for non-dropouts and 5.14% for dropouts.
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grant, there is no reason to think that the measurement error in the stock of education
will bias the estimation of the grant effects. Nevertheless, it may induce some bias in the
estimation of average treatment effects by level of education.
In terms of the data base, dropouts are those individuals aged 8 to 18 in the post-program
surveys who were not enrolled at school in the first census (October 1997). The re-
enrollment or dropouts panel includes 6,948 observations, 4,155 (60%) in the treatment
communities and 2,793 (40%) in the control communities.
Table 1.2 presents a set of descriptive statistics that characterize the population in the
dropout panel.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for Drop-outs (post-program surveys)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Sample size 1,310 1,490 2,431 1,717
Enrollment rate 0.526 0.528 0.258 0.259
Percentage of treatment communities 57.5 59.9 59.2 62.3
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 92.9 92.9 84.2 83.1
Percentage of children eligible
for receiving a grant 26.9 31.8 44.5 46.7
Grant (for grant different from zero) (pesos) 118.7 122.7 250.7 237.6
(31.4) (30.5) (22.9) (19.2)
Mother’s schooling (years) 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.0
(2.1) (2.0) (1.9) (2.1)
Percentage of children with
head of household ill 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.9
Percentage of children with
head of household employed 89.2 89.5 90.2 87.5
Percentage of children
with father not living at home 13.3 16.2 9.6 10.9
Number of girls from 5 to 16 2.0 1.0 1.9 1.0
(1.2) (1.0) (1.2) (1.0)
Number of boys from 5 to 16 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9
(1.0) (1.3) (1.0) (1.2)
Number of children under 5 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9)
Number of adult women 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.8
(0.9) (0.8) (1.0) (1.0)
Number of adult men 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.2
(1.0) (1.0) (1.4) (1.1)
Number of siblings enrolled at school 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.0
(1.5) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Distance to secondary school (km) 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6
(3.3) (3.0) (2.0) (1.9)
Percentage of children that have
a secondary school in their community 18.0 21.9 15.1 18.5
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km) 131.8 131.0 129.2 125.2
(64.8) (59.7) (73.2) (66.4)
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) 11.2 11.2 12.0 10.7
(7.2) (7.2) (9.4) (7.4)
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) 29.4 30.2 33.4 31.8
(11.4) (11.2) (11.9) (11.6)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis (continued in Appendix as Table 1-continued)
Table 1.6 of the Appendix reports similar statistics for non-dropouts.
In both tables variables are somewhat different for girls and boys, as expected. Also, we see
different variable values for children in primary and in secondary school. Hence, I want to
use an estimation strategy that will allow for differences in the program’s effects by gender
and by level of education.
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Comparing Table 1.2 and Table 1.6 we observe differences between dropouts and non-
dropouts. Below, in Table 1.3 there is a list of variables for which means and proportions
in both panels are statistically different.
Table 1.3: Difference in variable means and proportions between Drop-outs and Non-
dropouts (post-program surveys)
Variable name Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Enrollment rates -0.450*** -0.443*** -0.508*** -0.531***
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 3.5*** 3.1*** 3.7*** 1.2
Mother’s schooling (years) -1.6*** -1.4*** -0.8*** -0.9***
Percentage of children with
head of household employed -2.6*** -2.1*** 0.1 -1.9**
Percentage of children
with father living at home -3.5*** -6.1*** 0.7 -0.2
Number of siblings enrolled at school -0.7*** -0.6*** -0.6*** -0.6***
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) -1.2*** -0.4 1.7*** 0.7**
Distance to secondary school (km) 0.9*** 0.6*** 0.9*** 0.6***
Distance to metropolitan area (km) -16.9*** -19.4*** -23.1*** -28.8***
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) -0.6** -0.4** -0.2 -0.8***
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%. *** Statistical significance = 1%.
The statistical significance of the differences is tested using tests for equality of means or proportions.
An important fact pointed out by Tables 1.2 and 1.3, is the low enrollment rate of dropouts.
Only almost 60% of primary school children are actually attending class. Still worse is the
situation for secondary children. Only 25% of them go to school. Compared with non-
dropouts, enrollment rates after the implementation of the program are 45% lower for
primary school dropouts, and more than 50% lower for secondary school dropouts. Some
questions naturally arise from these figures. Why are these differences so large? Why is
a child that decided not attend school once unlikely to re-enroll? Can we infer from these
numbers that PROGRESA is not working all that well for dropouts contrary to what we
expected?
To answer the first two questions take a look at Table 1.3. Again, as in Section 1.3.2,
we conclude that, not considering grants, dropouts have more incentives to work than to
attend school. Moreover, a higher proportion of dropouts come from poor families and
with unemployed heads of households. Also, they have a higher direct cost of attending
secondary school reflected in higher distances to secondary schools. Another explanation
for the differences in enrollment rates could be that some unobserved characteristics as
ability or personal ambition affect a child’s schooling decision.
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The remaining question is if the PROGRESA program is convincing those children who
dropped out of school before the implementation of the program to go back to school and
finish their education. If the answer is yes this implies that without the program enrollment
rates would be much lower. On the other hand, if the program is not working for dropouts
pre and post program enrollment rates should be equal. In both situations it is necessary
to study alternatives schemes for the grant design that could send more dropouts back to
school.
The answer cannot be obtained by just looking at descriptive statistics but needs to make
use of the randomized assignment of the program. Comparison of results between treatment
and control communities allows us to estimate the causal relationship between enrollment
decision and PROGRESA grants.
1.5 Estimation of PROGRESA grants impact
1.5.1 Difference estimation
The random assignment of PROGRESA at community level has a crucial advantage. Ran-
domization balances all observed and unobserved variables other than enrollment decision
and treatment status across the two groups (treatment and control). Hence, this makes
it possible to quantify the effect of the program on enrollment rates by simply comparing
enrollment in treatment vs. enrollment in control communities, i.e., difference estimation
can simply measure the program’s effects.
To analyze if there exist differences in the effect of the program on non-dropout and dropouts
we can estimate separately difference estimators for both groups, and compare the results.
In the context of this paper difference estimators are defined in the following form:
Eˆn(Sit | grantit > 0, Pi = 1)− Eˆn(Sit | grantit = 0, Pi = 1), (1.1)
i = 1, ..., N t = 2, 3, 4
where Sit: dummy equal 1 if the child is enrolled in school at time t. Eˆn: post-program
period averages. grantit: the potential grant amount, that takes a value different from
zero only if the child belongs to a poor family, resides in a PROGRESA community, and
is attending a grade between 3rd year of primary school and 3rd year of junior secondary
school. grantit > 0 defines the treatment group while grantit = 0 defines the control
group7. Pi: is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the child belongs to a poor
family. t = 1, 2, 3, 4 identify the October 1997 census and the October 1998, May 1999 and
November 1999 surveys, respectively.
7For children who fulfill the requirement to obtain the grant but are not receiving it I set grantit = 0.
In the calculus of difference estimates they belong to the control group.
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Unfortunately, difference estimation applied to the original data set partitioned in our two
groups, dropouts and non-dropouts, may not be reliable. Randomization in the assignment
of the program assures that any kind of analysis of the complete panel that implies disag-
gregation based on observable characteristics, other than the dependent variable and the
treatment definition variable, is valid. Also, a sufficiently high number of observations is
needed for a law of large numbers to hold in both groups defined by the treatment status.
However, the variable that defines the groups under analysis is the dependent variable,
school enrollment, in October 1997. Moreover, the dropouts panel fails to contain enough
observations when we split the data between treatment and controls, by school level and
by gender8.
Only if randomization still holds when considering non-dropouts and dropouts observations
separately, difference estimation is valid. But this is not the case here. I carried out an
analysis of the randomization in both sub-panels following the methodology of Behrman
and Todd (1999). Comparing means and distributions of observable characteristics between
treatment and control observations I found some differences. Hence, the main conclusion is
that the assignment of the program is not completely random when considering the groups
as presented. Results for a set of relevant variables can be consulted in Table 1.9 and Table
1.10 of the Appendix. Therefore, difference estimation cannot provide accurate results.
Nevertheless, I present the difference estimates of PROGRESA grants effect on Table 1.4
below and I compare these estimates with those obtained using a regression framework in
Section 1.5.3.
1.5.2 Regression framework
Following the discussion presented in Section 1.3.2 and including variables that reflect the
impact of the PROGRESA program, a reduced form equation in latent variable form for
the probability of being enrolled in school at time t, S ∗it, is
9:
S∗it = ηi + α0t + α1Pi + α2Ti +
8∑
k=2
α3kgrantkit +
K∑
k=1
γkCkit +
J∑
j=1
βjXjit + eit (1.2)
i = 1, 2..., n t = 2, 3, 4 and eit ∼ F
What we observe, in fact is:
Si = 1[S∗i > 0], i = 1, 2..., n (1.3)
8Size for each group are reported in Table 1.8 of the Appendix.
9This reduced form equation is similar to the one proposed in Schultz (2004). The main differences are
the introduction of an additional term to allow for time-constant unobserved effects and the introduction of
a set of variables that allow for identification of differential effects of the program for dropouts.
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ηi is an unobserved factor, individual specific and time-constant. It may reflect ability,
personal ambition, etc. α0t is a time variant unobserved effect. Pi is a dummy variable
that takes on a value of 1 if the child belongs to a poor family. Ti is a dummy variable that
takes on value 1 if the child lives in a community where the program started in September
1998, i.e., in a treatment community. grantit as defined in Section 1.5.110. Ckit is equal
to 1 if the child has successfully completed k years of school, k = 1 or less, 2, ..., 8 and 9
or more, which qualifies the child for enrollment in (k + 1)th grade. Xjit are a set of J
individual, family, and community characteristics that includes the age of the child and the
square of the age, mother’s schooling, a dummy equal to one if the head of household was
ill, a dummy equal to one if the head of household was employed in the week before the
survey was conducted, a dummy set equal to 1 if the father lives at home, the number of
girls younger than 16 years in the family, and the number of boys younger than 16 years in
the family, the number of children younger than 5 years in the family, the number of adults
women and men in the family, number of siblings enrolled in school, daily mean agricultural
wage for men, distance to nearest junior secondary school, distance to nearest metropolitan
area, and distance to the main city of her/his municipality. F is a distribution function.
The expected values for the coefficients are the following. α1 should be negative reflecting
the common hypothesis that credit constraints limit the investment of the poor in their
children’s education. The effect of residing in a treatment community, or α2, should be close
to zero, since the assignment of the program is random, or slightly positive capturing some
“spillover effects” of the treated communities on the control communities. α3k captures the
program effects, so it is greater than zero if the program successfully reaches its goal.
For the β′s, we expect a negative effect of age, since for a given grade being older implies
higher costs of schooling (higher opportunity costs for being more likely to get a job and to
obtain a higher salary, psychological cost of disappointment if she/he failed, etc), a positive
effect if the mother is more educated, a negative effect if the head of the household was
ill and a positive effect if she/he had a job, a positive effect if the father lives at home,
also a positive effect if the proportion of siblings attending school is higher, a negative
effect from the opportunity cost of schooling (captured by wages), a negative effect from
the direct cost of attending a junior secondary school (i.e. the non-existence of a school in
the community), and finally a positive effect of the distance to the nearest metropolitan
area and of the distance to the main city of her/his municipality.
To answer the question “Did PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?” it is necessary
to model the probability of being enrolled for individual i at time t conditional on the
schooling decision she/he made before the program started:
10For children who fulfill the requirement to obtain the grant but are not receiving it I set grantit = 0
and Ti = 1.
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P(Sit | Si1), t = 2, 3, 4 (1.4)
and then compare these probabilities between ex-ante dropouts (Si1 = 0) and children who
were at school before the program started (Si1 = 1).
In order to capture the differences in the program’s effects on non-dropouts compared to
dropouts, the equation for the enrollment decision is modified as follows:
S∗it = ηi + α0t + α1Pi + α2Ti + α3Di + α4Pi ∗Di + α5Ti ∗Di+ (1.5)
8∑
k=2
α6kgrantkit +
8∑
k=2
α7kgrantkit ∗Di +
K∑
k=1
γkCkit +
J∑
j=1
βjXjit + eit,
i = 1, 2..., n and t = 2, 3, 4
where Di is a dummy variable, that takes a value of 1 if the child dropped out of school
before the program started. The impact of the program for non-dropouts is captured by the
variable “grant”, i.e., by the coefficient α6k. The impact for dropouts is given by α6k +α7k.
Hence, the difference in the program’s impacts on non-dropouts and dropouts, is equal to
α7k.
In order to estimate the parameters of equation 1.5 we have to take into account its two
main characteristics . First, it is a probability model, and second, there is an unobserved
fixed effect.
A fixed effects conditional logit model would allow us to consistently estimate the parame-
ters using a non-linear model and without any assumptions on how ηi is correlated with the
exogenous variables. This approach is desirable for at least three reasons. The estimated
probabilities are between 0 and 1, marginal effects are individual specific and it allows for
the most flexible specification of the unobserved heterogeneity. However, such a model
cannot be applied to the equation above since there is not enough variation in the data. A
fixed effects non-linear estimation strategy can only considers observations for which the
dependent variable has time variation. Applying this restriction to the PROGRESA panel
we are left with 9,036 observations. Of those observations only 1,632 refer to dropouts.
This is not enough data to identify the effect of interest.
Alternatively, we can use a fixed effects linear probability model (FELPM). It also has the
most flexible specification for the fixed effect, so consistency is not an issue. Nevertheless,
it has problems associated with the estimation of a probability using a linear model. One
concern is about the marginal effects that in this model are assumed to be constant among
individuals. In the context of schooling decision this assumption is not realistic. This
feature may be overcome by allowing for non-linearities in the effect of the grant in the
latent variable model, but only for time varying characteristics. Two important time-
invariant factors affecting the schooling decision are the stock of education of the children’s
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mother and the distance to the nearest school available, and by using a linear model the
estimated marginal effects will be assumed to be the same for all children, regardless their
mothers level of education and the transport cost they have to pay to attend school. We
still can introduce interactions between children’s characteristics relevant for the decision of
attending school like age, schooling, and family composition variables, and most importantly
by decomposing the effect of the grant by children’s family characteristics. While this
solution seems to be appealing for the estimation of the effect of the grant on non-dropout
children, to decompose the effect of the grant on dropouts will rise the problem that some
of these parameters will be identified by a small number of observations, so the accuracy
of the resulting estimates may not be reliable. Another concern with the linear model is
the number of observations for which the model estimates probabilities outside the interval
[0, 1]. Using parameters values estimated with a FELPM, the proportion of observations
for which the estimated probability lies outside the unit interval is 39%. This result makes
difficult to asses how convincing is the fit of the model, that is usually tested comparing
the distribution of actual and estimated probabilities.
Hence, I decided to estimate the effect of PROGRESA grants using the model proposed
by Chamberlain (1980) andMundlak (1978), known as Correlated Random Effects Probit
model (CREP). It is a non-linear probability model that impose some assumptions in the
specification of the unobserved factor. In this sense, it is more restrictive than a fixed effects
approach but also more flexible and its assumptions more likely to be fulfilled than a random
effects model. The CREP model explicitly allows the individual specific unobservable term
ηi to be correlated with time variant regressors assuming a conditional normal distribution
with linear expectation and constant variance. The specification assumed for ηi is:
ηi = ψ + ξx¯i + ai, (1.6)
where x¯i is a vector including the average of: i)daily mean agricultural wage for men, ii)head
of households’ health and work status and iiii)grant amount interacted with the dropout
dummy11
The complete set of assumptions for the identification of the parameters in the enrollment
decision equation are the following:
1. eit|ηi, Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit ∼ Φ ∀i,∀t,∀k, ∀j
where Φ stands for the standard normal distribution
2. Si1...SiT are independent conditional on ηi, Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit ∀i,∀t,∀k,∀j
11This correlation is only allowed between time variant variables and the fixed effect. A potential source
of bias in this model is the existence of correlation between the unobserved term and some time constant
variables. In the model presented so far the dummy Di may be correlated with ηi, since some unobserved
factor could have determined the decision of dropping out of school. I considered this fact in the model
including the grant amount multiplied by the dropout dummy in the vector x¯i.
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3. ηi|Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit ∼ N(ψ + x¯iξ, σ2a)
To compute the average values of estimated marginal effects across treated individuals with
the parameter’s estimates obtained with the CREP model I proceed as follows.
Let Zkit be the vector of explanatory variables:
Zkit ≡
(
1, x¯i, grantk, grantk ∗Di, X1it...XJit
)′
for each k = 2...8.
Let Z0kit be the same vector with the only difference that grantki = 0, for all individuals in
all time periods:
Z0kit ≡ (1, x¯i, 0, 0, X1it...XJit)′
Let pˆik be the vector of estimated parameters.
The average values of estimated marginal effects across treated individuals are calculated
using the following expression:
∑
i: granti>0
4∑
t=2
[Φ(pˆik ∗ Zkit)− Φ(pˆik ∗ Z0kit)], (1.7)
where Φ stands for the normal distribution function. I compute the average of the change
in enrollment probabilities due to the implementation of the grant for children in conditions
of receiving a grant (treated individuals). These averages are obtained for non-dropouts (i
with Di = 0) and dropouts (i with Di = 1) separately.
1.5.3 Results
Table 1.4 presents the estimates of the effect of PROGRESA grants on school attendance
for non-dropout and dropout children, by gender and education level, obtained with several
estimation strategies. Notice that the results are reported grouping individuals according
to the years of schooling completed as follows: from 2 to 5 years, corresponds to children
in condition of attending primary school; a child that completed 6 years of schooling has
graduated from primary school, and then is allowed to enter in secondary school; 7 and
more years of schooling completed corresponds to children in condition of attending junior
or secondary school. The last column of the table, column (11), shows the mean amount of
the grant received by beneficiaries in the second semester of 1998 when they received the
aid for the first time. These means are an approximation of the exact value used in the
estimations, since the amount of the grant varies with the grade the child is attending and
it was updated every semester to account for the increase in the level of general prices.
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1.5.3.1 CREP model estimates: Main results
Columns (8) and (9) in Table 1.4 show average treatment effects on the treated computed
using CREP model estimates of the parameters in the enrollment equation (equation 1.5). A
complete report of these parameter’s estimates can be found in Table 1.12 in the Appendix.
Consider non-dropout girls that have completed 6 years of schooling and are receiving the
grant. The average probability of enrollment for a girl in this group is 5.3% higher when
she is receiving the mean grant compared to when she is not receiving it. The probability
of being enrolled is 5.3% higher due to the grant. With this kind of interpretation in mind,
we can derive several conclusions.
In general the grant effect is positive. In four cases the effect is negative but insignificant
due to huge standard errors, so the effect of interest in those cases is not clearly identified (as
it happens with girls in primary school). The impact of the program is higher in secondary
school than in primary school. This is an expected result because grants in secondary school
are more than twice the amount of grants in primary school. Additionally, since enrollment
rates are lower in the secondary level of education the program has more scope to work at
this level.
The average effect of the grant for girls is higher than for boys in the non-dropout group.
This is due to the fact that girls in secondary school are receiving higher grants than boys.
Surprisingly, the same is not true in the group of dropouts. Drop-out boys react more
strongly to the grant, even though they receive less money than girls.
The effects are different when we compare dropouts with non-dropouts. Since the standard
errors of the estimated effects for dropouts in primary school are quite high, I do not made
conclusions on these groups and, in what follows, all comments refers to secondary school
children. For those children that have to enter in secondary school (6 years of schooling
completed) the results are conclusive enough. There is no effect of grants in the re-enrolment
decision of dropouts girls while for non-dropouts grants increase their enrolment probability
by more than 5%. Drop-out boys react more to the incentive given by grants than non-
dropouts. After receiving the grant the enrolment probability of both groups increase, but
for dropouts this increase is almost 10% higher than for non-dropouts.
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Table 1.4: Comparison of estimated marginal effects (percentage points)
Difference Estimation Regression Models with covariates All Models
Without unobserved With unobserved heterogeneity
Years of heterogeneity Fixed effects Linear Correlated random Mean
schooling Probit Probability Model effects Probit Model Grant
completed Marginal Standard Sample Marginal Standard Marginal Standard Marginal Standard Sample in July 98’
Effect Error Size Effect Error Effect Error Effect Error Size (mexican $)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
f
r
o
m
2
t
o
5
F
e
m
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.022∗∗∗ (0.003) 14,435 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.001 (0.010) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 8,118
108.8
Dropout 0.022 (0.036) 724 -0.114∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.271∗∗ (0.115) -0.052 (0.115) 352
Difference 0.000 (0.015) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.272∗∗ (0.115) 0.061 (0.115)
M
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.020∗∗∗ (0.003) 15,725 0.002 (0.002) 0.015 (0.010) 0.002 (0.002) 8,893
108.8
Dropout 0.152∗∗∗ (0.032) 867 -0.021 (0.027) 0.046 (0.095) 0.107 (0.081) 474
Difference -0.132∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.023 (0.027) -0.030 (0.096) -0.106 (0.081)
F
e
m
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.122∗∗∗ (0.016) 3,567 0.055∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.024 (0.020) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.014) 1,889
209.2
Dropout 0.126∗∗∗ (0.020) 1,770 0.039 (0.025) -0.286∗∗ (0.140) 0.010 (0.112) 956
Difference -0.004 (0.026) 0.015 (0.028) 0.310∗∗ (0.141) 0.043 (0.112)
6
M
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.077∗∗∗ (0.015) 3,760 0.019 (0.012) 0.015 (0.020) 0.019 (0.011) 2,050
199.2
Dropout 0.046∗ (0.024) 1,164 -0.039 (0.029) 0.055 (0.108) 0.114∗∗ (0.058) 688
Difference 0.031 (0.030) 0.058∗ (0.031) -0.040 (0.109) -0.095 (0.059)
7
o
r
m
o
r
e
F
e
m
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.024∗∗ (0.008) 2,701 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.011 (0.023) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.006) 1,455
244.2
Dropout 0.214∗∗∗ (0.074) 188 -0.023 (0.048) -0.331∗∗ (0.145) -0.196∗∗∗ (0.068) 127
Difference -0.190∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.038 (0.047) 0.343∗∗ (0.144) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.067)
M
a
l
e
Non-dropout 0.014 (0.009) 3,347 -0.002 (0.007) 0.010 (0.024) -0.001 (0.007) 1,868
214.2
Dropout -0.017 (0.077) 166 0.011 (0.043) 0.026 (0.105) -0.022 (0.115) 113
Difference 0.031 (0.043) -0.013 (0.043) -0.016 (0.106) 0.021 (0.115)
Standard errors for difference estimates obtained by performing test of difference of proportions. Standard errors for regression models computed by bootstrap
with 1000 replications. Cluster set at family level. Significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ : 10%.
The set of covariates used in the regression models include child’s information (age and education level), family characteristics (head of houselhold’s health and
working status, mother’s education level, family composition and proportion of children attending school), and village characteristics (mean wage salary, distance
to the main city at municipality level and to the nearest metropolitan area, and distance to the nearest village with a secondary school available). A detailed
report of covariates can be seen in Table 1.11 in the Appendix.
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Even though the equality of average marginal effects between dropouts and non-dropouts
cannot be rejected at standard levels of significance the distribution of marginal effects be-
tween both groups show notable differences. Moreover, p-values from kolmogorov-smirnov
tests of equality of distributions of marginal effects between dropouts and non-dropouts are
always bellow 0.001, so the null hypothesis of equality is in all cases rejected even at 1% of
significance. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 below depict marginal effects distributions stressing this
conclusion.
Figure 1.2: Marginal effects distribution: female primary school completed (grade 6 com-
pleted)
Drop-Outs
Non-Drop-Outs
- - - (dashed line) Average marginal effect for non-dropouts
—– (continuous line) Average marginal effect for dropouts
For girls that are about to enter in secondary school, the average impact is 5% for non-
dropouts while the corresponding figure for dropouts is only 1% and statistically zero. Main
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characteristics of the distributions are a smaller range for dropouts, from 0.0 to 0.025, and
for non-dropouts a high dispersion with almost all frequencies below 5%. Thus, for girls
who have to decide whether to enter in secondary school grants are more convincing for
those who were at school before the implementation of the program. PROGRESA education
grants are not a strong enough incentive to persuade dropout girls to start secondary school.
Notice that for this group the conclusion does not support the initial hypothesis that was
made simply considering observable characteristics.
Turning to boys that have completed 6th grade, there is an important and statistically
significant difference in average marginal effects, more than 9% higher for dropouts (2%
for non-dropouts, 11% for dropouts). For non-dropouts the distribution has a small range,
from 0 to 0.05 with the highest frequency, more than 30%, between 0 and 0.002. The
distribution for dropouts, on the other hand, is highly dispersed between 0 and 0.37 with
frequencies in general below 5%. 25, 50 and 75 percentiles are all higher for dropouts. The
message is clear. The program has a stronger effect on boys about to start secondary school
who dropped-out in 1997 or before than on those who stayed on school.
Summing up, the estimated results presented above allow us to conclude that there ex-
ists a differential effect of the grant between children that dropped out of school before
the program started and those who did not. The direction of differential effects in sec-
ondary school is not uniform for girls and boys. Drop-outs boys react more strongly to the
program’s incentives than non-dropouts. Non-dropouts girls have stronger grants’ effects
than dropouts. Therefore, I found the expected result of a higher effect of the grants on
dropouts in secondary school only for boys. In general the program is effective for children
that dropped out of school before they started receiving any grants. But when they have
to decide to enter secondary school PROGRESA grants provide a better incentive for boys
than for girls.
1.5.3.2 Estimates with alternative models
First, I report results of difference estimation. Columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 1.4
show the average increase in school attendance due by PROGRESA grants, its estimated
standard error and the number of observations used to compute the averages, respectively.
The main difference with the results of the CREP model appears for children that have
finished 6 years of education. The difference estimates show no differential effect of the
grant between non-dropout and dropout girls, and a higher effect of the grant for non-
dropout boys than for dropout boys. As I discuss in Section 1.5.1 it is highly likely that
these results are biased estimates of the true effect, since they do not control for differences
in observable and unobservable characteristics between treated and control individuals.
Second, in columns (4) and (5) I present results of a probit model that controls for ob-
served differences between treated and non-treated individuals, but still assumes that there
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Figure 1.3: Marginal effects distribution: male primary school completed (grade 6 completed)
Drop-Outs
Non-Drop-Outs
- - - (dashed line) Average marginal effect for non-dropouts
—– (continuous line) Average marginal effect for dropouts
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are no differences in time invariant unobservables. With this model we would conclude
that PROGRESA grants do not affect the probability of attending secondary school for
dropout boys. However, it is difficult to accept estimates of the parameters in an equation
reflecting school attendance without controlling for the existence of differences in ability.
At a minimum, it is necessary to test if the estimated parameters do not change with the
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity in the model.
Third, columns (6) and (7) report the average treatment effects on the treated and their
corresponding standard errors estimated using a FELPM. The results are qualitatively
consistent with those obtained with the CREP model. This provide evidence that the
assumptions related with the unobserved heterogeneity in the CREP model are fulfilled, so
the consistency of the estimates is validated. A report of the parameter estimates obtained
with this model can be seen in Table in the Appendix.
1.5.3.3 Exploring the reasons behind the differential effect of PROGRESA
grants
Ideally, one would want to estimate the effect of the grant for non-dropout and dropout
children interacted with several observed characteristics to disentangle the reasons for the
lack of effectiveness of PROGRESA grants in sending dropout girls back to secondary
school. Unfortunately, the limited number of dropout observations in the sample forbids us
to perform such exercise.
Still, I can exploit the nonlinear feature of the estimated marginal effects by computing the
grant effect at specific values of observable characteristics. These results are reported in
Table 1.13.
I will concentrate the analysis on the differential effect of the grant between non-dropouts
and dropout children in condition of starting secondary school. Non-dropout children that
have a numerous family (high number of siblings regardless of their gender and age) are
more responsive the the grant, while this family characteristic reduces the effect of the grant
for dropout children. In the case of girls, this finding may be rationalized in terms of their
outside option. Only 12% of dropout girls who do not attend school report to be working.
It is natural to thing that they may be staying at home helping in housework. Having a
more numerous family makes them more necessary at home so they are less likely to go
back to school.
The characteristics analyzed so far does not seem to help in explaining the differential effect
of the grant between dropout girls and dropout boys.
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Table 1.5: Average treatment effects evaluated at specific values of observable character-
istics: children with 6 years of schooling completed
Father living at home Mother’s schooling Distance to secondary school
(yes minus no) (6 minus 2 years) (3 km. minus 0 km.)
Effect S.E. Effect S.E. Effect S.E.
F
em
a
le Non-dropout -0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.003∗∗ (0.001) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dropout 0.002 (0.021) -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.006)
M
a
le Non-dropout -0.005
∗ (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
Dropout 0.040∗ (0.022) -0.013 (0.009) -0.010∗ (0.006)
Number of girls Number of boys Number of children Number of children
aged 6 or more aged 6 or more aged 5 or less attending school
(4 minus 0) (4 minus 0) (4 minus 0) (5 minus 2)
Effect S.E. Effect S.E. Effect S.E. Effect S.E.
F
em
a
le Non-dropout 0.032∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.017∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.044∗∗∗ (0.011)
Dropout -0.007 (0.065) -0.008 (0.079) -0.001 (0.010) 0.000 (0.051)
M
a
le Non-dropout 0.007
∗ (0.004) 0.014∗ (0.009) 0.002 (0.001) -0.018∗ (0.011)
Dropout -0.140∗ (0.077) -0.117 (0.076) -0.016 (0.010) 0.055 (0.066)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 1000 replications. Cluster set at family level.
Significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ : 10%.
1.6 Conclusions
I found evidence of the existence of a differential effect of PROGRESA grants on the school
attendance decision of the overall target population and on the reentry decision of children
who dropped out from school. These difference are observed in all groups analyzed. But the
direction of the difference varies across groups. The expected result of a higher program
effect on dropouts was found for boys in conditions of attending primary or secondary
school. For girls in secondary school who dropped out in 1997 or before, the grant is not
as good incentive to enroll in school as it is for non-dropout girls. Among dropouts in
secondary school the impact of the education grants is lower for girls even though they
receive more money than boys. The different responses of girls and boys to the grant in
secondary school should be studied in more detail.
The last finding motivates the design of a particular model of schooling decision for girls.
Individual variables such as marital state, pregnancy and number of children should be
considered. Moreover, it can be argued that girls face a third option other than schooling
or working. They may stay at home and take care of the children in the family. A model of
schooling decisions should reflect this third option for girls. Additionally, there exist some
perception that in the poorest rural communities girls are discriminated, so a monetary
incentive like the PROGRESA grants may not be effective.
At a methodological level, the estimation of PROGRESA effects and the differential impact
over dropouts can be improved by constructing a structural model of schooling. With the
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design of such a model, we might obtained a more conclusive answer to the question “Did
PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?”. Moreover, the estimation of a structural
model will allow for the identification of a more effective and efficient policy that can send
dropouts back to school.
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1.7 Appendix
Table 1.2(continued)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Years of schooling completed
0 0.000 0.003
1 0.170 0.150
2 0.114 0.117
3 0.439 0.401
4 0.113 0.154
5 0.164 0.176
6 0.863 0.816
7 0.071 0.072
8 0.019 0.039
9 or more 0.047 0.073
Age of child
8 0.070 0.070
9 0.115 0.090
10 0.091 0.086
11 0.092 0.089 0.001 0.000
12 0.106 0.097 0.015 0.015
13 0.125 0.097 0.096 0.087
14 0.127 0.133 0.253 0.209
15 0.134 0.149 0.310 0.306
16 0.111 0.144 0.247 0.288
17 0.029 0.045 0.075 0.093
18 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
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Table 1.6: Descriptive statistics for Non-Drop-outs (post-program surveys)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Sample size 25,564 23,521 8,659 9,735
Enrollment rate 0.976 0.971 0.767 0.790
Percentage of treatment communities 60.79 62.20 60.85 62.10
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 89.44 89.85 80.51 81.87
Percentage of children eligible
for receiving a grant 31.8 30.8 38.6 40.2
Grant (for grant different from zero) (pesos) 118.2 118.2 265.2 245.8
(29.7) (29.8) (28.1) (20.4)
Mother’s schooling (years) 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9
(2.6) (2.6) (2.5) (2.5)
Percentage of children with
head of household ill 5.96 6.26 7.10 7.14
Percentage of children with
head of household employed 91.80 91.60 90.03 89.51
Percentage of children
with father not living at home 9.83 10.11 10.50 11.07
Number of girls from 5 to 16 2.0 1.0 1.9 0.9
(1.2) (1.0) (1.1) (1.0)
Number of boys from 5 to 16 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9
(1.0) (1.1) ( 1.0) (1.1)
Number of children under 5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) ( 0.8) (0.8)
Number of adult women 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.6
(0.8) (0.9) (1.0) (0.9)
Number of adult men 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8
(0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0)
Number of siblings enrolled at school 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.7
(1.3) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Distance to secondary school (km) 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.0
(2.1) (2.1) (1.8) (1.8)
Percentage of children that have
a secondary school in their community 23.2 26.5 32.6 28.3
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km) 148.7 150.4 152.3 154.1
(76.8) (77.0) (77.4) (77.5)
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.5
(8.1) (7.9) (8.2) (8.0)
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) 30.6 30.5 31.8 31.2
(10.6) (10.5) (10.8) (10.4)
Years of schooling completed
0 0.000 0.000
1 0.200 0.207
2 0.181 0.184
3 0.279 0.271
4 0.177 0.172
5 0.164 0.166
6 0.489 0.455
7 0.231 0.245
8 0.175 0.190
9 or more 0.105 0.110
Age of child
6 0.073 0.069
7 0.146 0.136
8 0.155 0.151
9 0.155 0.152
10 0.151 0.148
11 0.151 0.142 0.023 0.021
12 0.092 0.098 0.181 0.139
13 0.042 0.056 0.255 0.224
14 0.022 0.028 0.232 0.247
15 0.008 0.013 0.182 0.210
16 0.003 0.005 0.103 0.127
17 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.030
18 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
Standard deviations are in parenthesis
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Table 1.7: Comparison with Schultz (2004) confidence intervals for post-program difference
estimation
Years of This paper Schultz (2004)a
schooling 95% Conf. Interval 95% Conf. Interval
completed
2
Female 0.0144 0.0352 -0.0111 0.0471
Male 0.0054 0.0217 0.0209 0.0210
3
Female -0.0026 0.0155 -0.0122 0.0382
Male 0.0061 0.0274 0.0489 0.0490
4
Female 0.0035 0.0267 0.0279 0.0481
Male 0.0108 0.0332 0.0439 0.0440
5
Female 0.0287 0.0582 0.0457 0.0643
Male 0.0101 0.0407 0.0409 0.0410
6
Female 0.0910 0.1521 0.1479 0.1480
Male 0.0481 0.1054 0.0531 0.0769
aThe results are taken from Table 3 in Schultz (2004).
Table 1.8: Groups size
Years of schooling
completed in Non-dropouts Drop-outs
previous year Female Male Female Male
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
From 2 to 5 8,118 6,317 8,893 6,832 352 372 474 393
6 1,889 1,678 2,050 1,710 956 814 688 476
7 or more 1,455 1,246 1,868 1,479 127 61 113 53
29
Chapter 1 Did PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?
Table 1.9: p-values for test of randomization - Drop-out Observations
p-value based
Variable p-value on community
(2,025 obs) mean (440 obs)
Community population distribution – 0.101 (3)
Distribution of communities over states – 0.897 (3)
Age distribution of children under 16 0.892 (3) 0.925 (4)
Child’s stock of education 0.107 (3) 0.340 (4)
Number of girls between 5 and 16 in the family 0.440 (3) 0.756 (4)
Number of boys between 5 and 16 in the family 0.426 (3) 0.336 (4)
Number of children under 5 in the family 0.099 (3) 0.856 (4)
Number of adult women in the family 0.002 (3) 0.456 (4)
Number of adult men in the family 0.180 (3) 0.720 (4)
Mother’s schooling 0.000 (3) 0.955 (4)
Percentage of children with 0.008 (2) 0.120 (4)
father not living at home
Percentage of children with 0.019 (2) 0.321 (4)
head of household employed
Number of siblings enrolled 0.765 (1) 0.474 (4)
at school
Community daily agricultural wage 0.000 (1) 0.914 (4)
Distance to metropolitan area 0.000 (1) 0.964 (4)
Distance to the main city 0.001 (1) 0.742 (4)
of her/his municipality
Distance to secondary school 0.001 (1) 0.799 (4)
(1)Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for test of equality between two distribution functions. Ho: the distribution of the
variable analyzed is equal in both groups
(2)T-test for equality of proportions. Ho: the variable analyzed has the same proportion of ones in both groups.
(3)Pearson’s chi-squared statistic for the hypothesis that the frequencies in a two-way tabular are independent. Ho:
the frequencies of the variable analyzed are independent.
(4)T-test for equality of means. Ho: the variable analyzed has the same mean in both groups.
Conclusion: At individual level several variables are different when comparing treatment and controls. At community
level there exist statistical differences in a couple of variables. Hence, the random assignment of the program is lost
when considering the group of dropouts separately.
30
Chapter 1 Did PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?
Table 1.10: p-values for test of randomization - Non-dropout Observations
p-value based
Variable p-value on community
(19,649 obs) mean (492 obs)
Community population distribution – 0.119 (3)
Distribution of communities over states – 0.781 (3)
Age distribution of children under 16 0.230 (3) 0.925 (4)
Child’s stock of education 0.009 (3) 0.369 (4)
Number of girls between 5 and 16 in the family 0.001 (3) 0.789 (4)
Number of boys between 5 and 16 in the family 0.000 (3) 0.415 (4)
Number of children under 5 in the family 0.000 (3) 0.295 (4)
Number of adult women in the family 0.000 (3) 0.701 (4)
Number of adult men in the family 0.007 (3) 0.525 (4)
Mother’s schooling 0.002 (3) 0.930 (4)
Percentage of children with 0.266 (2) 0.794 (4)
father not living at home
Percentage of children with 0.016 (2) 0.324 (4)
head of household employed
Number of siblings enrolled 0.000 (1) 0.957 (4)
at school
Community daily agricultural wage 0.000 (1) 0.997 (4)
Distance to metropolitan area 0.000 (1) 0.989 (4)
Distance to the main city 0.000 (1) 0.414 (4)
of her/his municipality
Distance to secondary school 0.000 (1) 0.615 (4)
(1), (2), (3) and (4) idem Table 1.9.
Conclusion: There exist even more relevant differences at the individual level than those presented in Table 1.9.
The evidence of lack of randomization is stronger when considering the group of non-dropouts separately.
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Table 1.11: Description of variables in Tables 1.12 and 1.13
Variable name Description
P One if the child belongs to a poor family
T One if the child resides in a community where PROGRESA grants were implemented in October 1998
D One if the child was not enrolled in school in the October 1997 census
DP Interaction between D (dropout) and P (poor family)
DT Interaction between D (dropout) and T (treatment community)
grant Grant amount (pesos)
grantd Grant amount interacted with D (dropout child) (pesos)
wrepeon Community daily agricultural wage for men (pesos)
health One if the head of household was ill in the four weeks previous to the survey
work One if the head of household has a job in the week previous to the survey
fhogar One if the child’s father is living at home with his family
distsec Distance from the community where the child resides to the nearest community with a secondary
school (km)
distmetro Distance from the community where the child resides to the nearest metropolitan area. For
communities in Hidalgo(state), these are Queretaro, Puebla, Tampico, or Mexico City;
in Michoacan(state) it is Morelia; in Puebla it is Puebla; in Queretaro it is Queretaro; in
San Luis de Potosi it is San Luis de Potosi; in Veracruz it is Veracruz and in Guerrero it
is Acapulco (km)
distcab Distance from the community where the child resides to the main city of her/his municipality (km)
schoolm Years of schooling completed by the child’s mother
girl Number of girls from 5 to 16 years old in the child’s family
boy Number of boys from 5 to 16 years old in the child’s family
baby Number of children aged less than 5 years old in the child’s family
women Number of adult women (aged more than 16) in the child’s family
men Number of adult men (aged more than 16) in the child’s family
w3 One for observations in the first post-program survey collected in October 1998
w4 One for observations in the second post-program survey collected in May 1999
age Age of the child
age2 Square of the age of the child
ck One if the child has completed k years of education (k = 1 or less, 2,..., 9 or more)
ageck Age interacted with the stock of education of the child
asistest Number of child’s siblings enrolled in school
distsecd Distance to secondary school interacted with dropout dummy D
distcabd Distance to main city at municipality level interacted with dropout dummy D
workd Variable work (head of household working status) interacted with dropout dummy D
schoolmd Mother’s stock of education interacted with dropout dummy D
workm Time average for variable work (3 post-program observations)
healthm Time average for variable health (3 post-program observations)
wrepeonm Time average for variable wrepeon (3 post-program observations)
grantdm Time average for variable grantd (3 post-program observations)
Xfp Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for girls in primary school
Xfs Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for girls in secondary school
Xmp Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for boys in primary school
Xms Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for boys in secondary school
X stands for the complete set of variables described above
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Table 1.12: Probit estimates of enrollment probabilitiesa
Number of obs = 74,427
Wald χ2(166) = 7,636.54
Log-pseudolikelihood = -9565.1793 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.6688
Percentage correctly predicted = 95.34%
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pfp -0.06012 0.12335 -0.49 0.626 -0.30188 0.18164
Tfp 0.036389 0.096795 0.38 0.707 -0.15333 0.226104
Dfp -1.78776 0.439293 -4.07 0.000 -2.64876 -0.92676
DPfp 0.539533 0.345394 1.56 0.118 -0.13743 1.216493
DTfp 0.233085 0.198013 1.18 0.239 -0.15501 0.621183
grantfp 0.002198 0.000881 2.5 0.013 0.000471 0.003925
grantdfp -0.00452 0.003856 -1.17 0.242 -0.01207 0.003042
agefp 0.329558 0.160167 2.06 0.04 0.015638 0.643479
age2fp -0.02601 0.007755 -3.35 0.001 -0.04121 -0.01081
c2fp 2.228879 0.497638 4.48 0.000 1.253527 3.204232
c3fp 1.676924 0.655976 2.56 0.011 0.391236 2.962613
c4fp 1.73503 0.744903 2.33 0.02 0.275047 3.195013
c5fp 1.829776 0.769984 2.38 0.017 0.320634 3.338917
agec2fp -0.22695 0.049548 -4.58 0.000 -0.32407 -0.12984
agec3fp -0.16305 0.057249 -2.85 0.004 -0.27525 -0.05084
agec4fp -0.14192 0.063374 -2.24 0.025 -0.26613 -0.01771
agec5fp -0.14879 0.06407 -2.32 0.02 -0.27436 -0.02322
wrepeonfp -0.00322 0.003184 -1.01 0.312 -0.00946 0.003019
distsecfp 0.028863 0.016966 1.7 0.089 -0.00439 0.062116
distcabfp 0.001253 0.00405 0.31 0.757 -0.00668 0.00919
distmetrofp 0.001298 0.000486 2.67 0.008 0.000346 0.00225
schoolmfp -0.00521 0.014298 -0.36 0.715 -0.03324 0.02281
healthfp -0.21307 0.083881 -2.54 0.011 -0.37747 -0.04867
workfp -0.09014 0.113698 -0.79 0.428 -0.31298 0.132706
fhogarfp 0.40628 0.137486 2.96 0.003 0.136812 0.675747
girlfp -0.44548 0.048201 -9.24 0.000 -0.53995 -0.35101
boyfp -0.53084 0.04877 -10.88 0.000 -0.62642 -0.43525
babyfp -0.00321 0.034287 -0.09 0.925 -0.07041 0.063991
womenfp 0.005986 0.047786 0.13 0.9 -0.08767 0.099645
menfp 0.024404 0.038311 0.64 0.524 -0.05068 0.099491
asistestfp 1.505614 0.059769 25.19 0.000 1.38847 1.622758
distsecdfp -0.05231 0.03061 -1.71 0.087 -0.1123 0.007689
distcabdfp 0.019577 0.009987 1.96 0.05 2.31E-06 0.039151
workdfp 0.535823 0.254472 2.11 0.035 0.037067 1.034579
grantdmfp -0.00262 0.004232 -0.62 0.536 -0.01091 0.005676
wrepeonmfp 0.006664 0.004662 1.43 0.153 -0.00247 0.015802
workmfp 0.28682 0.195492 1.47 0.142 -0.09634 0.669977
healthmfp 0.521563 0.215596 2.42 0.016 0.099003 0.944122
workdmfp -0.35971 0.353035 -1.02 0.308 -1.05165 0.332224
asistemstfp -0.66512 0.053696 -12.39 0.000 -0.77037 -0.55988
w3fp 0.093972 0.049281 1.91 0.057 -0.00262 0.19056
w4fp -0.05902 0.044302 -1.33 0.183 -0.14585 0.027812
cons 0.17941 0.851053 0.21 0.833 -1.48862 1.847444
(continued on next page)
a Variable’s definition are explained in Table 1.11.
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Table 1.12(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pfs -0.33882 0.095044 -3.56 0.000 -0.5251 -0.15254
Tfs 0.120591 0.088996 1.36 0.175 -0.05384 0.29502
Dfs 8.186298 5.750446 1.42 0.155 -3.08437 19.45696
DPfs 0.075007 0.202451 0.37 0.711 -0.32179 0.471803
DTfs -0.0103 0.197861 -0.05 0.958 -0.3981 0.377501
grantc6fs 0.001144 0.000435 2.63 0.009 0.000292 0.001997
grantdc6fs -0.0009 0.002183 -0.41 0.679 -0.00518 0.003375
grantc7fs 0.001022 0.000473 2.16 0.031 9.41E-05 0.00195
grantdc7fs -0.00545 0.001853 -2.94 0.003 -0.00908 -0.00182
agefs -0.71461 0.461384 -1.55 0.121 -1.61891 0.189682
age2fs 0.016453 0.014813 1.11 0.267 -0.01258 0.045486
c6fs 1.629472 1.315147 1.24 0.215 -0.94817 4.207113
c7fs 5.006646 1.351812 3.7 0.000 2.357142 7.656149
agec6fs -0.11693 0.086412 -1.35 0.176 -0.28629 0.052434
agec7fs -0.24183 0.088076 -2.75 0.006 -0.41445 -0.0692
wrepeonfs 0.004344 0.00267 1.63 0.104 -0.00089 0.009577
distsecfs -0.05119 0.013887 -3.69 0.000 -0.07841 -0.02397
distmetrofs 0.002178 0.000368 5.91 0.000 0.001456 0.0029
distcabfs 0.000799 0.003078 0.26 0.795 -0.00523 0.006831
schoolmfs 0.032229 0.013253 2.43 0.015 0.006254 0.058204
healthfs -0.15281 0.065867 -2.32 0.02 -0.28191 -0.02372
workfs 0.008876 0.079652 0.11 0.911 -0.14724 0.164991
fhogarfs 0.512864 0.123557 4.15 0.000 0.270697 0.755031
girlfs -0.64605 0.05665 -11.4 0.000 -0.75708 -0.53501
boyfs -0.69022 0.057308 -12.04 0.000 -0.80254 -0.5779
babyfs -0.06231 0.028582 -2.18 0.029 -0.11833 -0.0063
womenfs -0.00992 0.027727 -0.36 0.72 -0.06427 0.04442
menfs -0.0307 0.024896 -1.23 0.217 -0.0795 0.018092
asistestfs 1.651837 0.065212 25.33 0.000 1.524023 1.779651
agedfs -1.2938 0.793451 -1.63 0.103 -2.84893 0.261335
age2dfs 0.046772 0.027289 1.71 0.087 -0.00671 0.100257
schoolmdfs -0.07881 0.031583 -2.5 0.013 -0.14071 -0.01691
grantdc6mfs 0.000432 0.002275 0.19 0.849 -0.00403 0.004891
grantdc7mfs 0.008237 0.002846 2.89 0.004 0.002658 0.013815
wrepeonmfs -0.00456 0.003939 -1.16 0.247 -0.01228 0.00316
workmfs 0.286502 0.175365 1.63 0.102 -0.05721 0.630211
healthmfs 0.244266 0.215016 1.14 0.256 -0.17716 0.66569
asistemstfs -0.67138 0.047703 -14.07 0.000 -0.76488 -0.57789
w3fs 0.378933 0.049531 7.65 0.000 0.281854 0.476012
w4fs 0.35171 0.042589 8.26 0.000 0.268237 0.435182
fs 5.345003 3.769465 1.42 0.156 -2.04301 12.73302
(continued on next page)
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Table 1.12(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pmp 0.0019842 0.1115879 0.02 0.986 -0.216724 0.2206924
Tmp 0.1787204 0.0759595 2.35 0.019 0.029843 0.3275982
Dmp 3.9781890 2.4427500 1.63 0.103 -0.809512 8.7658900
DPmp -0.2495031 0.2543473 -0.98 0.327 -0.748015 0.2490085
DTmp 0.2368955 0.1807437 1.31 0.190 -0.117356 0.5911466
grantmp 0.0003683 0.0007122 0.52 0.605 -0.001028 0.0017642
grantdmp 0.0045421 0.0035240 1.29 0.197 -0.002365 0.0114490
agemp 0.4517245 0.1438856 3.14 0.002 0.169714 0.7337351
age2mp -0.0293674 0.0068852 -4.27 0.000 -0.042862 -0.0158727
c2mp 2.0547600 0.4078813 5.04 0.000 1.255328 2.8541930
c3mp 2.7626040 0.5830192 4.74 0.000 1.619907 3.9053000
c4mp 2.6819920 0.6220860 4.31 0.000 1.462726 3.9012580
c5mp 2.1837420 0.7014966 3.11 0.002 0.808834 3.5586500
agec2mp -0.1899496 0.0392167 -4.84 0.000 -0.266813 -0.1130863
agec3mp -0.2544400 0.0485934 -5.24 0.000 -0.349681 -0.1591988
agec4mp -0.2101065 0.0499493 -4.21 0.000 -0.308005 -0.1122077
agec5mp -0.1773750 0.0550845 -3.22 0.001 -0.285339 -0.0694115
wrepeonmp -0.0038323 0.0033377 -1.15 0.251 -0.010374 0.0027095
distsecmp -0.0003181 0.0134879 -0.02 0.981 -0.026754 0.0261176
distmetromp 0.0025447 0.0004920 5.17 0.000 0.001580 0.0035091
distcabmp 0.0006364 0.0038155 0.17 0.868 -0.006842 0.0081146
schoolmmp 0.0178968 0.0132084 1.35 0.175 -0.007991 0.0437848
healthmp 0.0215211 0.1050984 0.20 0.838 -0.184468 0.2275102
workmp 0.0301827 0.0868495 0.35 0.728 -0.140039 0.2004046
fhogarmp 0.4758867 0.1065015 4.47 0.000 0.267148 0.6846258
girlmp -0.5780486 0.0397477 -14.54 0.000 -0.655953 -0.5001446
boymp -0.4682509 0.0404441 -11.58 0.000 -0.547520 -0.3889820
babymp 0.0172073 0.0294409 0.58 0.559 -0.040496 0.0749103
womenmp 0.0573411 0.0347276 1.65 0.099 -0.010724 0.1254059
menmp 0.0066312 0.0296029 0.22 0.823 -0.051390 0.0646518
asistestmp 1.6161750 0.0665607 24.28 0.000 1.485718 1.7466310
agedmp -0.7478791 0.3750563 -1.99 0.046 -1.482976 -0.0127824
age2dmp 0.0271769 0.0145600 1.87 0.062 -0.001360 0.0557140
wrepeondmp 0.0129225 0.0072253 1.79 0.074 -0.001239 0.0270837
schoolmdmp -0.1354224 0.0340484 -3.98 0.000 -0.202156 -0.0686886
grantdmmp -0.0056409 0.0036899 -1.53 0.126 -0.012873 0.0015912
wrepeonmmp 0.0077109 0.0044644 1.73 0.084 -0.001039 0.0164610
workmmp -0.2277633 0.1669524 -1.36 0.172 -0.554984 0.0994573
healthmmp 0.1251161 0.2103195 0.59 0.552 -0.287103 0.5373348
wrepeondmmp -0.0077973 0.0093024 -0.84 0.402 -0.026030 0.0104351
asistemstmp -0.6956268 0.0626527 -11.10 0.000 -0.818424 -0.5728298
w3mp 0.1979129 0.0510996 3.87 0.000 0.097760 0.2980662
w4mp 0.0023492 0.0438664 0.05 0.957 -0.083627 0.0883257
mp -1.0594210 1.1248610 -0.94 0.346 -3.264109 1.1452670
(continued on next page)
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Table 1.12(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pms -0.35897 0.079264 -4.53 0.000 -0.51433 -0.20362
Tms 0.119921 0.077159 1.55 0.12 -0.03131 0.27115
Dms -1.11906 0.215512 -5.19 0.000 -1.54146 -0.69667
DPms 0.354124 0.207761 1.7 0.088 -0.05308 0.761328
DTms 0.263892 0.204407 1.29 0.197 -0.13674 0.664523
grantc6ms 0.000491 0.000407 1.21 0.227 -0.00031 0.001289
grantdc6ms 0.003254 0.00192 1.69 0.09 -0.00051 0.007018
grantc7ms -5.1E-05 0.000481 -0.11 0.916 -0.00099 0.000893
grantdc7ms -0.00036 0.001714 -0.21 0.833 -0.00372 0.002997
agems -0.80319 0.406263 -1.98 0.048 -1.59945 -0.00693
age2ms 0.019289 0.012876 1.5 0.134 -0.00595 0.044525
c6ms 2.651963 1.256475 2.11 0.035 0.189318 5.114608
c7ms 3.685036 1.233131 2.99 0.003 1.268144 6.101929
agec6ms -0.17643 0.081999 -2.15 0.031 -0.33714 -0.01571
agec7ms -0.16052 0.079794 -2.01 0.044 -0.31691 -0.00412
wrepeonms -0.00493 0.002574 -1.91 0.056 -0.00997 0.00012
distsecms -0.04974 0.01343 -3.7 0.000 -0.07606 -0.02341
distmetroms 0.002609 0.000382 6.82 0.000 0.001859 0.003358
distcabms 0.000743 0.003112 0.24 0.811 -0.00536 0.006842
schoolmms 0.014608 0.011231 1.3 0.193 -0.0074 0.036619
healthms 0.021708 0.08097 0.27 0.789 -0.13699 0.180406
workms 0.106334 0.07132 1.49 0.136 -0.03345 0.246118
fhogarms 0.682057 0.11782 5.79 0.000 0.451135 0.912979
girlms -0.8378 0.052616 -15.92 0.000 -0.94092 -0.73467
boyms -0.72726 0.050609 -14.37 0.000 -0.82645 -0.62807
babyms -0.06182 0.027068 -2.28 0.022 -0.11487 -0.00876
womenms 0.000452 0.029253 0.02 0.988 -0.05688 0.057786
menms -0.05032 0.026325 -1.91 0.056 -0.10191 0.001278
asistestms 1.83169 0.062904 29.12 0.000 1.708399 1.95498
schoolmdms -0.06732 0.032089 -2.1 0.036 -0.13021 -0.00442
grantdc6mms -0.00508 0.00197 -2.58 0.01 -0.00894 -0.00121
grantdc7mms 0.002296 0.002065 1.11 0.266 -0.00175 0.006343
wrepeonmms 0.000636 0.003678 0.17 0.863 -0.00657 0.007845
workmms 0.056352 0.155714 0.36 0.717 -0.24884 0.361547
healthmms -0.28532 0.187619 -1.52 0.128 -0.65305 0.082409
asistemstms -0.73616 0.052679 -13.97 0.000 -0.83941 -0.63291
w3ms 0.267694 0.047753 5.61 0.000 0.174099 0.361288
w4ms 0.223197 0.040794 5.47 0.000 0.143243 0.303151
ms 6.435053 3.395908 1.89 0.058 -0.22081 13.09091
36
Chapter 1 Did PROGRESA send dropouts back to school?
Table 1.13: Fixed-effects (within) regression coefficientsa
Number of obs = 74,427
Number of groups = 24,809
R-sq: within = 0.3887 Obs per group: min = 3
between = 0.3643 avg = 3
overall = 0.3580 max = 3
F (86, 49,532) = 366.15
corr(ui,Xb) = -0.4034 Prob > F = 0.0000
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
grantfp 0.0000 0.0001 0.0900 0.9250 -0.0001 0.0002
grantdfp -0.0023 0.0005 -4.9700 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0014
grantc6fs 0.0001 0.0001 1.6900 0.0900 0.0000 0.0002
grantd6fs -0.0013 0.0002 -5.4300 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0008
grantc7fs 0.00003 0.0001 0.7600 0.4480 -0.0001 0.0001
grantd7fs -0.0012 0.0002 -6.0500 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0008
grantmp 0.0001 0.0001 1.6600 0.0970 0.0000 0.0003
grantdmp 0.0002 0.0004 0.5700 0.5700 -0.0006 0.0011
grantc6ms 0.0001 0.0001 1.1200 0.2640 0.0000 0.0002
grantd6ms 0.0002 0.0002 0.7300 0.4660 -0.0003 0.0006
grantc7ms 0.00003 0.0001 0.7300 0.4660 -0.0001 0.0001
grantd7ms 0.0001 0.0002 0.2900 0.7700 -0.0004 0.0005
σu 0.2598
σe 0.1574
ρ 0.7315 ( fraction of variance due to ui)
F test that all ui = 0: F (24,808, 49,532) = 4.37 Prob > F = 0.0000
Standard errors are clustered at family level. a Variable’s definition are explained in Table 1.11.
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The school reentry decision of poor
girls. Structural estimation and
policy analysis using PROGRESA
database.
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I evaluate the effectiveness of alternative policies to persuade dropout girls
in poor families to go back to school and continue with their education. I discuss the dif-
ferential effect that several policies have on reentry decisions and on enrollment decisions.
I quantify the effect of demand-side policies such as conditional cash transfers and avail-
ability of daycare centers for young children. I also present results of the effect on school
attendance of supply-side policies such as reduction in class size and increase in the number
of communities where a secondary school is available. The analysis is based on a dynamic
behavioral model of school choices for girls. The structural parameters of the model are
estimated using the Mexican PROGRESA database.
The motivation behind this study is threefold. First, in the paper I address a relevant
policy concern: how to increase educational participation in developing countries. Despite
the efforts made by policy makers in increasing enrollment rates, educational participation
is far from targets proposed by several international institutions1. UNESCO (2007) reports
that between 2000 and 2006, the total number of out of school children in low-income
countries decreased by 41%. Yet, in 2006 almost one in five of children of primary school
age were not in school. Secondary net enrolment rates have been gradually increasing
by around 2 to 3 percentage points per year in most regions. Still, in 2005 three in five
children of secondary school age in low-income countries were not in school. To increase
school attendance rates among poor children in developing countries, policy makers have
1For example, universal primary education is Goal 2 of both Education for All movement and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals adopted by UN Member States in 2000
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implemented conditional cash transfers programs2. While transfers have been successful in
keeping boys and girls at school, there exist evidence that they do not increase girls’ reentry
rates.
Second, in this paper I contribute with the evaluation of a well-known anti-poverty program,
PROGRESA. I quantify the effect of PROGRESA grants on reentry decision for girls using
a dynamic behavioral model of school choices. The methodology applied allows to perform a
counterfactual analysis. The analysis of the effect of PROGRESA grants on reentry decision
has been seldom discussed. Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2001), using difference-in-
difference estimation techniques, conclude that PROGRESA grants increase reentry rates
and this effect is lower for girls than for boys. Valdes (2007) addresses the analysis of the
effect of PROGRESA grants on reentry rates by estimating a reduced form equation for
schooling enrollment and finds that grants increase reentry rates among boys but do not
affect girls’ reentry rates.
Third, this study contributes to a growing literature that addresses empirical questions us-
ing discrete choice dynamic programming models of individual behavior. These models are
attractive because structural parameters have a clear interpretation within the theoretical
model and they are useful tools for the evaluation of counterfactual policies (Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007)). Miller (1984) and Keane and Wolpin (1997) propose and estimate dy-
namic models of occupational choices. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) and Todd
and Wolpin (2006) use dynamic behavioral models to evaluate the PROGRESA program.
In this paper schooling choices for girls in poor families are modelled following the individual
decision approach as in Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005), where boys decide whether
to attend school or to work. For families with many children the value of retaining a girl
at home becomes more relevant since they are a good help in housework. As girls may
dropout from school to stay at home I depart from Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005)
by allowing girls to choose among three alternatives: attend school, stay at home and
work. Under this framework a girl schooling decision can be assumed to be made by her
parents in an altruistic fashion. That is, they choose the alternative that maximize their
daughter inter-temporal welfare independently of the decision they make for their other
children. I relax the assumption allowing the value of each alternative to be affected by
family composition in two ways. Unobserved individual heterogeneity and the utility a girl
derives from staying at home are affected by family characteristics.
The estimated model fits girls’ schooling choices reasonable well. It replicates patterns
observed in the actual distribution of schooling choices by ages: for each particular age
reentry rates are lower than enrollment rates; reentry and enrollment rates decrease as
age increases, and reentry rates decrease quicker than enrollment rates. It also replicates
2Examples of cash transfer programs are PROGRESA in Mexico, PRAF in Honduras, Red de Proteccio´n
Social in Nicaragua and Familias en Accio´n in Colombia.
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main features of the distribution of schooling choices by stock of education: reentry and
enrollment rates decreases as the stock of education increases and, in the last grade of
primary school and in the last grade of junior secondary school reentry and enrollment
rates go down remarkably. It is observed in the data that most girls that were attending
school in the previous academic year (non-dropout girls) are still in school in the current year
while only 40% of girls who were out of school (dropout girls) come back. The estimated
model is able to match these differences in the distribution of schooling choices between
non-dropout and dropout girls. It rationalizes these differences by showing that persistence
is relevant in the decision of attending school. The model also contributes to understand
the reasons that make a girl dropout from school. A girl’s decision to drop out of school is
related to her age, the composition of her family and her mother’s labor participation, but
unrelated to unobserved characteristics of the girl, such as her unobserved ability at school.
As her value at home increases with the number of members in her family and with her
age, she leaves school not to work but to stay at home helping in housework. Additionally,
results suggest that alternative policies to cash transfers, such as free access to community
nurseries and kindergartens, availability of secondary schools, and reductions in class size,
effectively increase school reentry rates for poor girls.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the theoretical model. Section 3
presents the main features of the PROGRESA program. Section 4 describes characteristics
of the PROGRESA database. It provides some main statistics that focus on the differences
between dropouts and non-dropouts. In Section 5 I discuss the empirical implementation
of the model. In Section 6 I present results of the estimation of the structural parameters
and of the counterfactual analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with its main
results.
2.2 The Data
2.2.1 Description of PROGRESA
The Education, Health and Nutrition program, PROGRESA, was first implemented by the
Federal Government of Mexico in 1997, with the aim of helping the poorest families in
rural communities. A fundamental characteristic of the program is that aid is conditioned
on a specific behavior of the beneficiary. This conditionality aims to guarantee that the
program does not lead to undesired outcomes, such as distortions in work decisions, and
that it successfully accomplishes its initial objectives.
The program comprises actions in three major areas: education, health and nutrition. The
expected outcomes were higher literacy rates, enrollment rates and completion rates; lower
child mortality rates and higher vaccination rates; and lower rates of undernourishment.
The program is targeted at family level. A family is qualified as being poor and thus
eligible for the program according to a single index. This index contains information on
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family income and housing characteristics like presence of running water, electricity, pipes,
etc.3 Eligibility is independent of residence and family size and composition. All aid is given
to the mother as there exist evidence that mothers are better than fathers at allocating
family resources4.
The education component includes monthly grants for children of a family qualified as
beneficiary. To be given a grant, children need to be less than 18 years old, enrolled in
school between the 3rd year of primary school and the 3rd year of junior secondary school,
and to fulfill a minimum attendance requirement. The grants are not assigned based on
academic achievement. A child who does not pass a grade is still eligible for the grant in
the following year. But if the child fails the same grade twice, she/he losses eligibility. The
grant increases with the years of schooling completed. In the junior secondary level the
grant is slightly higher for girls, since there exist evidence that in poor families girls are
more likely to dropout of school and that they dropout earlier than boys. Additionally,
beneficiaries receive an annual grant for school supplies. In Table 2.1 there is a description
of grants amounts. An eligible family was entitled to receive at most 420 pesos per month by
means of scholarships in the second half of 1998. This amount represents 40% of the mean
monthly family income and 67% of the mean monthly family expenditure in consumption.
Thus, scholarships are potentially an important source of household’s resources.
2.2.2 Evaluation of PROGRESA
Mexican authorities have intended to evaluate the program since its beginning, not only
to measure results and impacts but also to provide information that allow for a redesign
of policies. Accordingly, in 1997 and 1998 a high quality data set was collected in 506
communities where the program was to be implemented, and several surveys were carried
out afterwards. In October 1998, the program was implemented in 320 randomly selected
communities (treated communities) while in the remaining 186 communities (control com-
munities) the implementation was postponed until December 19995. In Figure 2.1 below, I
present the timing of the program.
3For a complete analysis of the targeting see Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999a) and Skoufias, Davis,
and Behrman (1999b).
4See Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) for a discussion.
5The quality of the randomization has been extensively documented in Behrman and Todd (1999), who
conclude that, at least at community level, the implementation of the random assignment was performed
successfully.
41
Chapter 2 The school reentry decision of poor girls
Table 2.1: Grant amount and household income and consumption (in Mexican pesos)
Monthly grant July - Dec, 98 Jan - June,99
Primary School
3 70 75
4 80 90
5 105 115
6 135 150
Secondary School
1 girl 195 210boy 185 200
2 girl 220 235boy 195 210
3 girl 240 255boy 205 225
Monthly maximum support by
means of grants per family 420 465
Annual aid for school supplies Academic year 98/99
Primary School 135
Secondary School 170
Monthly Household Income and Consumption Nov 98
Income 1071
Consumption 630
Source: Data on grants from Histo´rico de apoyos monetarios. SEDESOL 2005. Data on income
and consumption from Albarran and Attanasio (2002)
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the PROGRESA program
There exist a large literature on the evaluation of the average effect of PROGRESA school-
ing grants. Authors agree in their main conclusions: the program has increased enrollment
rates for those children who received the grants, and this positive effect is higher on girls
and on children who attend secondary school. We can distinguish two approaches in this
literature according to the methodology applied. Researchers exploited the random assign-
ment of the program at a village level and calculated difference and difference-in-difference
estimators. Schultz (2004) is one of the main references. Then, researchers turned to ana-
lyze how to improve the effectiveness of the program estimating structural dynamic models
of discrete choice6 to simulate schooling decisions under alternative policies. Attanasio,
Meghir, and Santiago (2005) models schooling as an individual decision and Todd and
Wolpin (2006) which uses a model of parental decisions about fertility and child schooling.
2.2.3 Summary statistics
The sample used for the estimation of the model includes observations for females from
8 to 17 years old from the October 1998 survey that was conducted one year after the
implementation of the program7. This includes 9,174 girls belonging to 6,303 families. To
identify dropout girls I use information from the October 1997 survey. In particular, I use
the following question: “Is she attending school now?” A girl is considered a “dropout girl”
if the answer is “no”, and a “non-dropout girl” if the answer is “yes”. The sample consist
of 7,884 (86%) non-dropout and 1,290 (14%) dropout observations.
By the time of the October 1998 survey, 85% of girls were enrolled in school, 2.2% were
working for a salary and 12.8% were neither in school not working, so I assume they were
at home helping in housework. The distribution of choices is not the same for non-dropout
6Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Rust (1994) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) are exceptional surveys
on the estimation of structural dynamic models of discrete choice.
7I do not include 6 and 7 years old girls because PROGRESA grants are given to those children that
have completed at least 2nd grade in primary school. So a children aged 7 or less is not entitled to receive
a grant. Additionally, even thought the entrance in primary school is delayed one or two years, enrollment
rates in 1st and 2nd grade in primary school were above 96% in the 1998 survey.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of choices for Non-dropout and Dropout Girls
Choice Non-dropout Dropout Total
school 7,276 516 7,792
(92.3) (40.0) (84.9)
work 110 95 205
(1.4) (7.4) (2.2)
home 498 679 1,177
(6.3) (52.6) (12.8)
Total 7,884 1,290 9,174
Percentages in parenthesis.
and dropout girls. As it can be seen in Table 2.2 most non-dropout girls were still at school
in 1998 while more than 60% of dropout girls didn’t go back to school and were mainly at
home. For both groups the alternative of working for a salary is negligible.
Differences in the distribution of choices between non-dropout and dropout girls are even
more important when they are analyzed by age and by stock of education, as it is shown
in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below8. In both graphs it is evident that girls leave school to stay
at home, and not to work for a salary. Additionally, enrollment rates for non-dropout
are always higher than for dropout girls. Looking at the distribution of choices by ages,
enrollment rates decrease with age and the rate at which they decrease is higher for dropout
girls.
There are two grades in which enrollment rates for non-dropout girls go down remarkably.
Grade 6, when girls finish primary school, and grade 9, when girls finish secondary school.
A similar situation occurs with reentry rates: they are at their minimum levels in grades 6
and 9.
8A complete report of distribution of actual choices can be found in the Appendix in Table 2.7 and in
Table 2.8.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of choices by age
Figure 2.3: Distribution of choices by stock of education
The information contained in the PROGRESA surveys refers to individual characteristics,
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family composition, parents activities and background, and community characteristics. De-
scriptive statistics for selected variables for non-dropout and dropout girls are presented in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for Non-dropout Girls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 11.04 (2.19) 8 17
Years of education 4.19 (2.1) 0 11
Potential monthly wage 374.32 (203.63) 11.82 1928.53
Percentage of girls belonging to
a poor family 0.87 (0.34) 0 1
Percentage of girls whose father
is present at home 0.93 (0.26) 0 1
Number of sisters 1.28 (1.12) 0 6
Number of brothers 1.27 (1.09) 0 6
Number of siblings aged 5 or less 1.16 (1.19) 0 11
Percentage of girls whose mother works 0.09 (0.28) 0 1
Mother’s years of education 2.88 (2.54) 0 18
Percentage of girls that reside
in a community with secondary school 0.35 (0.48) 0 1
Class size in primary school 25.27 (4.35) 16.66 38.5
Class size in secondary school 22.27 (4.38) 10.11 45
Table 2.4: Summary statistics for Dropout Girls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 13.59 (1.86) 9 17
Years of education 4.93 (2.01) 0 9
Potential monthly wage 491.15 (166.77) 102.66 1385.65
Percentage of girls belonging to
a poor family 0.87 (0.34) 0 1
Percentage of girls whose father
is present at home 0.93 (0.26) 0 1
Number of sisters 1.39 (1.18) -1 6
Number of brothers 1.29 (1.07) 0 5
Number of siblings aged 5 or less 1.14 (1.17) 0 7
Percentage of girls whose mother works 0.09 (0.28) 0 1
Mother’s years of education 1.92 (2.09) 0 16
Percentage of girls that reside
in a community with secondary school 0.22 (0.41) 0 1
Class size in primary school 26.32 (4.42) 16.66 38.5
Class size in secondary school 22.33 (4.94) 10.11 45
The mean non-dropout girl is 11 years old and has 4 years of education completed. Her
mother has completed 3 years of education. She has two sisters and a brother older than
six years, and one sibling aged less than 5. If she decides to work she can earn 375 pesos,
an amount of money higher than the amount of the scholarship. In her municipality the
mean class size is 25 students per class in primary school and 22 in secondary school. 87%
of non-dropout girls belong to a poor family, only 9% of them has a working mother and
7% do not live with her father. 35% of non-dropout girls have a secondary school in their
community of residence.
The mean dropout girl is 13 years old and has 5 years of education completed. Her mother
has completed 2 years of education. She has two sisters and a brother older than six
years, and one sibling aged less than 5. If she decides to work she can earn 490 pesos. In
her municipality the mean class size is 26 students per class in primary school and 22 in
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secondary school. 87% of dropout girls belong to a poor family, 9% of them has a working
mother and 7% do not live with her father. 22% of dropout girls have a secondary school
in their community of residence.
Comparing both groups we can conclude that dropout girls have less educated mothers, a
higher proportion of them have to travel to other community to attend secondary school
and if they work they receive a higher salary than non-dropout girls.
2.3 Model and Empirical implementation
2.3.1 The general model
In this section, I present a dynamical behavioral model of schooling decision for girls aged 6
(the official age to enter school) to 17 (the stopping period)9. At each age t, a girl chooses
one of three mutually exclusive actions: go to school (ait = 1), work for a salary (ait = 2) or
stay at home to help in housework (ait = 3). This is consistent with assuming that parents
make decisions in the best interest of each of their children, so there are no interactions
between the decisions of children that belong to the same family. Let Ωit denote the state
vector which contains all variables known by girl i at age t which have an impact on her
current and future choices. Among other components, it also includes the girl’s stock of
education and she faces uncertainty about the evolution of her future stock of education.
Denote by pistg the probability of passing the grade at age t for grade g, that is the transition
probability for the girl’s stock of education. At age 18 girls either work and earn wages in
accordance to their levels of education or stay at home.
Period t alternatives are chosen to maximize the intertemporal utility function
E[
T−t∑
j=0
βju(ai,t+j ,Ωi,t+j)|ait,Ωit] + βT−t+1E[V T+1(ΩT+1)|ait,Ωit] (2.1)
subject to the evolution of future values of the state variables, particulary to the probability
of passing a grade pistg. β is the intertemporal discount factor, V
T+1() is the terminal value
function, Et is the expectation operator conditional on the state and u(ait,Ωit) is the
instantaneous utility function at age t for individual i that is specific for each choice a. By
Bellman’s principle of optimality, the choice specific value functions can be obtained using
the recursive expression:
v(a,Ωit) ≡ u(a,Ωit) + βE[max
a∈A
v(a,Ωi,t+1)|ait,Ωit] (2.2)
for a = 1, 2, 3 and t ≤ T − 1, and v(a,Ωit) = u(a,Ωit) + βE[V T+1(ΩT+1)|ait,Ωit] for
9The reason for choosing 17 as the stopping age is that all women aged 18 or more in the database report
not to be enrolled in formal education.
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a = 1, 2, 3 and t = T . The optimal decision rule is then:
α(Ωit) = arg max
a∈A
v(a,Ωit) (2.3)
In the database there is information on the individual’s action ait and a set of individuals
characteristics Xit. From an econometric point of view, the state vector includes two
subset of state variables: Ωit = (Xit, it). Xit are observed variables and it are unobserved
variables.
2.3.2 Utilities
Let ait = 1 ≡ w, ait = 2 ≡ e, ait = 3 ≡ h identify the alternatives of working, attending
school, and staying at home respectively.
The per-period utility function of working is:
u(w,Ωit) = ηwit + wit (2.4)
where wit is the potential wage a girl can earn10.
The per-period utility function of attending school is:
u(e,Ωit) = µi + α1ηGit + α2Di + α3ASi,98 + α4CSi,98 + α5Sit + α′6xit + 
e
it (2.5)
µi is the unobserved type, individual specific and time-constant. Git is the potential grant
amount, that takes a positive value if the child belongs to a poor family, resides in a treated
community, and is attending a grade between 3rd year of primary school and 3rd year of
junior secondary school. Di is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the child dropped out
of school in the previous academic year11. ASi,98 is a dummy equal 1 if there is a junior
secondary school in the community where the girl resides (is a measure of the direct cost
of attending secondary school). CSi,98 is a municipality measure of class size. Sit is the
girl’s stock of education. xit is a set of individual and family characteristics that includes
the age of the child, an indicator of the socioeconomic situation of the family and mother’s
schooling.
The per-period utility function of staying at home is:
u(h,Ωit) = δ0 + δ1Di + δ2MWi + δ3C5it + δ4SIit + δ5Bit + δ6Sit + δ′7xit + 
h
it (2.6)
10Since in the survey it is reported only in a small percentage of the cases it is estimated by OLS. For
more details see the Appendix.
11The dropout dummy is constructed using information on school attendance from the September 1997
survey. It is based on the same question used to construct the alternative chosen by the girl in 1998.
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MWi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother works for a salary. C5it is the number
of siblings aged less than 5 years old. SIit is the number of sisters aged from 12 to 16, and
Bit is the number of brothers from 6 to 18 years old.
2.3.3 Assumptions
On random shocks ait for a = w, e, h is a random variable which affects the utility of action
a in period t for individual i. It is observed by the individual but not by the econometrician.
The ait’s satisfy the conditional independence assumption, i.e., they are independent across
choices, individuals and periods with distribution F(.).
On utilities u(ait,Ωit), the utility functions, are additively separable in observables and
unobservables:
u(ait,Ωit) = u˜(a,Xit) + ait (2.7)
Thus, the optimal decision rule becomes
α(Xit, it) = arg max
a∈A
v(a,Xit) + ait (2.8)
And, for any (a,X) ∈ A× X, the conditional choice probability is:
Pr(a|X) =
∫
1[v(a,Xit) + ait > v(a
′
, Xit) + a
′
it ∀a
′
]dF(it) (2.9)
On unobserved heterogeneity Following Heckman and Singer (1984) there are M types of
individuals, for M a finite set of types. µm is the parameter related to type m and pim is
the proportion of the population of that type12. Girls are heterogeneous in their ability at
school. Each girl knows her own type but it is not observed by the econometrician.
On transition probabilities pistg, the transition probability of the stock of education, is ex-
ogenous and does not depend on effort or on the willingness to continue schooling. It varies
with the grade and the age of the individual13 and it is known to the individual. Age of the
girl, amount of the grant and salaries evolve deterministically14. Availability of secondary
schools and class sizes remain constant since 1998. Girls’ mothers stock of education is
constant. To control for the socioeconomic situation of the family I use the poor family
indicator reported in PROGRESA. This indicator do not vary across time. Girls expect
that the composition of her family will not change after 1998. Work status for the girl’s
12Types probabilities are estimated using a logit model. Types probabilities depend on family composition
variables
13It is also different between those girls that receive PROGRESA grants and those who do not receive
the aid, since the grant could be an incentive to perform better at school.
14The evolution of the amount of the grant from 1998 to 2007 is observed and reported in Oportunidades
(2008). The evolution of salaries in the period 1998-2007 is constructed using observed salaries in 1998 and
updating them with the annual increase in the minimum wage for Mexico reported in CONASAMI (2008).
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mother is assumed time-invariant and identified with her work status reported in 1998. If
her father does not live with his family I assume he is not present at home in all periods.
The number of sisters, brothers and sibling aged 5 years old or less evolve with the age of
the siblings and I assume there are not newborn children through all periods.
On individual decision approach I assume that each girl is a single decision unit. The model
presented so far is valid if it is the girl or her altruistic parents who decide girl’s actions
that maximize her lifetime welfare. In particular, interrelationship of schooling decisions
across siblings are not directly considered. The individual decision assumption is relaxed in
two ways. I allow girl’s utility of staying at home to vary with several family composition
variables. Additionally, the unobserved type, that enters the utility of attending school, is
affected by the number of adults and children in the family and by the girl’s birth order.
It can be argued that parents make schooling decision for all their children simultaneously.
Particularly, the decision of whether or not to send a daughter to school is affected by the
number, ages, gender and action chosen for the other children in the family. In the model,
to choose the action for a girl, parents take into account the number of children they
have, their ages and their genders; parents also consider whether the mother is working
outside the household and the total number of adults in the family. The assumption that
the decision of one girl in a family do not depend on the decision of other girls in the
family may be strong, since, as I show in Tables 2.16 and 2.17 in the Appendix, there exist
a positive correlation between a girl’s decision of attending school and the proportion of
sisters that do attend school even after controlling for family composition variables. For
girls attending secondary school it only matters the proportion of sisters attending the
same level of education, while for girls in primary school there is a positive correlation with
the proportion of sisters attending both levels of education. Assuming that a girl’s school
participation do not depend on her brothers choices seems more plausible since there is no
correlation between girls’s school participation and the proportion of brothers attending
school.
2.3.4 Identification discussion
There are two concerns about the identification of the parameters in the proposed model:
state dependence in the utility of attending school and identification of the effect of PRO-
GRESA grants.
State dependence I introduce state dependence in the model in to ways. First, by al-
lowing the utility of attending school to depend on the dropout indicator Di. Second,
state dependence is also present throught the stock of education Sit that is determined by
past decisions of school attendance, and that also affects the utility of attending school
in the current period. Both variables Di and Sit are correlated with the unobserved type
µi. I assume that state dependence is fully controlled by Pr(Sit), that is, I assume that
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Pr(Sit, Di|µi) = Pr(Sit|µi, Di). To introduce in the model the equation for the probability
of having completed Sit = s years of schooling, Pr(Sit = s), I follow Attanasio, Meghir, and
Santiago (2005). I model this probability as an interval regression probit model with grade
specific (predetermined) cut-off points. The identification of the parameters of Pr(Sit = s)
relays on the availability of variables that affect this probability but do not affect the current
utility of attending school. Those variables are one period lags of availability of secondary
school and class size measures. The identification of the unobserved heterogeneity using a
single cross section of data in a model with state dependence is very tenuous and relies in
functional forms.
Pr(Sit = s|Zit, µi) = Φ(s− (ζ ′Zit + ξµi))− Φ((s− 1)− (ζ ′Zit + ξµi)), (2.10)
where Zit is a set of individual, family, and community characteristics that includes the
age of the child, the dropout indicator Di, the mother’s schooling level, the socioeconomic
indicator of the family, availability of junior secondary school in 1997 and the municipality
measure of class size at primary and junior secondary school in 1997. The load factor ξ
governs the covariance between the probability of having a stock of education s and the
utility of attending school.
Grant effect The effect of the grant in the utility of attending school is modelled as a
proportion of the impact of the wage in the utility of working. Then, the model can reflect
a different effect on the decision of attending school given by one peso received as a grant
or one peso received as a salary. For the identification of both effects it is necessary to
have two different sources of exogenous variation. Wages vary with girls’ age and stock of
education and a set of labor market variables at village level. The amount of the grant also
varies with girls’ age and stock of education, and, most importantly, it has an exogenous
(random) variation between girls who reside in treatment and control communities.
2.3.5 Likelihood
Define θa = {η, α1, ..., α6, δ0, ..., δ6} as the set of parameters in utilities, and θs =
{ζ, ξ} as the set of parameters in the initial condition equation. Let’s denote ρ =
{θa, θs, {µm}Mm=1, pim, β, pistg}, the set that includes all the parameters to be estimated in the
model and the transition probability of the stock of education. Suppose u˜(a,Xit), V T+1()
and F() are known up to ρ. A girl contribution to the likelihood is:
li(ρ) =
∑
a
1(ait = a)
M∑
m
Pr(a|Xit, Sit = s, µm, θa, pistg, β, )× Pr(Sit = s|µm, θs)× pim
(2.11)
and the sample log-likelihood is then L(ρ) =
∑
i ln li(ρ).
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In order to evaluate the li for a particular value of ρ it is necessary to know the optimal deci-
sion rules α(Xit, it, ρ). Therefore, for each trial value of ρ the value functions v(a,Ωit) have
to be calculated. The expression for the value functions at subsequent ages are computed
recursively starting from age 18 and working backwards until the current age t. Under the
assumption that the unobserved state variables ait are drawn from an extreme value distri-
bution, conditional choice probabilities and recursive value functions in equation 2.2 have
convenient (logistic) closed forms15. I estimate the model by a combination of maximum
likelihood for θa, θs, {µm}Mm=1, pim and a grid search for the discount factor.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Parameter estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s structural parameters are reported in Tables
2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 in the Appendix. I report probabilities of passing grade s at age t used
in the estimation of the model in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 in the Appendix.
The estimated parameters in the three instantaneous utilities and in the stock of education
equation have the expected signs. The utility of attending school is higher for younger girls,
more educated, with more educated mothers, living in communities where there exists a
secondary school and in municipalities where the mean class size is lower. Salaries have a
positive effect on the utility of working. The utility of staying at home is higher for older
girls, who are more educated, with less educated mothers, belonging to a family with at
least one children aged 5 years old or less. This utility is higher if the girl’s mother works
outside the household. The stock of education of a girl is higher when she has a more
educated mother, was enrolled in school in the previous year (non-dropout) and there is a
secondary school in her village. On the other hand, girls belonging to poor families, who
dropped out of school before 1997 and attending school in a municipality with higher class
size have less years of education completed.
The model identifies two type of individuals. The high type individuals have a higher utility
of attending school with an estimated unobserved effect equal to 9.4. The corresponding
estimated value for low types is 5.5. The probability of being of high type is higher for
the older girl in the family, whose mother do not work, and belongs to a family with a
lower number of adults and children. Those girls who choose to attend school or to stay at
home are of high type with probability above 95%. The probability of being high type is
lower than 86% for those who choose to work. So unobserved heterogeneity partly explains
why girls choose to work instead of attend school or stay at home. But it does not help
to explain why a girl, once she decides not to work, decides to stay at home or to attend
15See the Appendix for the explicit functional form of value functions, conditional choice probabilities and
Emax function.
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school. As it can be seen in Table 2.13 in the Appendix, unobserved heterogeneity does not
contribute to explain differences in choices between non-dropout and dropout girls. In fact,
new dropout girls, that is girls who were at school last year but are not attending school
the current year, have the same probability of been high type than former non-dropout
girls that choose to attend school.
2.4.2 Model Validity
The validity of the estimates for the structural parameters relies strongly in the functional
form assumptions made on utilities and on the initial condition equation. Thus, it is crucial
to test the validity of the estimated model. In what follows I present several evidence on
the validity of the estimated parameters.
First I compare the distribution of predicted choice probabilities obtained with the esti-
mated parameters with the actual choices the individuals in the sample have made16. A
complete report of distribution of actual and predicted choices can be found in the Ap-
pendix in Table 2.7 and in Table 2.8. The model does quite well in predicting distribution
of choices by ages for non-dropout girls and dropout girls. As we can see in Figure 2.4 bel-
low, actual and predicted schooling enrollment rates are close for all ages except 17 years
old17.
16Predicted conditional choice probabilities are computed following Carro and Mira (2006). The procedure
is explained in the Appendix.
17The reason is the tiny number of girls aged less than 17 years old in the sample. It is 5 non-dropout
and 3 drop-out
53
Chapter 2 The school reentry decision of poor girls
Figure 2.4: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by age (%)
Predicted choice probabilities by years of schooling completed reflect the main patterns in
the actual distribution of choices: enrollment rates for non-dropout girls are always higher
than for dropout girls; enrollment rates for both groups decrease as the stock of education
increases; the lowest enrollment rate in primary school appears in the last grade, that is
grade 6; and the lowest enrollment rate considering all grades come in the last year of junior
secondary school.
54
Chapter 2 The school reentry decision of poor girls
Figure 2.5: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by stock of education (%)
Second, I compare the estimated grant effects with the estimates reported in Schultz (2004)
and Valdes (2007). The effect of PROGRESA grants in the present model is computed
by comparing the choices predicted when girls are receiving the grant with the choices
predicted when the grant amount is set to zero for all girls. The results obtained in this
paper agree with those reported elsewhere, suggesting that the model does well in fitting
the effects of PROGRESA grants for non-dropout and dropout girls. A summary of results
are presented in Table 2.9 in the Appendix.
2.4.3 Counterfactual analysis
Although PROGRESA grants do not increase school reentry rates among girls, perhaps
other policies do. In what follows, I analyze the effectiveness of several policies by means
of counterfactual exercises. Results are presented in Table 2.5 and details on the policies
follows bellow. It is worth to notice that counterfactuals exercises obtained by using the
parameters related with PROGRESA grants are more credible than other exercises. The
reason is that the identification of PROGRESA grants parameters is obtained with the
exogenous variation provided by the random assignment of the scholarships, while there is
not a natural experiment behind the identification of the other parameters in the model.
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Table 2.5: Increase in school attendance due to different policies (in %)
Non-dropout Drop-out
Policy Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Enrollment rate 97 80 59 28
PROGRESA grant 0.7 5.1 0.8 0.8
Duplicate PROGRESA grant 0.7 5.2 0.7 1.0
in secondary
Free access to daycare center 0.0 1.0 1.2 1.7
Availability of secondary school 0.6 2.6 4.6 5.3
in almost all villages
Reduction of class size to 25 0.2 0.5 1.5 1.1
children
Duplicate the amount of PROGRESA grants in secondary school : Enrollment rates in
primary school is near 90% while the figure in secondary school is 67%. A policy intended
to increase school enrollment could at most increase in 10% enrollment in primary school
but more than 30% in secondary school. This fact makes it attractive the implementation
of scholarships that give a higher amount of money in secondary school. The results show
that for non-dropout the actual amount of the grant is already optimal since the response
to the extra money is almost negligible. For dropout girls the effect is only 1%, confirming
the initial hypothesis that cash transfers, no matter how much money they receive, do not
substantially change their utility of attending school.
Community nurseries/kindergartens: Suppose all the children aged less than five in the
family are sent to a (free) daycare center18. Girls will be no longer needed at home to
look after them and may go back to school. In the model the utility of staying at home is
(positively) related with the number of children aged less than five in the family. The effect
of this policy on girls’ school enrollment can be approximated by simulating girls’ choices
after setting the number of children aged less than five equal zero. Notice that making zero
the number of children less than five in the family may overestimate the actual effect of
having free access to a daycare center. Not having children below five at home means the
girl will not have to take care of them during all day, while having access to a child care
facility will reduce the need of help in taking care of the youngest children in the family
during at most 8 hours. In the case that school ours fully coincide with the time the children
can be left in the daycare center, the upward bias in the estimation will be reduced. The
approximate effect of availability of nurseries on non-dropout girls is lower than the effect
of PROGRESA grants while it is higher for dropout girls. A combination of both policies
has the desired effect, increasing enrollment in secondary school for non-dropout in 6% and
18I do not discuss how the daycare center would be financed.
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2% for dropout girls.
Availability of secondary school in almost all villages As it is shown in Table 2.3 and Table
2.4 above, only in 34% of the villages where non-dropout girls reside and in 22% of the
villages where dropout girls reside there exists a secondary school. No availability of a
secondary school in a village implies transportation and time costs. Both costs decreases
the utility of attending school. If the government establishes a secondary school in at
least all villages where the demand is high enough, a positive effect on school enrollment
and reentry rates could be expected. I simulate girls’ choices by setting equal one the
indicator variable of availability of secondary school for girls who reside in villages where
the potential number of secondary school students is higher than 25. The result is promising
for all groups, non-dropout and dropout girls attending primary and secondary school. In
primary school enrollment rate increases 1% and reentry rate increases 5% while the figures
in secondary school are 3% increment in enrollment rate and 5% increment in reentry rate.
Reduction in the class size The quality of the education process is an important determinant
of the utility of attending school. In classrooms where the number of students is high
teachers cannot pay enough attention to all of them and the acquisition of knowledge is
likely damaged. Average class size in the villages analyzed is around 25, not a huge value.
But in some villages classes have 45 students in secondary school and 39 in primary school.
An improvement in school enrollment and reentry rates could be expected from a reduction
in class size. The proposed policy is to reduce to 25 the mean number of students per class
wherever it is necessary. Simulations of girls choices imposing this reduction in class size
show that class size matter only for dropouts, and this policy is more effective in primary
school.
2.5 Alternative model
In this section I discuss an alternative model specification that implement a different solu-
tion for the initial conditions problem. Instead of modeling the correlation existent between
the stock of education Sit, the dropout indicator dummy Di and the unobserved heterogene-
ity µi introducing an equation for the probability of having completed s years of schooling,
I make the type probability a function of both Sit and Di. Additionally, I estimate the new
model using a panel data that has information in two academic years 98/99 and 99/2000
with the aim of improving the identification of the unobserved heterogeneity. In the new
model, the individual likelihood is:
li(ρ) =
∑
a
1(ait = a)
M∑
m
∏
t
Pr(at = a|Xit, Sit, Di, µm, θa, pistg, β)× Pr(µm = µ|Sit, Di)
(2.12)
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This new approach to solve the initial conditions problem implies changes in the computa-
tion of the predicted conditional choice probabilities that are shown in the Appendix under
the title “Predicted probabilities”.
I also make several changes in the specification of the utilities to avoid having to relay in
functional forms for the identification of the parameters related with the variables girl’s
stock of education, age, mother’s stock of education, and poor indicator dummy.
The per-period utility function of attending school is now:
u(e,Ωit) = µi + α1ηGit + α2Di + α3ASit + α′4x
e
it + 
e
it, (2.13)
where xeit is a set of individual and family characteristics that includes a dummy variable
equal one if the child is behind in school, a dummy variable equal one if the child has
graduated from primary school and a dummy variable to reflect the effect of graduation
from secondary school, and mother’s schooling. I remove the class size from the utility of
schooling since its effect is more likely to appear in the probability of passing a grade. For
this reason I re-estimate those probabilities using a municipality measure of class size for
each academic year, 98/99 and 99/2000.
The per-period utility function of staying at home in the new model is:
u(h,Ωit) = δ0+δ1C5it+δ2SIit+δ3MWi+δ4C5itMWi+δ5C5itSIit+δ6Bit+δ′7x
h
it+
h
it, (2.14)
where xhit is a set of individual and family characteristics that includes the age of the child, a
dummy equal one if the girl’s father lives with his family, and indicator of the socioeconomic
situation of the family.
I introduce a small change in the Terminal Value function that is discussed in the Appendix.
2.5.1 Results
2.5.1.1 Parameter estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s structural parameters are reported in Tables
2.20 and 2.21 in the Appendix. These results are a first approximation to the definite
estimates for the parameters in the alternative model, in the sense that they may correspond
to a local optimum of the likelihood function. More work in terms of checking the validity
of the estimated coefficients is currently been done.
The estimated parameters in the three instantaneous utilities have the expected signs and
the most relevant parameters for the policy analysis pursued in this paper are statistically
significant.
The estimation of the model has been done so far with two type of individuals, that are
well identified. The high type individuals have a higher utility of attending school with
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an estimated unobserved effect equal to 5.0. The corresponding estimated value for low
types is 1.8. The probability of being of high type is higher for younger girls in the family,
a girl that do not drop out from school in 1997, whose father lives with her family, and
belongs to a family with a lower number of adults and children. The estimated coefficient
of Di is highly significant, that is, the model relates the types with the dropout status.
The probability of being high type is 76% for non-dropouts and 35% for dropouts. The
approach followed in the new model to specify unobserved heterogeneity seems to improve
the identification of the distribution of random effects. As it can be seen in Table 2.6 below,
unobserved heterogeneity does contribute to explain differences in the decision of attending
school between non-dropout and dropout girls. The probability of attending school for a
high type non-dropout girl is 78.2% while the probability of attending school for a low type
dropout girl is only 52.5%. Among non-dropout girls, those of them who are low type have
a higher relative probability of staying at home rather than attending school.
Table 2.6: Types distribution in the Alternative Model: Non-dropout and Dropout (%)
Type 1: High Type Type 2: Low Type
Choice Non-Dropout Dropout Non-Dropout Dropout
School 78.2 47.4 21.2 52.5
Work 60.7 25.3 39.3 74.7
Home 55.2 27.3 44.8 72.7
2.5.1.2 Model Validity
Looking at Figures 2.6 and 2.7 we can compare the distribution of predicted choice prob-
abilities obtained with the estimated parameters with the actual choices the individuals in
the sample have made. A complete report of distribution of actual and predicted choices
can be found in the Appendix in Table 2.18 and in Table 2.19. The model does quite well
in predicting distribution of choices by ages for non-dropout girls and dropout girls until
the age of 12. Above that point, the model is not so accurate and for dropouts observations
the differences are more relevant.
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Figure 2.6: Alternative Model: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by age (%)
Predicted choice probabilities by years of schooling completed reflect two important pattern
in the actual distribution of choices: enrollment rates for non-dropout girls are always
higher than for dropout girls, and enrollment rates for both groups decrease as the stock
of education increases. But the current estimation of the model is not able to pick the
characteristic fall in enrollment rates in grades 6 and 9. Instead, the estimated model show
a smooth decrease in enrollment probabilities as the stock of education increases.
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Figure 2.7: Alternative Model: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by stock of education
(%)
In general, the current estimated model overestimate enrollment probabilities for both,
non-dropouts and dropouts observations. This in turn makes the fit of the effect of the
grant quite inaccurate. In particular it underestimate the effect of PROGRESA grants on
non-dropouts. For this reason I do not report results of counterfactual policy exercises.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper I present a dynamic behavioral model of school choices for girls in poor fami-
lies and estimate its structural parameters using the Mexican PROGRESA database. The
estimated structural model fits girl’s schooling choices reasonable well. It is able to replicate
patterns observed in the actual distribution of schooling choices, and it also matches differ-
ences in the distribution of schooling choices between non-dropout and dropout girls. The
model explains these differences highlighting the relevance of persistence in the decision of
attending school and the importance of the girl’s family composition. Results also suggest
that unobserved heterogeneity in schooling decision does not explain differences between
reentry and enrollment decisions.
The evaluation of PROGRESA grants resulting from the estimated model is consistent
with previous literature. Grants are a good incentive to keep girls at school but the ones
that are out of school do not come back. Simulations suggest that cash transfers do not
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increase school reentry rates even when the amount of the scholarship is duplicated. Since
dropout girls are mainly at home helping to take care of the youngest children in the
family, the availability of daycare centers implemented simultaneously with PROGRESA
grants is efficient in increasing both school enrollment and reentry rates. Both targets are
also efficiently achieved by reducing transportation and time costs in secondary school.
Reduction in class size increases reentry rates but it does not change enrollment rates.
The relevance of family characteristics in school choices for girls suggested by the present
model, invites for future research. Probably one of the most natural extensions is the study
of school reentry decisions in the context of a family decision model. The estimation of a
model of family child schooling and fertility decisions, like the model presented in Todd and
Wolpin (2006), allows relaxing the assumption that there is no newborn children in girls’
families.
As a further step, it would be interesting to estimate a collective decision model in which
parents make labor and consumption decisions along with schooling decisions for their
children. Such a model would allow analyzing interrelations between parents’ labor par-
ticipation decisions and girls schooling choices in poor families. Results in the present
study show that mothers’ working status affects girls’ utility of staying at home. It can be
expected that a girl whose mother works in the labor market would be more valuable at
home, replacing her mothers’ housework. However, worker mothers in the sample have less
children than mothers who stay at home. This family characteristic is coherent with the
result suggested by the present model, namely that a girl whose mother works outside the
household has a lower utility of staying at home. A collective decision model in which par-
ents simultaneously decide their labor status and their children schooling would shed light
in the relation between both decisions. In the framework proposed, it would be possible to
analyze the effect of policies intended to increase children school participation on parents’
labor participation and girls schooling.
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2.7 Appendix
Value functions
The value function for choosing to attend school is:
v(e,Xit) = u˜(e,Xit)
+ βpistgE[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit + 1, ait = e]
+ β(1− pistg)E[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit, ait = e]
for a = e, w, h and t ≤ T − 1. At age t = T ≡ 17 it is:
v(e,XT ) = u˜(s,XT )
+ βpistgV
T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT + 1)
+ β(1− pistg)V T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT )
The value function for working (or staying at home) is:
v(w,Xit) = u˜(w,Xit)
+ βE[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit, ait = w]
for a = e, w, h and t ≤ T − 1. At age t = T ≡ 17 it is:
v(w,XT ) = u˜(w,XT ) + βV T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT )
I assume that girls do not attend school beyond 18 years old, so when they are 18 they
have to decide wether to work or stay at home with her birth family or with her new
family if she gets married19. The value of working is given by the salary an 18 years old
girl can earn and her stock of education. The value of staying at home depends on the
composition of her family and also on her stock of education. Unfortunately I do not have
information on family composition at the age of 18 for girls in the sample. For this reason I
cannot estimate separately parameters in both, the terminal value of staying at home and
the terminal value of working. I estimate the parameters that affects the difference in the
terminal value between both alternatives. This difference depends on the stock of education
and on the salary. The terminal value function is:
19Most of the girls that get married in this villages stay in her new home taking care of her new family.
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V T+1 = δ5Si,18 − ηrwi,18
where rwi is the real wage for adult workers in the community where the girl resides.
In the second new model I consider a slightly different specification for the terminal value
function, in which I introduce a parameter for the effect of schooling in the terminal value
and this parameter is not present in the current utility of attending school:
V T+1 = γSi,18 − ηrwi,18
In all cases below, Emax function are as follows:
E[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1, ait] = ln(
3∑
a=1
exp(v(a,Xt+1))) + E
where E is the Euler constant (0.577215665). This expression is given by the extreme value
distribution and by the conditional independence assumptions on ait.
Conditional choice probabilities
Assuming the ait are drown from an extreme value distribution and are conditional inde-
pendent, the probability of choosing action a at time t is:
Pr(ait = a′|Xit) = exp v(a
′, Xit)∑
a∈A exp v(a,Xit)
Predicted probabilities
Following Carro and Mira (2006), predicted conditional choice probabilities for each girl are
computed as the weighted average of conditional choice probabilities for each unobserved
type, with weights given by the ex post probability that the girl is of each type conditional
on her stock of education and choice in Oct98.
Pia =
M∑
m
PiamP(µi|ai, Si)
P(µi|ai, Si) = P(µm, ai|Si)P(ai|Si)
P(µm, ai|Si) = P(ai|Si, µm)P(µm|Si)
P(ai|Si, µm) = Piam
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P(µm|Si) = P(Si|µm)pim∑M
m P(Si|µm)pim
P(ai|Si) =
M∑
m
P(ai|Si, µm)P(µm|Si)
where Piam is the probability that girl i chooses action a if she is of unobserved type m,
conditional on the state variables. Piam, P(Si|µm) and pim are obtained from the model
given parameter estimates.
Using the second approach proposed to deal with the initial conditions problem generates a
change in the computation of predicted conditional choice probabilities. In the new model,
these probabilities are estimated as follows:
Pia =
M∑
m
PiamP(µi|ai, Si, Di)
P(µi|ai, Si, Di) = P(µm, ai|Si, Di)P(ai|Si, Di)
P(µm, ai|Si, Di) = P(ai|Si, Di, µm)P(µm|Si, Di)
P(ai|Si, Di, µm) = Piam
P(ai|Si, Di) =
M∑
m
P(ai|Si, Di, µm)P(µm|Si, Di)
Also in this specification Piam and P(µm|Si, Di) are obtained from the model given param-
eter estimates.
Estimation of salaries
The salary for a girl i residing in village l that chooses to work is computed using the OLS
parameters of the following equation:
ln(wil) = γ0 + γ1ln(wl) + γ2Si + γ3agei + γ4distmetrol + γ5distcabl + ωil,
where wl is the agricultural wage in community l, distmetrol is the distance (km) from
the community where the girl resides to the nearest metropolitan area and distcabl is
the distance (km) from the community where the girl resides to the main city at her
municipality.
A sample selection problem arise in the estimation of the previous equation. The resulting
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estimated salaries may be not a good approximation of the potential salaries for girls who
do not work and for girls who do work but do not report their salaries. This problem is
solved adding the assumption that the transitory shocks to potential earnings ωil are not
observed before the girl make her choice. Moreover, the variance of gilrs’s salaries may be
low since they are expected to work in low skilled homogenous agricultural activities.
In the second model proposed I also introduce as a regressor a municipality measure of class
size.
Fit of the model: Main model
Table 2.7: Actual an predicted choices: Non-dropout observations (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 99.2 97.7 0 1.2 .8 1
1 97 97.2 .8 1 2.3 1.7
2 97.4 98.1 1.1 .6 1.5 1.3
3 97.8 96.8 .7 .8 1.4 2.5
4 97.2 95.2 .6 1.1 2.1 3.7
5 94.8 95.1 1.2 1 3.9 3.9
6 72.6 81.8 2.9 3 24.4 15.2
7 97.4 85.9 .8 1.7 1.9 12.4
8 93.2 83.5 1.8 2 5.1 14.5
9 52.2 67.4 9.3 4.1 38.5 28.5
10 90.9 68.5 0 4.2 9.1 27.3
11 100 25.3 0 1.2 0 73.5
Table 2.8: Actual an predicted choices: Dropout observations (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 96.3 73.4 1.2 6.9 2.4 19.7
1 33.3 54.8 0 8.2 66.7 37
2 56.9 55.3 4.6 8.5 38.5 36.2
3 44.2 45.7 5.8 10.2 50 44.1
4 75.9 63.1 5.7 4.6 18.4 32.3
5 42.1 54.6 9.6 7.3 48.2 38.1
6 25.5 27.7 8.5 7.1 66 65.2
7 66.7 43.9 6.1 6.7 27.3 49.5
8 53.3 42.1 6.7 4.5 40 53.4
9 22.2 22.3 14.8 5 63 72.7
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Table 2.9: Comparison of results with related literature
Non-dropout Drop-out
Author Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Schultz (2004) 0.02 0.065 — —
Valdes (2007) 0.01 0.061 -0.05 0.01
This paper 0.01 0.051 0.01 0.01
Estimation results: Main Model
Table 2.10: Estimates of structural parameters: Instantaneous Utilities
Standard
Variable Estimate Error
Schooling utility
age -9.79 0.94
stock of education 2.72 0.39
dropout indicator dummy -1.51 0.19
PROGRESA grant effect 3.52 1.61
mother stock of education 0.35 0.65
poor indicator dummy 0.16 0.23
availability of secondary school 0.39 0.10
class size -2.43 0.47
Working utility
wage 1.71 1.42
Staying at home utility
age -3.57 1.02
stock of education 2.72 0.40
number of babies at home 1.82 0.41
number of sisters between 12 and 16 -0.51 0.72
number of brothers 1.12 0.98
mother stock of education -1.27 0.69
worker mother indicator dummy -2.51 0.22
poor indicator dummy -0.01 0.23
dropout indicator dummy 0.53 0.19
father at home indicator dummy -0.43 0.18
constant 3.62 0.74
Log-likelihood = -31968.63, Discount Factor = 0.95
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Table 2.11: Estimates of structural parameters: Stock of Education equation
Standard
Variable Estimate Error
mother stock of education 0.27 0.58
poor indicator dummy -0.02 -0.11
dropout indicator dummy -0.46 -0.75
dropout indicator*age 0.44 0.42
availability of secondary school in 1997 -0.14 -0.25
availability of secondary school*age 0.30 0.30
class size in 1997 -1.79 -2.22
class size*age 3.17 2.73
unobserved heterogeneity load factor 0.04 1.07
Table 2.12: Estimates of structural parameters: Types and Types probabilities
Standard
Estimate Error
Unobserved type effect
Type 1 9.49 0.81
Type 2 5.50 0.69
Variables in types probabilities
birth order 0.85 0.61
number of adults in the family -1.09 -1.23
number of children in the family -0.31 -0.47
father at home indicator dummy -0.55 -1.60
worker mother indicator dummy -3.83 -8.26
constant 5.05 7.98
Reference category is Type 2
Table 2.13: Types distribution: Non-dropout and Dropout (%)
Type 1: High Type Type 2: Low Type
Choice Non-Dropout Dropout Non-Dropout Dropout
School 95.8 95.3 4.2 4.7
Work 76.8 86.4 23.2 13.6
Home 95.7 96.5 4.3 3.5
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Table 2.14: Probability of passing grade s at age t for girls who fulfill the conditions
required to receive the grant
Grade (s)
Age (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
6 0.81 0.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
7 0.93 0.84 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.88 0.80 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
9 1.00 0.74 0.87 0.91 0.87 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 0.93 0.78 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
11 0.91 0.73 0.70 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.67 0.95 0.87 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
12 0.83 0.40 0.85 0.72 0.83 0.88 0.71 0.95 0.78 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
13 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.65 0.88 0.84 0.56 0.90 0.50 0.46 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
14 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.27 0.73 0.77 0.37 0.80 0.64 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
15 0.99 0.29 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.61 0.22 0.80 0.71 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
16 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.83 0.79 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 1.00 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2.15: Probability of passing grade s at age t for girls who do not fulfill the conditions
required to receive the grant
Grade (s)
Age (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
6 0.84 0.51 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.93 0.83 0.92 0.88 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.82 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 1.00 0.77 0.77 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.78 0.99 0.00 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 1.00 0.63 0.79 0.74 0.90 0.92 0.67 0.95 0.12 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.83 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.86 0.95 0.60 0.90 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 1.00 0.50 0.45 0.38 0.82 0.82 0.46 0.91 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.36 0.53 0.67 0.14 0.76 0.75 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 0.51 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.53 0.42 0.15 0.68 0.77 0.25 0.40 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.40
16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.79 0.77 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
17 0.38 0.72 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Correlation in school attendance among siblings
Tables 2.16 and 2.17 bellow show the OLS estimates of the coefficients of the following
simple linear model:
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yit = β0 + β
′
1Xit,
where yi is equal one if the girl is attending school, and X includes the age of the girl (age),
the proportion of sisters aged below 12 attending school (asgypr), the proportion of sisters
aged 12 or more years old attending school (asgopr), similar variables for the proportion
of brothers attending school (asbypr and asbopr), a dummy equal one if the girl’s father
is living with her family (f hogar), number of brothers between 6 and 16 years old (boy),
number of sisters between 6 and 11 years old (girl11), number of sisters between 12 and
16 years old (girl16), number of sisters between 17 and 18 years old (girl16), number of
children aged less than 5 years old (baby), a dummy equal one if the girl’s mother works for
a salary (work m), and an indicator of the socioeconomic status of the girl’s family (poor).
Table 2.16: Estimation results : Girls in primary school
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
age -0.043∗∗∗ (0.002)
asgypr 0.701∗∗∗ (0.041)
asgopr 0.137∗∗∗ (0.010)
asbypr 0.046 (0.039)
asbopr -0.005 (0.010)
f hogar -0.021 (0.023)
boy -0.002 (0.006)
girl11 0.017∗∗ (0.007)
girl16 -0.012 (0.008)
girl18 0.017∗ (0.010)
baby -0.003 (0.004)
work m -0.008 (0.019)
poor 0.010 (0.018)
Intercept 0.575∗∗∗ (0.061)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 2.17: Estimation results : Girls in secondary school
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
age -0.041∗∗∗ (0.005)
asgypr 0.007 (0.052)
asgopr 0.959∗∗∗ (0.017)
asbypr 0.014 (0.055)
asbopr 0.038∗∗ (0.016)
f hogar -0.009 (0.037)
boy -0.010 (0.009)
girl11 0.000 (0.013)
girl16 -0.004 (0.011)
girl18 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015)
baby -0.007 (0.006)
work m 0.030 (0.029)
poor 0.021 (0.023)
Intercept 0.576∗∗∗ (0.110)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Fit of the model: Alternative model
Table 2.18: Actual an predicted choices: Non-dropout observations (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 98.6 97.7 .7 13.6 .7 19.6
1 96.1 97.4 .8 12.7 3.1 20.9
2 96.7 97.9 1.1 11.5 2.2 19.4
3 97.1 97.3 1.1 9.8 1.8 20.9
4 95.9 95.6 1.4 8.9 2.7 24.5
5 93.3 93.2 1.8 7.7 4.8 26.1
6 65.7 88.2 3.9 6.9 30.4 30
7 93.4 84.7 2.1 5.9 4.6 29.3
8 90.5 77.1 2.8 5.6 6.8 34.4
9 41.5 66.1 10.5 6.2 48 46.6
10 93.8 63.2 4.2 5.1 2.1 44.9
11 88.9 53.7 0 4.7 11.1 54.6
71
Chapter 2 The school reentry decision of poor girls
Table 2.19: Actual an predicted choices: Dropout observations (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 94.3 83.4 1.1 13.2 4.6 31.4
1 65.2 80.1 0 11.4 34.8 37.3
2 47.2 76.7 8.5 13.8 44.3 52.8
3 39.8 75.6 6.2 14.6 54 57.8
4 73.4 79 5.7 16.9 20.9 60.5
5 45.5 71.1 6.9 14.5 47.6 65.6
6 20.4 56.7 10.8 11.5 68.8 72.6
7 74.3 51.1 4.7 9.7 21.1 64.5
8 55.7 40.8 3.3 9 41 66.3
9 19.4 28.5 11.9 8.3 68.7 78.6
10 66.7 24.9 0 7.6 33.3 83.4
Estimation results: Alternative Model
Table 2.20: Estimates of structural parameters: Instantaneous Utilities and terminal value
function
Standard
Variable Estimate Error
Schooling utility
drop -1.35 0.15
existence of secondary 0.34 0.07
mother stock of education 2.02 0.27
graduation from primary 0.84 0.17
graduation from secondary -0.43 0.15
repeater -0.51 0.05
grant 4.09 1.04
Working utility
wage 1.42 0.65
Staying at home utility
age 5.51 0.58
number of children aged less than 5 0.36 0.40
number of girls aged 12 to 16 -0.81 0.62
number of boys aged 6 to 16 -0.06 0.48
poor -0.01 0.09
worker mother -0.37 0.12
father present at home 0.18 0.13
interaction babies*number of girls -1.29 4.15
interaction babies*worker mother -0.82 0.90
constant -2.00 0.38
Terminal value function
school -2.20 7.25
Log-likelihood = -7293.73, Discount Factor = 0.95
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Table 2.21: Estimates of structural parameters: Types and Types probabilities
Standard
Estimate Error
Unobserved type effect
Type 1 5.06 0.50
Type 2 1.77 0.49
Variables in types probabilities
school -6.12 0.41
drop -1.23 0.17
birth order 2.23 0.60
number of adults -1.14 0.35
number of children -1.03 0.31
working mother 0.13 0.13
father present at home 0.96 0.23
constant 2.85 0.31
Reference category is Type 2
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Chapter 3
Spillovers of Health Education at
School on Parental Health
Lifestyles
(joint work with M. Lucila Berniell and M. Dolores de la Mata)
3.1 Introduction
Although the prevalence of serious communicable diseases is very low in developed coun-
tries, conditions such as heart disease and cancer are the major causes of death. As a result,
prevention increasingly involves lifestyles changes that reduce risk factors for these condi-
tions (Kenkel, 2000). Interactions inside the family may crucially affect the “production” of
such healthy lifestyles. As Kenkel (2000) points out, the family is often identified as being
the unit of production of prevention practices, and this may be due to the fact that there
is not an identifiable industry that produces prevention viewed broadly.
Previous literature on intra-household decision making and health-related decision has fo-
cused on the interactions between spouses.1 On the other hand, the literature on inter-
generational transmission of characteristics such as health, ability, education or income,
has focused on the effects that parents’s decisions may have on children’s behaviors and
outcomes about these same characteristics.2 Nevertheless, little research has been done to
evaluate the impact of children on parental health decisions.
The first goal of this paper is to assess the existence of spillover effects of Health Education
(HED) received by children at school on their parents.3 Health Education is likely to affect
children’s health behaviors.4 However, it may be the case that parents are also affected
1For instance, see Clark and Etile (2006) on spousal correlation of smoking behavior.
2There is a large amount of studies quantifying the role of intergenerational transmission of parents
characteristics and behaviors on children outcomes (Currie, 2009).
3According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “Health Education is a planned,
sequential, and developmentally appropriate instruction about Health Education designed to protect, promote,
and enhance the health literacy, attitudes, skills, and well-being” (Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley, 2007).
4As stated by WHO (1999), there are several reasons for promoting healthy behaviors through schools.
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by the education about preventive health care that their kids acquire at school. Potential
effects of HED on parental lifestyles are twofold. When the child receives new information
from the HED school program he may also bring this new information to the household,
which may affect parents’s knowledge about particular healthy lifestyles. Also, a child who
learns the benefits of healthy lifestyles at school and changes his behavior accordingly, may
also affect his parents’s behavior, for instance, by increasing the time they spend together
doing healthy activities. In this work we focus in a particular type of healthy lifestyle, the
regular practice of physical activity. A second goal of this paper is to discuss the plausible
channels through which children receiving HED at schools may affect the frequency with
which their parents do physical activity.
This work is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature on
policy evaluation that focuses on measuring the spillover effects of policy interventions
on non-targeted individuals, also called Indirect Treatment Effects (ITE). In our case,
we focus on spillovers on parental behavior of a program targeted to children. There is
little research assessing the existence of spillovers inside the household. One exception is
Bhattacharya, Currie, and Haider (2006), who analyze the effects of the School Breakfast
Program (SBP) in the US not only on targeted children but also on adult (not targeted)
family members and find that the SBP improves diet quality even for family members who
were not directly exposed to it. Jacoby (2002) and Shi (2008) also analyze the effects of
policies directed to children on other -not eligible- members of the household but they do not
find evidence of the existence of family spillover effects.5 The explanations for the existence
of family spillover effects in this literature operate to the extent that the particular program
loosens the family budget constraint, so resources are freed up by the program and maybe
redirected towards other household members. In contrast, in this paper we explore the
existence of family spillovers occurring through non-budgetary channels. There is a related
literature that quantifies ITE of some policies interventions arising at the community level
and not at family level. For instance, Angelucci and Giorgi (2009) is a recent paper that
evaluates the existence of spillover effects of an aid program (PROGRESA) on the entire
local economies (villages) where the program was implemented. Also, Lalive and Cattaneo
(2006) find that PROGRESA significantly increases school enrollment among non-eligible
families in the villages and that this raise is driven by a peer effect. Miguel and Kremer
(2004) using evidence from a randomized experiment show that a deworming program
Schools are an efficient way to reach school-age children and their families in an organized way and also
the school is a place where students spend a great portion of their time, and where education and health
programmes can reach them at influential stages in their lives.
5Jacoby (2002) analyzes the impact of a school feeding program in Philippines on caloric intake of
targeted and non-targeted individuals inside the family, while Shi (2008) studies the existence of resources
reallocation inside the household after a child receives a subsidy for covering the schooling fees in rural
China. These two papers find evidence on the existence of intra-household flypaper effects, that is, there is
no sizeable reallocation of resources after a child receives the subsidy.
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substantially improved health and school participation among untreated children in both
treatment schools and neighboring schools.
The second strand of literature related to our work consists of recent works evaluating the
impact of particular aspects of health education at the school level on health outcomes
and behaviors. Cawley, Meyerhoefer, and Newhouse (2007) find positive effects of physical
education requirements on student physical exercise time but no effects on their BMI or
the probability that the student is overweight. Also, McGeary (2009) assesses the effects
of state-level nutrition-education program funding on individual-level Body Mass Index
(BMI), the probability of obesity and the probability of above normal weight.6 Her results
suggest that this funding is associated with reductions in BMI and the probability of an
individual having an above normal BMI.
In this work we exploit the quasi-experiment provided by the changes in the state-level
HED requirements in elementary schools implemented between school-years 1999/2000 and
2005/2006 to see what the effects of these programs on parents’s health lifestyles are.7
Thus, we focus on a policy that does not imply any transfer of resources to children -the
targeted individuals-, but it provides them with new information. Therefore, this paper
contributes to the literature on ITE evaluation by providing evidence that HED affects the
behavior of parents of children receiving this education at school and that these spillovers
occur through non-market channels, such as information sharing.
To identify the spillover effects of HED policies we use a “differences-in-differences-in-
differences” (DDD) strategy, that allows as to control for any systematic shocks to the
parents’s outcome behavior that are correlated with, but not due to, changes in HED poli-
cies. In the estimation procedure we exploit the time series and the cross sectional state
variation, as well as the within state variation, since within each state there are groups
exposed and not exposed to the treatment. The time dimension allow us to include year
effects, to capture national trends in the frequency of physical activity. The variation across
states allow us to control for systematic differences in the frequency of physical activity be-
tween people living in states that change their HED policies and people living in states that
do not change their HED policies. And most importantly and key for our analysis, we can
control for state-specific shocks over the period of analysis which are correlated with the
decision of changing HED policies. By controlling for the existence of state-specific time
trends we do not need to impose the usual “difference-in-difference” identifying assumption
that the implementation of the policy in a given state at a particular point in time has to
be exogenous, that is, not correlated with the outcome. Even if the reason to change the
HED policy is related with the particular trend in the level of physical activity observed in
6Notice that this funding is allocated to public-school systems, public-health clinics, as well as public-
service announcement and advertisements, so her analysis exceed the effects of education at school, thus she
constructs her estimates for the entire population in each state.
7Further details on these policy changes on Section 3.2.
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the state, we still are able to isolate the effect of HED because we have a key comparison
group for treated individuals in a given state: non-treated individuals that reside in the
same state during the same time period.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1999-2005
merged with data on state HED reforms from the 2000 and 2006 School Health Policies
and Programs Study (SHPPS). PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of
U.S. individuals (men, women, and children) and the family units in which they reside.
PSID gathers health-related information such as health status, health behaviors, health
insurance, and health care expenditures. It also provides detailed information about family
income as well as information on family composition and demographic variables, including
age of family members, race, marital status, employment status and education. SHPPS is
a nationwide survey that was designed to gather information on the characteristics of each
health education program at the state, district, school, and classroom levels and across
elementary, middle, and high educational levels.
We find evidence of a positive effect of HED at elementary school on fathers’s frequency
of light physical activity. There are two ways of rationalizing our results. First, it can
be argued that fathers have less information about the importance of preventive health
behavior and healthy lifestyles for obtaining good health outcomes. Thus, the arrival of
new information about healthy lifestyles coming from the HED imparted at school is likely
to have a stronger effect on fathers, which are the individuals with the relative smaller stock
of information on health preventive care. The second idea has to do with the role models
that mothers and fathers play for their children. Parents usually spend more time with their
children doing gendered activities. Thus, fathers are more likely to do stereotypically male
activities with their children, among which we can include physical activity. Accordingly,
the impact of HED reforms on physical activity is also expected to appear for fathers rather
than for mothers. Our results suggest that fathers are those that are affected the most by
the HED reforms, since they change their level of physical activities after these reforms
are in place while mothers do not alter their behavior in this respect. We also explore
the existence of the information sharing channel by analyzing the differential impact of
HED reforms on individuals with low and high education levels. The idea here is that the
less information parents have (less educated parents), the more knowledge will they gain
with the introduction of HED at schools. Although we do find the expected signs in the
coefficients of interest -individuals with low levels of education are those affected by the
HED reforms-, the estimates are in general not statistically significant.
The existence of spillovers of HED on parental lifestyles indicates that the interaction be-
tween children and parents play a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles inside the
household and that this fact must be taken into account to properly design policy interven-
tions aiming to increase the acquisition of healthy lifestyles in a given community.
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3.2 Health Education Policies
3.2.1 SHPPS
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducts the SHPPS every 6 years
since 1994. This nationwide survey is designed to gather information on the characteristics
of each school health program at the state, district, school, and classroom levels and across
elementary, middle, and high schools. SHPPS analyzes eight components, including HED.8
One important data limitation in SHPPS is that it is not possible to know the exact date
at which the HED reforms took place in each state. However, we do know the changes
between the two survey years, 2000 and 2006. The data collection in SHPPS starts in
January of the corresponding year, which implies that SHPPS 2000 gathers information on
the school-year 1999/2000 and SHPPS 2006 information on the school-year 2005/2006.
We use the information of the HED component from the SHPPS state-level survey. The
state-level questionnaires were completed by state education agency personnel in all 50
states plus the District of Columbia in both years.
3.2.2 Policies on HED: topics and enforcements
HED policies have several dimensions, which we collapse in two variables. The first variable
refers to the number of specific health education topics that the state requires that elemen-
tary schools must teach. We select five health topics that consist of information that could
be transmitted from children to parents and which could also contain new information for
parents. We exclude from our final list of topics those that are related to sexual education,
and HIV/violence/suicide/injury prevention.
The second category consists of the number of specific policies implemented in order to
guarantee the effective implementation of HED education requirements. We broadly refer
to each one of these requirements as enforcements. Table 3.1 describes the five topics and
the specific state requirements enforcing HED which we consider in our analysis. The full
list of topics and requirements can be consulted in Table 3.15 in the Appendix.
According to Kann, Brener, and Allensworth (2001), who analyze the changes in HED
requirements using SHPPS, between years 1994 and 2000 health education policies and
programs generally remained stable at the state level. For instance, the percentage of
states requiring schools to teach alcohol and other drug use prevention, nutrition and dietary
behavior, HIV prevention, accident or injury prevention, and physical activity and fitness
remained fairly constant. However, positive changes were detected since 2000 at the state
level.9 Tables 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 in the Appendix summarize the HED reforms in each
8The remaining seven components are Physical education and activity, Health services, Mental health
and social services Nutrition services, Healthy and safe school environment, and Faculty and staff health
promotion.
9According to Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley (2007), fewer increases in HED requirements were noted
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Table 3.1: HED topics and enforcements
Topic Code Description
1 Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
2 Emotional and Mental Health
3 Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
4 Physical Activity and Fitness
5 Tobacco-Use Prevention
Enforcement
code Description
1 State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines
2 State requires students in elementary school to be tested
on health topics
3 State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
of the two dimensions -topics and enforcements- in all states between 1999 and 2005. We
do not include in our analysis those states that experimented a reduction in the number of
topics and/or enforcements. For this reason we dropped the following states: California,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts , Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin. There is
no information in SHPPS explaining the reasons for the reverse in the application of the
policy. It seems plausible that they have decided to reduce the number of topics and/or
enforcements for budgetary reasons, parents’s demands, and/or introduction of other topics
not related with HED. It seems less likely that these states reversed the policy because of
it does not achieve its goal, since there is no formal evaluation of the effects of HED on
children and/or their families. In section 3.4.1.2 we discuss how these selection in the sample
may potentially affect our results and we provide evidence showing that in fact there is no
bias in our estimation of the spillover effects of HED on the other states. The results in
the existence of HED spillover effects that we present in what follows have to be thought
as spillover effects of only positive changes in HED.
3.3 Data and Identification Strategy
Our goal is to identify the spillover effects of elementary school HED policies implemented
in certain states -the “experimental states”- on the behavior of parents of children of
elementary-school-age -the treatment group. Identifying this effect requires, as stated in
Gruber (1994), controlling for any systematic shocks to the parents’s outcome behavior in
at the school and classroom levels. Nonetheless, it is possible that the increased state and district efforts to
improve health education and professional preparation requirements may have provided the support schools
needed to at least maintain if not improve their health education activities.
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the experimental states that are correlated with, but not due to, changes in HED policies.
To do so we use a “differences-in-differences-in-differences” (DDD) approach that allows us
to exploit the variation of HED policies across time (time dimension), across states (geo-
graphical dimension) and across different groups of individuals residing in the same state
(individual dimension). That is, we compare the treatment individuals in experimental
states to a set of control individuals in those same states and measure the change in the
treatments’ relative outcome, relative to states that did not change HED policies. The iden-
tifying assumption requires that there is no contemporaneous shock affecting the relative
outcome of the treatment group in the same state-years as the change in the HED policy.
We analyze the impact of HED policies on the behavior of adults who have children at-
tending elementary school using data from the PSID. It is a nationally representative lon-
gitudinal survey of U.S. individuals (men, women, and children) and the family units in
which they reside. Since 1999 PSID has expanded the set of health-related questions for
family units’ heads and wives, gathering information such as health status, health behav-
iors, health insurance, and health care expenditures. We concentrate on the indirect effect
of HED policies on individuals’ level of physical activity, that is one of the health behav-
iors reported in this survey. PSID also provides detailed information about family income
as well as information on family composition and demographic variables, including age of
family members, race, marital status, employment status and education. PSID covers all
states.
We base our analysis on the PSID survey years 1999 and 2005, using 1999 as the pre-reform
period. Given that the SHPPS does not provide the exact year in which HED reforms were
introduced at the state level, we are not able to use the additional data available from PSID
for periods 2001 and 2003. The DDD design we use to identify the effect of interest does
not require the use of a panel, but the identification is improved by using longitudinal data.
Even though we do not specify a model for panel data, in our final sample about 90% of
the observations correspond to individuals in a panel.
Treated individuals, those exposed to HED policies, are adults who have children of
elementary-school-age (6-10). PSID does not provide information on whether a child is
attending elementary school. However, it provides information on the age of children,
allowing us to determine if the individuals have children of school-age.10
The control group includes individuals who were unaffected by state HED requirements. We
use as control group adults who have children of elementary-school-age (6-10) living in states
that did not implement HED policies and those residing in states that even when having
HED requirements did not introduce any reform on this policy. Furthermore, to control
10Notice that the drop-out rate in elementary school is very low in the US, contrary to the case of secondary
education. Therefore, by knowing the age of the children we are able to know whether the child is or not
attending elementary education.
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Table 3.2: State groups, by policy implemented by 1999 or by 2005, and by policy reforms
Group Topics Enforcements Num. of
1999 2005 1999 2005 states Observations
Non- S0 no no no no 3 350
Experimental S1 no no yes yes 1 157
S2 yes yes yes yes 9 2,250
S3 yes yes no yes 1 347
S4 yes yes yes yes (increased) 5 943
S5 no yes no yes 3 681
Experimental S6 no yes yes yes 2 685
S7 yes yes (increased) yes yes 3 623
S8 yes yes (increased) yes yes (increased) 2 460
Total 29 6,496
for possible correlation of state HED policies with unmeasured state trends in health and
health behaviors, we use a sample of adults who have children aged 17 or younger but
not of elementary-school-age as a comparison group. We group the non-treated individuals
in three different control groups. We include in the Treatment-Non-Experimental group
(Control 1) individuals with children of elementary-school-age residing in non-experimental
states. The Control-Experimental group (Control 2) includes individuals with children
above elementary-school-age residing in experimental states. Finally, in the Control-Non-
Experimental group (Control 3) we include individuals with children above elementary-
school-age residing in non-experimental states.
The HED reforms that took place between 1999 and 2005 were dissimilar across states since
some of them have modified one, two, or none of the policy dimensions we are analyzing.
According to the observed type of HED policy reform, we classify states in nine groups
as shown in Table 3.2, in which states are sorted taking into account whether they have
topics and enforcements in both years and whether they have increased or maintained the
number of topics and enforcements between survey years. Table 3.2 also groups states in
two broad sets: experimental and non-experimental states. The experimental states are
those states that have introduced some HED reforms -by requiring for the first time topics
and/or enforcements or by increasing the number of topics and/or enforcements on HED-
between 1999 and 2005. There are six different types of treatments (policies) that define
six types of states, that we name S3 to S8. On the contrary, non-experimental states are
those that have not introduced any change in their HED requirements in this period, which
we name S0 to S2.
Our final sample consists parents of children under the age of 18 years old, women and
men, that were part of the PSID in 1999 and/or in 2005. We have a database of 6496
observations distributed across 9 groups of states, as described in Table 3.2 and Table 3.16
in the Appendix. It is worth to notice that for most of the individuals we also have her/his
couple in the sample. Given the way in which PSID is designed, for some of the individuals
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we also have another relative in the sample, for instance her/his siblings. This feature of
our data makes it important to control for cluster at the family level in all the regressions.
We use light physical activity as the outcome variable. PSID respondents are asked about
their physical activity habits in two questions. They first answer how often they do light
physical activity and then they report the time unit that allows to measure the frequency
of these activities (daily, weekly, monthly or annually). There was a change in the question
between 1999 and 2005 that we discuss in section 3.4.1.4 Based in these two questions
we construct a variable that indicates the number of times per week individuals do light
physical activity. It is an ordinal variable that assumes 44 different values, from 0 to 21. Its
histogram is presented in Figure 3.1. There two well-differentiated mass points -at values
0 and 7- can be identified. Also, more than 10% of the total number of observations lies
in the interval (0,2] and around 22% are included in the interval [2,7). This inspection of
the outcome variable makes it clear that we cannot treat it as a continuous variable in the
specification of our empirical model.
Figure 3.1: Outcome variable’s histogram: frequency of light physical activity (times per
week)
In Figure 3.2 we show the average weekly frequency of light physical activity by gender
in 1999 and 2005 for treated and control individuals, pooling all groups of states. We
observe a downward trend in all groups for both genders. In particular, for the groups of
treated individuals the frequency of light physical activity goes down. This simple Before-
After estimator is telling us that HED policies have a negative impact on the outcome
of interest. However, this estimate is obviously biased given the fact that the average
of the outcome variable in the Treatment-non-Experimental group (Control 1) has also a
downward trend which is even higher. Exploring gender differences we can see that Females
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in the Treatment-Experimental group (Treatment) present a larger drop in the frequency
of light physical activity than that one observed for males in the same group. This fact
suggests the potential need for taking into account gender differences when estimating the
effect of HED policies.
Figure 3.2: Average frequency of light physical activity (times per week) by treat-
ment/control groups and by gender, in 1999 and 2005
Treated: individuals with children of elementary school age in experimental states. Control1: individuals with children
of elementary school age in non-experimental states. Control2: individuals without children of elementary school age
in experimental states. Control3: individuals without children of elementary school age in non-experimental states.
As we discuss above, the implementation of HED policies between 1999 and 2005 was
not homogenous across states. For this reason we may expect differences in the temporal
evolution of the outcome of interest across the 8 groups of states previously defined. We
show the average frequency of light physical activity by gender and by group of states in
Figure 3.3. We see that for males residing in states belonging to groups S3 and S5 the
frequency of light physical activity raises between 1999 and 2005. These upward trends
suggest the existence of a positive effect of HED policies on the outcome variable of males
in these two particular groups of states.
To assess the existence of differences in observable characteristics among individuals un-
der treatment compared to those not exposed to HED policy reforms, in Table 3.3 we
report descriptive statistics -in year 1999- of the outcome variable, and other demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics. We present the descriptive statistics for the four mu-
tually exclusive groups: Treatment-Experimental, Treatment-Non-Experimental, Control-
Experimental, and Control-Non-Experimental.
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Figure 3.3: Average frequency of light physical activity (times per week) by treatment
groups and by gender, in 1999 and 2005
The type of policies corresponding to each group of states S are as follows. S3: topics unchanged and implementation
of enforcements; S4: topics unchanged and increase the number of enforcements; S5: implementation of topics and
enforcements; S6: implementation of topics and enforcements unchanged; S7: increase the number of topics and
enforcements unchanged; S8: increase the number of topics and enforcements.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics treatment and control groups, 1999
Full Sample Treatments in Treatments in Controls in Controls in
Exp. states Non-Exp. states Exp. states Non-Exp. states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Light phy. act. 4.331 4.309 4.618 4.281** 4.216**
(sd) (3.062) (3.012) (3.310) (2.925) (3.105)
Heavy phy. act. 2.004 2.170 2.103 1.786 2.051
(sd) (2.578) (2.707) (2.705) (2.375) (2.594)
Smoke 0.242 0.240 0.287*** 0.228 0.230
(sd) (0.428) (0.428) (0.453) (0.420) (0.421)
BMI 26.830 27.224 26.845 26.539 26.790
(sd) (5.588) (5.781) (5.545) (5.318) (5.752)
Health Excellent 0.271 0.226 0.277*** 0.271 0.315**
(sd) (0.445) (0.419) (0.448) (0.445) (0.465)
Female 0.567 0.574 0.585 0.559 0.560
(sd) (0.496) (0.495) (0.493) (0.497) (0.497)
Age 36.714 36.182 35.558 37.126*** 37.563***
(sd) (8.158) (6.275) (6.641) (9.344) (9.037)
Education 12.931 12.897 12.686*** 12.989 13.067
(sd) (2.366) (2.335) (2.265) (2.294) (2.553)
Num. of Children 2.341 2.608 2.690 2.084*** 2.150***
(sd) (1.232) (1.319) (1.248) (1.064) (1.223)
Children in Elementary 0.432 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
(sd) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.534 0.519 0.473*** 0.563* 0.554
(sd) (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.497)
Married 0.754 0.764 0.697*** 0.767 0.766
(sd) (0.431) (0.425) (0.460) (0.423) (0.424)
Unemployed 0.035 0.050 0.037 0.026** 0.030
(sd) (0.184) (0.218) (0.188) (0.160) (0.170)
Retired 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.005** 0.007***
(sd) (0.063) (0.037) (0.000) (0.074) (0.086)
Disabled 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.021*** 0.024***
(sd) (0.137) (0.117) (0.134) (0.142) (0.152)
Labor income pc 14,488 13,120 12,161 14,792*** 17,227***
(sd) (14,946) (13,981) (10,410) (14,877) (18,083)
Total income pc 17,160 15,800 13,594 17,366*** 20,925***
(sd) (17,622) (17,322) (11,292) (16,416) (22,056)
N 2,804 720 491 918 675
Stars in columns (3) to (5) show statistical significance of differences in proportion or distribution of the referred
variable, between the referred control group and the treatments in experimental states group (column (2)). We
perform tests of difference in proportion for the dummy variables Smoke, Health Excellent, Children in Elementa-
ry, White, Married, Unemployment, Retired, and Disabled. We perform tests of differences in distribution for the
categorical variables Light phy. act., Heavy phy. act., Age, Education, and Number of Children, and for the conti-
nuous variables BMI, Labor income pc, and Total income pc. Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
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We find evidence of statistically significant difference in some observable characteristics
between the Treatment-in-Experimental group and each of the three control groups. These
differences are less important between Treatment-in-Experimental and Treatment-in-Non-
Experimental states. That is, individuals with children of elementary-school-age are reason-
able alike in some observable characteristics regardless their exposition to changes in HED
policies. In terms of our DDD identification strategy this means that treated individuals
have a close comparison group in the third dimension (individual dimension). To account
for the observable differences between treatment and control individuals we use a regression
framework in the estimation of the effect of interest.
3.3.1 DDD estimation in a simple linear model
Table 3.4 presents the DDD estimate of the effect of changes in the HED policy on fathers’s
behavior for a particular group of states, S5, in which both topics and enforcements where
implemented between 1999 and 2005 for the first time. In this section we treat the outcome
variable, number of times per week individuals do light physical activity, as if it were a con-
tinuous variable. With this assumption we cannot make valid quantitative interpretations
of the effect of the policy, but we can still make inference regarding the sign of the effect.
The top panel compares the change in the frequency of physical activity for fathers with
children of elementary-school-age residing in states S5 to the change for fathers with children
of elementary-school-age in non-experimental states. Each cell contains the mean average
frequency of light physical activity for the group labeled on the axes, along with the standard
errors and the number of observations. The Before-After estimate (∆TE) of the effect is
presented in the third column. There was a non-significant increase in the frequency of
light physical activity for fathers with children of elementary-school-age in experimental
states, compared with a significant fall in the frequency of light physical activity for fathers
with children of the same age in other states. Thus, the diff-in-diff estimator (∆TE −∆TNE),
reported in the bottom part of the upper panel, is positive and significant; the relative
frequency of light physical activity of fathers with children of elementary-school-age has
risen.
If there were a different shock common to the experimental states that affected fathers’s
frequency of physical activity, the previous estimator does not identify the spillover effects
of the implementation of HED policies. In the middle panel of Table 3.4 we perform the
same exercise for the groups of fathers with children above elementary-school-age. For those
groups we find a fall in the relative frequency of light physical activity in the experimental
states, relative to the other states. Although not significant, this suggests that it may be
important to control for state-specific shocks in estimating the impact of HED policies.
Taking the difference between the two panels of Table 3.4, there is a significant increase
in the relative frequency of physical activity for fathers of children in elementary-school-
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Table 3.4: DDD estimator for males in S5
Before HED After HED Time
change change difference
A. Treatment individuals: with children in elem
Experimental states 3.588 4.228 0.640 ∆TE
(0.458) (0.555) (0.721)
[46] [47] [93]
Non-experimental states 4.379 3.632 -0.747** ∆TNE
(0.239) (0.214) (0.320)
[204] [210] [415]
Difference in difference 1.387*
(0.789)
[508]
B. Control Individuals: without children in elem
Experimental states 4.164 3.122 -1.042** ∆CE
(0.308) (0.294) (0.433)
[79] [109] [188]
Non-experimental states 3.995 3.637 -0.358 ∆CNE
(0.168) (0.149) (0.230)
[297] [474] [771]
Difference in difference -0.684
(0.491)
[959]
DDD = (∆TE −∆TNE)− (∆CE −∆CNE) 2.071**
(0.929)
[1,467]
Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Cells contain mean frequency of light
physical activity for the group identified. Standard errors are given in parentheses, sample
sizes are given in square brackets. The non-experimental states are groups of states S0, S1 and S2.
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age in the states that implemented HED requirements, compared to the change in relative
frequency of physical activity in non-experimental states. This statistically significant DDD
estimate provides some evidence on the existence of spillovers of HED on fathers’s physical
activity. However, its quantitative interpretation is problematic since the support of the
outcome variable is not the real line. We discuss in the next Section how the DDD design
can be expressed within a regression framework in which we can explicitly model the discrete
support of the outcome variable as well as we can control for observed characteristics.
3.3.2 Empirical model
Our outcome variable, the number of times per week individuals do light physical activity,
is an ordinal variable with clearly distinguished mass points as it was shown in Figure
3.1 above. For this reason, we redefine it as a variable with 5 categories and we estimate
ordered Probit specifications. We perform several robustness checks over the definition of
the dependent variable that are discussed in Section 3.4.1.1. The categories for the outcome
variable are the following:
yi =

0 0 times
1 more than 0 and less than 3 times
2 from 3 times until less than 7 times
3 7 times
4 more than 7 times
The latent variable version of the model with six types of treatment has the following form:
y∗itj = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi +
8∑
k=1
β3,kSk+
β4(elemi × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β5,k(Sk × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β6,k(Sk × elemi)+
8∑
k=3
β7,k(Sk × elemi × τt) + β8Xitj + uitj ,
(3.1)
where i = 1...N indexes individuals, t = 0, 1 indexes time (0=before policy, 1999; 1=after
policy, 2005), j = 1...29 indexes states and k = 1, .., 8 indexes state groups; τt is a dummy
variable, equal one in 2005; Sk is a dummy equal one if the individual resides in the
state j that belongs to group k; elemi is a dummy equal one if individual i has children of
elementary school (children aged between 6 and 10 years old); and Xitj is a set of observable
individual characteristics including age, race, gender, marital status, number of children,
children of high school-age, education level, employment status, total family income level
and state of residence.
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This specification controls for time trend in the dependent variable (β1), for time-invariant
characteristics of the treatment group (β2), and for time-invariant characteristics of the
different groups of states ({β3,k}8k=1). The second-level interactions control for changes
over time for the treatment group nationwide (β4), changes over time in each group of
experimental and non-experimental states ({β5,k}8k=1), and time-invariant characteristics
of the treatment group in each group of states ({β6,k}8k=1). The third-level interactions
({β7,k}8k=3) capture all variation in frequency of physical activity specific to the treatments
(relative to controls) in the experimental states (relative to the non-experimental) in the
year after the HED requirements changed. These are the DDD estimates. Given the
existence of different time trends on the frequency of light physical activity between females
and males observed in Figure 3.2 the model we estimate also interacts the policies with a
dummy variable for gender.
The model with interactions by gender has the following form:
y∗itj = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi +
8∑
k=1
β3,kSk + β4genderi + β5(τt × genderi) + β6(elemi × genderi)+
8∑
k=1
β7,k(Sk × genderi) + β8(elemi × τt) + β9(elemi × τt × genderi) +
8∑
k=1
β10,k(Sk × τt)+
8∑
k=1
β11,k(Sk × τt × genderi) +
8∑
k=1
β12,k(Sk × elemi) +
8∑
k=1
β13,k(Sk × elemi × genderi)+
8∑
k=3
β14,k(Sk × elemi × τt) +
8∑
k=3
β15,k(Sk × elemi × τt × genderi) + β16Xitj + uitj .
(3.2)
The DDD estimates in this model are β14,k for males and β14,k + β15,k for females. If the
coefficient β15,k is significantly different from zero, then there is evidence of the differential
impact of HED policies among fathers and mothers. Morover, if β14,k is positive and
significant and β15,k is negative and significant, then there is evidence that our hypothesis
on the higher effect of HED for those individuals with lower stock of information holds.
We estimate the parameters of interest by Maximum-Likelihood and we compute standard
errors corrected for cluster at family level. A report of the estimated coefficients can be
found in Table 3.18 in the Appendix.
3.4 IATE estimates
In this Section we report the estimates of the Indirect Average Treatment Effect (IATE).
The IATE is computed as the average value of the indirect treatment effect across treated
individuals.
Let pˆik = (β0, β1, β2, {β3,k}8k=1, β4, {β5,k}8k=1, {β6,k}8k=1, β8) be the vector of estimated pa-
rameters without including the parameters that measure policy effects ({β7,k}8k=3). Sim-
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ilarly, let Zitj be the vector of variables for the individual i at time t = 2005 residing in
state j without including the third level interaction variable Sk × elemi × τt.
The IATE across treated individuals of the policy change applied in the group of states Sk
corresponding to the category m of the outcome variable is computed using the following
expression:
∑
i: elem=1
[Φ(αm − pˆikZkit − β7,k(Sk × elemi × τt))− Φ(αm − pˆikZkit)]/Nkt, (3.3)
where Φ stands for the normal distribution function, αm is the cutoff point corresponding
to the m category in the ordered Probit model of the dependent variable, and N is the
number of treated individuals in the group of states Sk at time t = 2005.
We report in Table 3.5 the IATE for the six different types of treatment. A complete report
of the estimated IATE including 95% confidence intervals can be found in Table 3.19 in the
Appendix.
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Table 3.5: IATE across treated individuals. Outcome variable: frequency of light physical activity (times per week)
MALE FEMALE
# of # of
GROUP POLICY 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 obs. 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 obs.
S3 Topics unchanged -0.086 -0.049 0.005 0.117 0.012 25 -0.124 -0.033 0.028 0.122 0.007 39
Implement Enforcements (0.103) (0.047) (0.021) (0.121) (0.016) (0.121) (0.031) (0.032) (0.105) (0.010)
S4 Topics unchanged -0.035 -0.013 0.006 0.039 0.003 69 -0.025 -0.006 0.006 0.025 0.002 102
Increase Enforcements (0.078) (0.027) (0.016) (0.083) (0.009) (0.067) (0.017) (0.016) (0.064) (0.005)
S5 Implement Topics -0.172∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.032 0.186∗∗ 0.014 47 0.069 0.042 -0.002 -0.097 -0.012 84
Implement Enforcements (0.099) (0.029) (0.027) (0.089) (0.011) (0.050) (0.034) (0.010) (0.074) (0.013)
S6 Implement Topics -0.097 -0.038 0.016 0.111 0.008 63 0.032 0.018 -0.002 -0.044 -0.005 69
Enforcements unchanged (0.089) (0.029) (0.021) (0.090) (0.011) (0.064) (0.037) (0.009) (0.087) (0.011)
S7 Increase Topics -0.037 -0.029 -0.004 0.060 0.010 48 -0.054 -0.021 0.008 0.061 0.005 56
Enforcements unchanged (0.070) (0.046) (0.013) (0.101) (0.018) (0.077) (0.027) (0.016) (0.080) (0.009)
S8 Increase Topics -0.018 -0.013 -0.001 0.028 0.004 29 0.046 0.016 -0.009 -0.049 -0.003 47
Increase Enforcements (0.080) (0.052) (0.013) (0.117) (0.018) (0.090) (0.032) (0.019) (0.097) (0.009)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level.Significance levels: ∗ = 10%; ∗∗ = 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%. The regression includes the
following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age, education level, employment status, total family income level and state
of residence.
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We found evidence of a positive effect of HED education at elementary school on parents’s
frequency of light physical activity. Requiring topics and enforcements for the first time
(S5 group of states) raises fathers’s frequency of doing physical activity. In particular, the
probability of not doing physical activity (category 0) for a father affected by this policy is
17 percentage points lower than a comparable father not affected by the policy. Moreover,
the probability of doing physical activity 7 times per week (category 3) is 18 percentage
points higher. The effect on mothers’s frequency of physical activity is never statistically
significant, but interestingly the signs are the opposite of those found for fathers.
From these probabilities it is possible to compute a rough measure of the plausible savings on
health care expenditures caused by physical inactivity. The costs associated with inactivity
and obesity accounted for some 9.4% of the national health expenditure in the US in 1995,
and in Canada physical inactivity costs about 6% of total health care spending (?). For the
case of the US, reducing the probability of fathers being physical inactive by 17% may imply
cost savings of about 0.8% of national health expenditure.11 This is of course a very rough
assessment of plausible economic benefit of introducing HED at schools because of two main
reasons. First, this measure comes from aggregate health care costs. Second, looking only
at the costs of physical inactivity to the health care system grossly underestimates their
total cost: production losses from work absenteeism and also from the costs of informal
care contribute greatly to the overall financial burden.
We now comment on the direction of the effect obtained for the other types of treatment, but
in all cases the estimated effects are not statistically significant. For males, the estimated
effect has the same sign in all groups of states. HED policies on average seem to increase the
frequency of light physical activity for fathers who have children of elementary school age.
For females, the effect of the different types of policies is not homogeneous. The difference
may be explained by the timing in the implementation of topics. The estimated IATEs
suggest a negative effect of HED on mothers residing in groups of states S5, S6, and S8. In
most of the states belonging to these groups the number of topics in 1999 was 0, and only
one state has 2 topics implemented by that time. We find a positive sign of the estimated
HED effects for mothers living in states included in groups S3, S4, and S7. In all of them,
the number of topics in 1999 was at least 4. Thus, it seems that the positive effect of HED
on mothers generated by the implementation of topics is reflected in the frequency of light
physical activity after a longer period of time than for fathers.
We conclude that there are positive spillovers of HED reforms on fathers’s probability of
doing physical activity, while for mothers we do not find a statistically significant effect of
these reforms.
11This simple measure is obtained computing the product of the lower probability of being a father
physically inactive times the share of the health care costs associated with inactivity, divided by two (to
take into account just the male population).
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3.4.1 Robustness checks
We perform several types of robustness checks. First, we run the estimations with alter-
native categorizations of the dependent variable. Second, to address the sample selection
concern related to not including in our estimation sample those groups of states where HED
policies have been reversed, we estimate our model under several specifications including in
the sample all groups of states. Third, we estimate different model specifications, redefining
the types of treatment evaluated. So far, we have a model that is general enough, in the
sense that we do not impose separable effects of the reforms on topics and on enforcements.
In the specifications described below we assume separability in the effects of each one of
the two dimensions of the HED policy we are analyzing. Fourth, we use probit estimates
of the HED policies to provide evidence that the change that took place between 1999 and
2005 in the question about frequency of light physical activity does not affect our results.
Last, we perform a falsification test to show that there is none contemporaneous shock to
HED policies affecting the frequency of light physical activity of individuals of the same
range of ages than those having children of elementary school age.
3.4.1.1 Alternative categorization of the outcome variable
We obtain the IATE presented in Table 3.5 using a redefinition of the dependent variable
that has 5 categories. In Figure 3.1 we can clearly distinguish mass points in the distribution
of the outcome variable for values 0, 1 and 7. There is also an important accumulation of
observations in the interval (2,7) that can be treated as a unique mass point or as several
categories. To analyze whether our results are sensitive to different redefinitions of the
outcome variable, we estimate our model using alternative categorizations of it. In Table
3.6 we summarize the alternative specifications and in Table 3.7 we report the estimated
IATE corresponding to the group of states S5.
We start by reporting results of OLS estimates for two specifications, one of them includes
covariates and the other does not. Both groups of estimates are in line with the results
obtained with the ordered probit model: positive and significant effects of HED on fathers’s
frequency of physical activity and no effects on mothers. Comparing the results with and
without covariates we can see that the effect of HED is overestimated when no covariates
are included.
To propose a reliable specification of the probit model we need an objective criterion to
construct a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual is doing enough physical
activity or not. To obtain important health benefits, the CDS recommends to do 2 hours
and 30 minutes (150 minutes) of moderate-intensity aerobic activity (i.e., brisk walking)
every week and muscle-strengthening activities on 2 or more days a week. They recommend
to spread the activity out during the week in modules of at least 10 minutes at a time.
Following these guidelines, the BRFSS classifies a respondent as “meeting the objective”
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if she/he does 30 or more minutes per day of moderate physical activity and for five or
more days per week of moderate physical activity. Unfortunately, in our data individuals
only report how many times per week they do physical activity, and they do not report how
many minutes they spend each time in this activity. This makes unfeasible for us to propose
a unique and convincing probit model, so we present several alternative specifications and
then we compare all the results.
Table 3.6: Alternative categorization of the outcome variable
Model New outcome variable values Original outcome variable values
Probit
A 0, 1 {0}, (0, > 0]
B 0, 1 [0, 3), [3, > 3]
C 0, 1 [0, 5), [5, > 5]
D 0, 1 [0, 7), [7, > 7]
Ordered
3 0, 1, 2 {0}, (0, 7), [7, > 7]
4 0, 1, 2, 3 {0}, (0, 2), [2, 7), [7, > 7]
5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 {0}, (0, 3), [3, 7), {7}, [7, > 7]
9 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 {0}, (0, 1), [1, 2), [2, 3), [3, 4), [4, 5), [5, 7), {7}, [7, > 7]
We found statistically significant positive effect of HED on fathers’s frequency of light
physical activity, and non-statistically significant effect on mothers in all ordered probit
specifications. For the probit models, the signs of the estimated effects are in all cases com-
patible with the ordered probit specifications but we obtain IATEs for fathers statistically
significant only with the probit B model. Additionally, we obtain a statistically significant
negative effect for mothers with model probit A.
Summing up, we are confident that our results presented in section 3.4 are not driven by
the categorization used for the outcome variable, since the estimated IATE are robust to
several changes on it.
3.4.1.2 Exclusion of states in which the policy was reversed
As we explain before, we do not include in our analysis those states that experimented a
reduction in the number of topics and/or enforcements. The main reason why we decided
to drop these states is because we do not know why the reverse application of the policy was
decided in each state. Possible reasons are that topics and/or enforcements were eliminated
due to budgetary constraints, parents’s demands, and/or the introduction/substitution of
other topics not related with HED. The elimination of some topics and/or enforcements
may also be a consequence of some evidence related with the lack of effectiveness, but we
do not give much credit to this explanation since there is no available formal evaluation of
HED policies.
Regardless the reason driving the decision, the reverse application of the policy itself can be
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considered as another type of treatment. Let us call S9 to an additional group of states that
includes all states that reduced the policy. Assuming that there exists no correlation in the
effect of HED topics between S9 and S3 to S8, excluding S9 from the model estimated so
far should not produce a sample that favor our results, since individuals in dropped states
are not part of the control group that is required for identification of the effect of policies
in states S3 to S8. In terms of the model in equation 3.2, we are assuming that it is a
restricted model that imposes the value zero to the parameter that measures the effect of
HED in S9. We can test the validity of both assumptions by estimating IATEs using the
complete set of states. That is, we estimate a model that considers 7 types of treatment, 6
with positive changes in HED and 1 with negative changes in HED.
The results for the estimation of several alternative specifications of the model including
all 7 types of treatment are reported in Table 3.7. The results indicate that IATE for male
and female in groups S3 to S3 are robust to the inclusion of S9.
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Table 3.7: Testing the categorization of the outcome variable and the exclusion of states that reversed the policy. IATE estimates for type of
treatment S5: Implementation of Topics and Enforcements
MODEL MALE FEMALE
6
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
Original variable Categorical variable (5 categories) Original variable Categorical variable (5 categories)
OLS With covariates Without covariates With covariates Without covariates With covariates Without covariates With covariates Without covariates
1.775* 2.043** 0.617* 0.773** -0.804 -0.644 -0.292 -0.227
(0.925) (0.918) (0.317) (0.307) (0.670) (0.676) (0.239) (0.241)
0 (0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,7) 7 >7 0 (0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,7) 7 >7
PROBIT
A {0}(0, > 0] 0.199 -0,165 **
(0.162) (0.071)
B [0, 3)[3, > 3] 0,270** -0.106
(0.127) (0.098)
C [0, 5)[5, > 5] 0.172 -0.108
(0.121) (0.107)
D [0, 7)[7, > 7] 0.158 -0.061
(0.126) (0.107)
ORDERED
3 categories -0.147 -0.045 0.192* 0.076 0.044 -0.120
(0.100) (0.038) (0.107) (0.055) (0.045) (0.095)
4 categories -0.176* -0.059* 0.033 0.201** 0.070 0.045 0.000 -0.115
(0.104) (0.030) (0.029) (0.099) (0.051) (0.037) (0.011) (0.092)
5 categories -0.172* -0.059** 0.032 0.186* 0.014* 0.069 0.042 -0.002 -0.097 -0.012
(0.100) (0.029) (0.027) (0.089) (0.011) (0.050) (0.034) (0.010) (0.074) (0.013)
9 categories -0.162 -0.017** -0.028** -0.011 0.006 0.008 0.015 0.176* 0.013 0.068 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.097 -0.012
(0.099) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.091) (0.011) (0.050) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.074) (0.014)
7
t
y
p
e
s
o
f
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
PROBIT
A 0.202 -0.161**
{0}(0, > 0] (0.165) (0.072)
B 0.275** -0.102
[0, 3)[3, > 3] (0.124) (0.099)
C 0.178 -0.108
[0, 5)[5, > 5] (0.117) (0.110)
D 0.166 -0.062
[0, 7)[7, > 7] (0.120) (0.109)
ORDERED -0.178* -0.061** 0.036 0.189** 0.015 0.066 0.041 -0.002 -0.094 -0.012
5 categories (0.097) (0.029) (0.029) (0.085) (0.013) (0.050) (0.035) (0.010) (0.075) (0.015)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level.Significance levels: ∗ = 10%; ∗∗ = 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%. The regression includes the
following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age, education level, employment status, total family income level and state
of residence. IATE estimated with 47 observations for males and 84 for females.
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3.4.1.3 Alternative model specifications
The IATE estimates presented so far are computed with a relatively small number of obser-
vations. To explore whether sample size is an issue we present two alternative specifications
of our model in which states are grouped in a different fashion. In these new specifications
we impose the assumption that the effect of changing topics and enforcements are sepa-
rable. For instance, the effect of an increase on the number of topics in two states is the
same regardless of what they change in their enforcement requirements. In this sense, these
models are more restrictive than the model described in equation 3.1.
First, we propose an alternative specification with 4 types of treatment:
y∗itj = β0 + β1τt + β2elemit +
8∑
k=1
β3kSk+
β4(elemit × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β5k(Sk × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β6k(Sk × elemit)+∑
k∈{5,6}
β7.1(Sk × elemit × imptoptj) +
∑
k∈{7,8}
β7.2(Sk × elemit × inctoptj)+
∑
k∈{3,5}
β8.1(Sk × elemit × impenftj) +
∑
k∈{4,8}
β8.2(Sk × elemit × incenftj)+
β9Xitj + uitj ,
(3.4)
where imptoptj is a dummy that takes the value 1 if state j that is in the group of states Sk
has implemented at least one topic for the first time in 2005; inctoptj is a dummy taking
the value 1 if the state j that is in the group of states Sk has increased in 2005 the number
of topics already taught in 1999; impenftj is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the state j
that is in the group of states Sk has implemented at least one enforcement for the first time
in 2005; incenftj is a dummy taking value 1 if the state j that is in the group of states Sk
has increased in 2005 the number of enforcements already in place in 1999.
In this specification the identification of the parameters of interest, β7.1, β7.2, β8.1, β8.2, is
achieved using a non-mutually exclusive groups of states. Parameter β7.1 measures the
variation in the frequency of light physical activity in those states where topics were im-
plemented for the first time in 2005, and it is identified by two groups of states S5 and
S6. Parameter β7.2 captures the effect on the frequency of doing light physical activity
of increasing the number of topics, and it is identified by the groups of states S7 and S8.
Parameter β8.1 captures the effect of implementing enforcements, and it is identified by S3
and S5. Finally, β8.2 measures the effect of increasing the number of enforcements, and it
is identified by groups S4 and S8.
IATE estimates across treated individuals for this model are reported in Table 3.8 below.
We compute the IATE across treated individuals corresponding to the implementation of
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topics for the first time as follows:
∑
i: elem=1
{
∑
i: Sk=5
[Φ(αm − pˆikZkit − β7.1(S5 × elemi × imptoptj)− β8.1(S5 × elemi × impenftj))
− Φ(αm − pˆikZkit − β8.1(S5 × elemi × impenftj))]+∑
i: Sk=6
[Φ(αm − pˆikZkit − β7.1(S6 × elemi × imptoptj))− Φ(αm − pˆikZkit)]}/Nkt,
(3.5)
where Nkt is the total of number of treated individuals in the groups of states S5 and S6
at time t = 2005.
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Table 3.8: Model with four types of treatment: IATE estimates for Implementation of Topics (G1) and Implementation of Enforcements
(G3). Outcome variable: frequency of light physical activity (times per week)
MODEL POLICY MALE FEMALE
With covariates Without covariates With covariates Without covariates
OLS G1 0.910 0.965 -1.089* -1.073
Original (0.709) (0.705) (0.598) (0.598)
variable G3 0.817 0.994 0.360 0.456
(0.788) (0.774) (0.661) (0.654)
0 (0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,7) 7 >7 0 (0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,7) 7 >7
PROBIT
A G1 0.108 -0.073
{0}(0, > 0] (0.072) (0.049)
G3 0.073 -0.074
(0.103) (0.096)
B G1 0,139* -0.038
[0, 3)[3, > 3] (0.065) (0.053)
G3 0.090 0.067
(0.120) (0.106)
C G1 0.095 -0.043
[0, 5)[5, > 5] (0.061) (0.052)
G3 0.076 0.088
(0.119) (0.101)
D G1 0.070 -0.020
[0, 7)[7, > 7] (0.062) (0.051)
G3 0.121 0.059
(0.113) (0.092)
ORDERED
3 categories G1 -0.071 -0.027 0.098* 0.023 0.016 -0.040
(0.044) (0.021) (0.052) (0.034) (0.022) (0.045)
G3 -0.080 -0.043 0.123 -0.016 -0.004 0.019
(0.080) (0.034) (0.104) (0.075) (0.023) (0.089)
4 categories G1 -0.082* -0.035** 0.012 0.106** 0.022 0.015 0.000 -0.037
(0.044) (0.017) (0.011) (0.050) (0.033) (0.017) (0.010) (0.044)
G3 -0.076 -0.042 0.006 0.112 -0.028 -0.012 0.004 0.035
(0.079) (0.033) (0.015) (0.099) (0.071) (0.028) (0.013) (0.087)
5 categories G1 -0,080* -0,036** 0.011 0.098** 0.008 0.020 0.015 0.001 -0.032 -0.004
(0.041) (0.017) (0.010) (0.045) (0.006) (0.032) (0.016) (0.009) (0.037) (0.006)
G3 -0.073 -0.039 0.005 0.097 0.010 -0.025 -0.010 0.004 0.029 0.002
(-0.074) (0.032) (0.014) (0.086) (0.009) (0.068) (0.026) (0.013) (0.075) (0.008)
9 categories G1 -0.074* -0.009** -0.017** -0.009 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.091** 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.031 -0.005
(0.041) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.046) (0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.037) (0.006)
G3 -0.072 -0.010 -0.018 -0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.096 0.010 -0.027 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.032 0.003
(0.074) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.086) (0.009) (0.068) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.075) (0.008)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level.Significance levels: ∗ = 10%; ∗∗ = 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%. All regressions, except OlS without
covariates, include the following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age, education level, employment status, total family income
level and state of residence. IATE of type of treatment G1 estimated with 110 observations for males and 153 for females. IATE of type of treatment G3 estimated with 72 for males
and 123 for females.
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We found evidence of a positive effect of HED reforms on parents’s frequency of doing
light physical activity. The probability that fathers do light physical activity once a day is
increased by 9.8 percentage points with the implementation of topics. The probability of
not doing light physical activity is reduced in 8 percentage points. We could not estimate
the effect of changes in the number of enforcements accurately but still we can see a positive
effect of this policy on fathers’s frequency of light physical activity. Additionally, we found
that the effect of both policies, implementing topics and implementing enforcements, on
mothers’s frequency of light physical activity is negligible.
Second, we propose an alternative model specification that defines two types of treatment:
changes in the number of topics or changes in the number of enforcements. The latent
variable version of the model with two types of treatment is as follows:
y∗itj = β0 + β1τt + β2elemit +
9∑
k=1
β3kSk+
β4(elemit × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β5k(Sk × τt) +
8∑
k=1
β6k(Sk × elemit)+∑
k∈{5,6,7,8}
β7(Sk × elemit × dtoptj) +
∑
k∈{3,4,5,8}
β8(Sk × elemit × denftj)+
β9Xitj + uitj ,
where dtoptj is a dummy equal one if state j that is in group of states Sk has changed the
number of topics in 2005; denftj is a dummy equal one if state j that is in group of states
Sk has changed the number of enforcements in 2005.
This model has two underlying assumptions. First, the effects of implementing topics
(enforcements) for the first time has the same effects than increasing the number of topics
(enforcements). Second, the effects of changing topics and enforcements are separable.
These assumptions imply that this model is the most restrictive one.
We report IATE estimates in Table 3.9. With this third model specification we also find
similar IATE estimates to those found with the first model specification.
With all results reported in this section we can conclude that the relative small number of
observations we use to obtain IATEs is not imposing a bias to our results. Additionally,
assuming separability in the effect of topics and enforcements leads to results qualitatively
similar to our main model results but the estimates are less accurate.
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Table 3.9: Model with two types of treatment: IATE estimates for Change in Topics (T)
and Change in Enforcements (E). Outcome variable: frequency of light physical activity
(times per week)
MODEL POLICY MALE FEMALE
With covariates Without covariates With covariates Without covariates
OLS T 0.472 0.601 -0.679 -0.565
Original (0.523) (0.529) (0.433) (0.439)
variable E 0.574 0.729 0.068 0.146
(0.528) (0.532) (0.429) (0.430)
0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7
ORDERED T -0.049 -0.028* 0.002 0.067* 0.008 0.020 0.010 -0.002 -0.026 -0.003
(0.032) (0.016) (0.005) (0.039) (0.006) (0.025) (0.013) (0.004) (0.032) (0.004)
5 categories E -0.039 -0.020 0.004 0.050 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.049) (0.022) (0.008) (0.059) (0.007) (0.043) (0.016) (0.008) (0.047) (0.004)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level. All regressions, except
OLS without covariates, include the following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children,
children of high school-age, education level, employment status, total family income level and state of residence.
IATE of type of treatment T estimated with 187 observations for males and 256 for females. IATE of type of
treatment E estimated with 170 for males and 272 for females.
3.4.1.4 Change in the question
There was a change in the questions we use to construct the outcome variable. In 1999
the questions were “How often (do you/does he) participate in light physical activity- such
as walking, dancing, gardening, golfing, bowling, etc.?” and “How often (do you/does
he) participate in vigorous physical activity or sports -such as heavy housework, aerobics,
running, swimming, or bicycling?”. In 2005 the questions were “How often do you do
light or moderate activities for at least 10 minutes that cause only light sweating or slight to
moderate increases in breathing or heart rate?” and “How often do you do vigorous activities
for at least 10 minutes that cause heavy sweating or large increases in breathing or heart
rate?”. The change of the wording of the question may impede to separately identify the
effects of the reform from the change in the question. However, this concern is based in a
too demanding assumption: that the wording of the question not only has different effect
on different individuals, but also that it affects systematically (positively or negatively) the
group of parents with children in elementary school within each experimental state. We do
not see any a priori reason to believe that the interpretation of the new question should
create a bias across treatment and control groups in a specific state and in a systematic
direction. However, we do not want to impose any assumption in this sense, so we proceed
to test whether there is or not a systematic effect of the change of the question on different
groups. A way to minimize the effect of a systematic overestimation or underestimation of
the true level of physical activity is to group the dependent variable in broad categories.
Thus, we reduced the dependent variable to a 0/1 dummy and estimated the respective
probit model.
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Now, let us suppose that the bias exists, that it is positive, and that the two categories for
the dependent variable are {0} and > 0. Then, if any given individual does physical activity
in both years 1999 and 2005 and, due to the change in the question she/he over-reports
her/his actual frequency in 2005, this will not affect the final value we attach to the dummy
variable for this individual. Still, we may have problems with those whose actual frequency
of physical activity is 0 but they report a positive number. To alleviate this problem we
tried alternative cut-off points in the definition of the 2 categories for the outcome variable.
If the bias exists, we will never reduce it to zero since we would always have problems
with those individuals whose actual level of physical activity is close to the cut-off point
defined. Despite this drawback, and given that no extra information is available for 2006,
dichotomization of the dependent variable is the best solution we can provide to the problem
of the change in the question.
According to the results for the different probit specifications in Table 7, we still find positive
effects of the policy in S5. So we conclude that if any bias exist, it is negligible.
3.4.1.5 Existence of other shock affecting the outcome variable
There may exist a concern that our results might be driven by an age-related shock that
affects in a different manner the outcome variable of individuals in the control and in the
treatment groups. The fact that the definition of control and treatment groups of individuals
is based on the age of their children may imply that this definition resides also on the age
of the individual himself. That is, a person could be affected by a shock that has to do with
their age and not with the fact that they have children of primary school-age. To analyze
whether this concern is indeed flawing our results, we construct a falsification test in which
the control and treatment groups are formed by people without children. In the treatment
group we include those individuals that, while they do not have any children, they are in
the same range of ages of those with children of primary school age. Moreover, the control
groups comprise those individuals that are younger or older than individuals whose ages
overlap the range of ages of those with children that attend primary schools. To define the
relevant range of ages we took the 5% percentile (25 years old) and the 95% percentile (47
years old) in the distribution of ages of individuals with children of primary school age as
the cutoffs of this interval.
Table 3.10 presents the IATE estimates for the three alternative definitions of the treat-
ments (S-groups, G-groups, and T and E groups). None of these estimates are statistically
significant, which means that the concern about the existence of an age-related shock is not
affecting our findings on the existence of family spillovers of HED received at school.
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Table 3.10: Testing the existence of an age-related shock: IATE estimates for alternative
models. Outcome variable: frequency of light physical activity (times per week)
MALE FEMALE
# #
POLICY 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 obs. 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 obs.
Models with
6 treatments
Probit B S5 0.347 44 -0.134 40
(0.212) (0.253)
Ordered 5 S5 -0.171 -0.071 0.043 0.186 0.013 44 0.012 0.007 -0.002 -0.016 -0.001 40
categories (0.186) (0.070) (0.072) (0.141) (0.082) (0.136) (0.066) (0.043) (0.143) (0.064)
Model with
4 treatments
Ordered G1 -0.062 -0.042 0.006 0.090 0.009 87 -0.043 0.013 0.030 0.005 -0.005 76
5 (0.067) (0.040) (0.030) (0.078) (0.044) (0.075) (0.047) (0.035) (0.066) (0.030)
categories G3 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 70 -0.147 -0.048 0.044 0.143 0.008 59
(0.107) (0.062) (0.035) (0.123) (0.059) (0.139) (0.049) (0.056) (0.103) (0.063)
Model with
2 treatments
Ordered T -0.071 -0.053 0.001 0.110 0.013 169 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 146
5 (0.054) (0.035) (0.025) (0.068) (0.043) (0.047) (0.026) (0.014) (0.054) (0.023)
categories E -0.056 -0.032 0.009 0.072 0.006 164 -0.039 -0.026 0.004 0.057 0.006 141
(0.081) (0.039) (0.028) (0.086) (0.041) (0.072) (0.040) (0.022) (0.085) (0.038)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level. All regressions
include the following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age,
education level, employment status, total family income level and state of residence. S5 refers to the policy:
implementation of topics and enforcements. G1 refers to the policy: implementation of topics; G3 refers to the
policy: implementation of topics. T refers to the policy: change in the number of topics: E refers to the policy:
change in the number of enforcements.
3.4.2 Plausible explanations for our results
The estimates from the model interacting the policies with a dummy variable for gender
allow us to obtain some insights on the channels driving the potential existence of spillovers
of HED on parental physical activity. There are two ways of rationalizing our results.
First, the amount of information provided by HED programs is likely to have a stronger
effect on those individuals who have a lower stock of information. This is for instance
consistent with other works on Indirect Treatment Effects, such as Bandiera and Rasul
(2006) who study agricultural technology adoption and find evidence on the fact that the
adoption decisions of farmers who have better previous information about the innovation
are less sensitive to the adoption choices of others. In our case, fathers are thought to
own a pre-reform stock of information about healthy lifestyles that is smaller than that
one of mothers. This idea is supported by the fact that mothers are those that take their
children to the physicians and that in general are more aware of preventive care methods
than fathers. Therefore, a specification that allows for differential impact of the policies
by gender will provide indirect evidence on the existence of information sharing between
the child and his parents as a plausible channel driving the potential spillovers of HED on
parental health lifestyles. The second idea has to do with the role models that mothers and
fathers play for their children. Parents usually spend more time with their children doing
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gendered activities. Figure 3.4 in the Appendix shows some evidence in this respect with
data coming from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Women spend roughly twice
as much time in childcare as do men, a pattern which holds true for all subgroups and for
almost all types of childcare, except for “Recreational” childcare. This type of childcare
activities includes playing games with children, playing outdoors with children, attending
a child’s sporting event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks with
children, etc. In the case of “Recreational” childcare, mothers allocate relatively less of
their time with children when compared with the time allocation into types of childcare
activities that fathers do. Thus, this is evidence on the fact that fathers are more likely to
do stereotypically male activities with their children, among which we can include physical
activity. Accordingly, the impact of HED reforms on physical activity is also expected to
appear for fathers rather than for mother.
We also explore the existence of the information sharing channel by analyzing the differential
impact of HED reforms on individuals with low and high education levels.12 In the estimates
of the model that interacts the policy variables with a dummy for level of education -low and
high level- we do find the expected signs in the coefficients of interest. That is, individuals
with low levels of education are those affected by the HED reforms. However the estimates
are in general not statistically significant as it can be seen in Table 3.11. In the same
Table, we present results by race, splitting the data into white and non-white groups of
individuals. The results for this interaction are not convincing enough, since we found a
zero effect of HED policies for both white and non-white individuals. The lack of accuracy
in the estimation of HED effects by level of education and race may be explained by the fact
that we are pooling together males and females in each education/race category. Ideally
we would want to estimate by gender/education/race categories, but groups’s sample sizes
do not allow us to do it.
12The model with interactions by level of education is exactly the same as the one presented for the case
of interactions with gender, but in this case the dummy variable is he and it takes the value 1 when the
individual has a high level of education (at least 12 years of education), and the value 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.11: Testing the channels behind our results: IATE estimates for alternative models.
Outcome variable: frequency of light physical activity (times per week)
POLICY 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 # of 0 (0,3) [3,7) 7 >7 # of
obs. obs.
Models with
6 treatments
Education LOW EDUCATION HIGH EDUCATION
Ordered 5 S5 -0.214 -0.068 0.041 0.225* 0.016 8 0.017 0.009 -0.002 -0.023 -0.002 71
categories (0.165) (0.046) (0.045) (0.132) (0.016) (0.062) (0.032) (0.009) (0.080) (0.009)
Race NON-WHITE WHITE
Ordered 5 S5 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 27 -0.052 -0.041 -0.006 0.085 0.013 57
categories (0.087) (0.028) (0.020) (0.089) (0.007) (0.069) (0.043) (0.014) (0.096) (0.016)
Model with
4 treatments
Education LOW EDUCATION HIGH EDUCATION
Ordered G1 -0.074 -0.029 0.011 0.084 0.008 14 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 149
5 (0.069) (0.043) (0.027) (0.081) (0.024) (0.030) (0.015) (0.007) (0.037) (0.004)
categories G3 0.016 0.009 0.000 -0.023 -0.003 10 -0.038 -0.018 0.005 0.047 0.004 119
(0.120) (0.061) (0.025) (0.147) (0.037) (0.061) (0.025) (0.011) (0.069) (0.006)
Race NON-WHITE WHITE
Ordered G1 -0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.011 0.001 50 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 0.017 0.003 113
5 (0.044) (0.017) (0.012) (0.045) (0.004) (0.031) (0.022) (0.007) (0.046) (0.007)
categories G3 -0.015 (0.087) 0.003 0.015 0.001 34 -0.043 -0.032 -0.003 0.069 0.009 95
-0.004 (0.027) (0.020) (0.087) (0.007) (0.058) (0.035) (0.010) (0.081) (0.011)
Standard errors computed by bootstrap with 2000 replications. Cluster is set at family level. All regressions
include the following covariates: age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age,
education level, employment status, total family income level and state of residence. S5 refers to the policy:
implementation of topics and enforcements. G1 refers to the policy: implementation of topics; G3 refers to the
policy: implementation of topics.
3.5 Conclusion
We find evidence on the existence of positive spillovers of HED imparted in elementary
schools on parents’s frequency of light physical activity. However, our results suggest that
fathers and not mothers are those affected by the HED reforms. We also analyze the
differential impact of HED reforms on fathers and mothers as a way to explore the nature
of the channels driving the spillovers.
We proposed two ways of explaining the differential impact by parents’s gender. First,
we argue that fathers have less information about preventive health behavior and thus
are likely to be more affected by the arrival of new information on this subject. Since
fathers are actually found to be more affected by HED received by children, there is an
indirect evidence of information transmission from children to parents. We also explore the
existence of the information sharing channel by analyzing the differential impact of HED
reforms on individuals with low and high education levels, and even when we do find the
expected signs in the coefficients of interest -individuals with low levels of education are
those affected by the HED reforms-, the estimates are in general not statistically significant.
The second idea has to do with the role models that mothers and fathers play for their
children. Parents usually spend more time with their children doing gendered activities.
Since physical activity can be included into the group of the typically male-activities, the
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effect of the promotion of the advantages of doing physical activity is more likely to appear
for fathers rather than for mothers.
We perform several robustness checks, changing the model specification while regrouping
states in different manners, and changing the definition of categories of the dependent
variable. To summarize, the existence of a positive effect of the implementation of topics
and enforcements on fathers’s frequency of physical activity still holds true after performing
all these checks.
Our results also highlight the importance of clearly distinguishing the existence of several
dimensions in the implementation of a policy. In our case, considering the two dimensions
in the HED reforms -changes in topics and enforcements- as well as the distinction be-
tween implementing requirements for the first time relative to reforms in already existing
requirements is important for the policy evaluation. Our main result shows the existence
of spillovers only in the case when both policy dimensions are simultaneously implemented
for the first time.
The existence of spillovers of HED on parental lifestyles indicates that the interaction be-
tween children and parents play a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles inside the
household. Therefore, taking into account these spillovers is important in the cost-benefit
analysis of introducing health education at schools. In addition, the conclusion that im-
plementing reforms in topics is not enough to obtain spillovers at the family level helps to
properly design policy interventions aiming to increase the acquisition of healthy lifestyles
in a given community.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.12: States That Require Elementary Schools to Teach Health Topics, by Topic and
Year
2000 2006
State topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5 topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5
Alabama yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Alaska no no no no no no no no no no
Arizona no no no no no no no no no no
Arkansas no no no no no no no yes yes no
California yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Colorado no no no no no no no no no no
Connecticut yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Delaware yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District of Columbia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Florida no no no no no yes yes yes no no
Georgia yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hawaii no no no yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Idaho no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Illinois yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Iowa yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no yes
Kansas no no no no no no no no no no
Kentucky yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Louisiana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Maine yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Maryland yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Massachusetts yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Michigan yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes no yes
Minnesota yes no yes yes yes no no no no no
Mississippi yes yes yes yes yes no no no yes no
Missouri yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no yes
Montana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nebraska yes no no no yes yes no yes yes yes
Nevada yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
New Hampshire yes yes yes yes no yes no no no no
New Jersey yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes
New Mexico no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
New York yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
North Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
North Dakota yes no no no yes yes no no yes yes
Ohio yes no yes yes yes no no no no no
Oklahoma yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no
Oregon yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no yes
Pennsylvania yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Rhode Island yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Dakota no no no no no no no no no no
Tennessee yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Texas no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Utah yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Vermont yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Virginia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Washington yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
West Virginia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wisconsin yes yes no no yes no no no no no
Wyoming no no no no no no yes no no no
Source: School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Topic 1:Alcohol or other drug-use prevention; Topic 2: Emotional and mental health;
Topic 3: Nutrition and dietary behavior; Topic 4: Physical activity and fitness; Topic 5: Tabacco-use prevention.
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Table 3.13: States That Implemented Enforcements, by Enforcement and Year
2000 2006
State Enf 1 Enf 2 Enf 3 Enf 1 Enf 2 Enf 3
Alabama yes no no yes no yes
Alaska no no no yes no no
Arizona yes no no yes no no
Arkansas yes no no yes no no
California no no no no no no
Colorado no no no no no no
Connecticut no no no no no no
Delaware yes no yes yes no yes
D. of Columbia no yes yes yes no yes
Florida yes no no yes no no
Georgia yes no no yes no no
Hawaii yes yes no yes no no
Idaho no no no yes yes yes
Illinois yes no no yes no no
Indiana yes no no yes no no
Iowa no no no no no no
Kansas no no no no no no
Kentucky no yes no yes yes no
Louisiana yes no no yes no no
Maine yes yes no yes yes no
Maryland yes no no yes no no
Massachusetts yes no no no no no
Michigan yes no no yes no no
Minnesota yes no no no no no
Mississippi yes no no yes no no
Missouri yes yes no yes yes no
Montana yes no no yes no no
Nebraska no no no no no no
Nevada yes no no yes no no
New Hampshire no no no no no no
New Jersey yes yes no yes no no
New Mexico yes yes no yes no no
New York yes no yes yes no no
North Carolina yes no no yes no no
North Dakota no no no no no no
Ohio no no no no no no
Oklahoma no no no yes no no
Oregon no no no yes no no
Pennsylvania yes no no yes yes yes
Rhode Island yes yes no yes yes yes
South Carolina yes no no yes yes no
South Dakota no no no no no no
Tennessee yes no no yes no no
Texas no no no yes no no
Utah yes no no yes yes no
Vermont yes no no yes yes no
Virginia no no no yes no no
Washington yes yes no yes yes no
West Virginia yes no no yes no no
Wisconsin no no no no no yes
Wyoming no no no yes no no
Source: School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Enforcement 1: State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines.
Enforcement 2: State requires students in elementary school to be tested on
health topics.
Enforcement 3: State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
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Table 3.14: Number of Topics and Enforcements, by State and Year
State topics topics enforcements enforcements
2000 2006 2000 2006
Alabama 5 5 1 2
Alaska 0 0 0 1
Arizona 0 0 1 1
Arkansas 0 2 1 1
California 5 4 0 0
Colorado 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 5 5 0 0
Delaware 5 5 2 2
District of Columbia 5 5 2 2
Florida 0 3 1 1
Georgia 4 5 1 1
Hawaii 1 5 2 1
Idaho 0 5 0 3
Illinois 5 5 1 1
Indiana 5 4 1 1
Iowa 5 3 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 5 5 1 2
Louisiana 5 4 1 1
Maine 4 5 2 2
Maryland 5 5 1 1
Massachusetts 5 5 1 0
Michigan 4 4 1 1
Minnesota 4 0 1 0
Mississippi 5 1 1 1
Missouri 5 2 2 2
Montana 5 5 1 1
Nebraska 2 4 0 0
Nevada 5 4 1 1
New Hampshire 4 1 0 0
New Jersey 5 4 2 1
New Mexico 0 5 2 1
New York 5 5 2 1
North Carolina 5 5 1 1
North Dakota 2 3 0 0
Ohio 4 0 0 0
Oklahoma 5 0 0 1
Oregon 5 2 0 1
Pennsylvania 2 5 1 3
Rhode Island 5 5 2 3
South Carolina 5 5 1 2
South Dakota 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 5 5 1 1
Texas 0 5 0 1
Utah 5 5 1 2
Vermont 4 5 1 2
Virginia 5 5 0 1
Washington 4 5 2 2
West Virginia 5 5 1 1
Wisconsin 3 0 0 1
Wyoming 0 1 0 1
Source: School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
109
Chapter 3 Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parental Health Lifestyles
Table 3.15: HED topics and enforcements - Full list
Topics Description
Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
Emotional and Mental Health
Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
Physical Activity and Fitness
Tobacco-Use Prevention
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevention
Accident or injury prevention
Sexually transmitted disease (STD) prevention
Pregnancy prevention
Suicide prevention
Violence prevention, for example bullying, fighting, or homicide
Enforcements Description
State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines
State requires students in elementary school to be tested
on health topics
State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
State uses staff development for health education teachers to
improve compliance with health education standards or guidelines
State uses written reports from districts or schools to document
compliance with health education standards or guidelines
State provides a list of one or more recommended elementary
school health education curricula
State provides a chart describing the scope and sequence of
instruction for elementary school health education
State provides lesson plans or learning activities for
elementary school health education
State provides plans for how to assess or evaluate students
in elementary school health education
State adopts a policy stating that newly hired staff who teach
health education at the elementary school level will have
undergraduate or graduate training in health education
State offers certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach
health education
State adopts a policy stating that teachers will earn continuing
education credits on health education topics to maintain state
certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach health education
In Italic topic and enforcements considered for the analysis.
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Table 3.16: States classified by groups Sk
State Num. of observations
NON-EXPERIMENTAL
S0
Colorado 224
Kansas 70
South Dakota 56
S1
Arizona 157
S2
Delaware 12
District of Columbia 63
Illinois 376
Maryland 431
Michigan 571
Montana 13
North Carolina 532
Tennessee 229
West Virginia 23
EXPERIMENTAL
S3
Virginia 347
S4
Alabama 128
Kentucky 170
Rhode Island 9
South Carolina 543
Utah 93
S5
Idaho 25
Texas 640
Wyoming 16
S6
Arkansas 261
Florida 424
S7
Georgia 391
Maine 30
Washington 202
S8
Pennsylvania 453
Vermont 7
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Table 3.17: DDD estimator for females in S5
Before HED After HED Time
change change difference
A. Treatment individuals: with children in elem
Experimental states 5.137 3.675 -1.462*** ∆TE
(0.363) (0.318) (0.481)
[70] [84] [154]
Non-experimental states 4.787 3.777 -1.010*** ∆TNE
(0.191) (0.198) (0.275)
[287] [298] [585]
Difference in difference -0.451
(0.554)
[739]
B. Control Individuals: without children in elem
Experimental states 4.390 3.594 -0.615 ∆CE
(0.168) (0.126) (0.379)
[96] [150] [246]
Non-experimental states 4.390 3.594 -0.797*** ∆CNE
(0.168) (0.126) ( 0.207)
[378] [608] [986]
Difference in difference 0.182
(0.432)
[1,232]
DDD = (∆TE −∆TNE)− (∆CE −∆CNE) -0.633
(0.703)
[1,971]
Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Cells contain mean frequency of light
physical activity for the group identified. Standard errors are given in parentheses, sample
sizes are given in square brackets.
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Table 3.18: Ordered Probit Model: light/moderate physical activity
Number of obs=6496 Wald chi2(113) = 501.67
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -8892.6266 Pseudo R2 = 0.0255
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1182 clusters at family level)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
tau -0.127 (0.161) S3 elem tau w 0.057 (0.448)
elem 0.092 (0.174) S4 elem tau w -0.036 (0.319)
S1 -0.189 (0.325) S5 elem tau w -0.881∗∗∗ (0.316)
S2 0.501 (0.379) S6 elem tau w -0.472 (0.377)
S3 -0.195 (0.286) S7 elem tau w 0.006 (0.349)
S4 0.109 (0.257) S8 elem tau w -0.233 (0.377)
S5 -0.361 (0.430) S1 jhs -0.077 (0.259)
S6 0.143 (0.254) S2 jhs 0.332∗∗ (0.154)
S7 0.084 (0.245) S3 jhs 0.247 (0.210)
S8 -0.177 (0.401) S4 jhs 0.462∗∗∗ (0.171)
elem tau -0.142 (0.132) S5 jhs 0.296∗ (0.173)
S1 tau -0.190 (0.291) S6 jhs 0.300 (0.187)
S2 tau 0.000 (0.168) S7 jhs 0.551∗∗∗ (0.179)
S3 tau 0.066 (0.289) S8 jhs 0.238 (0.193)
S4 tau -0.096 (0.213) jhs -0.191 (0.151)
S5 tau -0.300 (0.225) jhs tau -0.054 (0.070)
S6 tau -0.139 (0.227) gender 0.009 (0.201)
S7 tau -0.103 (0.234) age1 -0.029∗∗ (0.013)
S8 tau -0.047 (0.261) age2 0.000 (0.000)
S1 elem -0.004 (0.302) white 0.261∗∗∗ (0.038)
S2 elem 0.005 (0.178) edu1 0.019∗∗∗ (0.007)
S3 elem -0.058 (0.307) marital1 -0.066 (0.057)
S4 elem -0.240 (0.235) marital3 -0.235 (0.166)
S5 elem -0.215 (0.259) marital4 -0.029 (0.070)
S6 elem -0.332 (0.258) marital5 0.080 (0.089)
S7 elem 0.159 (0.259) ch nchildren 0.071∗∗ (0.034)
S8 elem 0.153 (0.273) nch2 -0.006 (0.004)
S3 elem tau 0.346 (0.401) rhwy pclabinc 0.011 (0.008)
S4 elem tau 0.118 (0.275) empstatusd2 0.069 (0.149)
S5 elem tau 0.589∗ (0.303) empstatusd3 0.014 (0.082)
S6 elem tau 0.340 (0.305) empstatusd4 -0.158 (0.158)
S7 elem tau 0.186 (0.306) empstatusd5 -0.504∗∗∗ (0.104)
S8 elem tau 0.076 (0.342) empstatusd6 0.062 (0.050)
tau w -0.054 (0.225) empstatusd7 0.177∗ (0.094)
elem w 0.306 (0.236) stated4 0.050 (0.154)
S1 w 0.372 (0.368) stated5 -0.485 (0.510)
S2 w 0.066 (0.207) stated6 -0.495 (0.349)
S3 w 0.492 (0.305) stated7 0.041 (0.110)
S4 w -0.171 (0.234) stated8 -0.146 (0.111)
S5 w -0.166 (0.234) stated9 0.856∗∗ (0.425)
S6 w -0.306 (0.249) stated10 -0.515 (0.334)
S7 w 0.053 (0.240) stated11 0.100 (0.218)
S8 w 0.220 (0.240) stated12 -0.062 (0.153)
elem tau w -0.016 (0.157) stated14 -0.517 (0.332)
S1 tau w -0.023 (0.421) stated15 -0.582∗ (0.330)
S2 tau w -0.091 (0.223) stated17 -0.557∗ (0.333)
S3 tau w -0.279 (0.391) stated18 0.141 (0.299)
S4 tau w 0.090 (0.281) stated20 -0.088 (0.122)
S5 tau w 0.290 (0.285) stated22 -0.552∗ (0.333)
S6 tau w 0.273 (0.303) stated23 0.391 (0.351)
S7 tau w -0.078 (0.291) stated24 0.141 (0.154)
S8 tau w -0.151 (0.316) stated27 -0.055 (0.124)
S1 elem w -0.183 (0.432) stated28 -0.342 (0.375)
S2 elem w -0.291 (0.243) cut1 -1.318∗∗∗ (0.335)
S3 elem w -0.785∗∗ (0.368) cut2 -0.551 (0.336)
S4 elem w -0.247 (0.298) cut3 0.026 (0.335)
S5 elem w 0.307 (0.307) cut4 1.909∗∗∗ (0.333)
S6 elem w 0.195 (0.329)
S7 elem w -0.610∗ (0.325)
S8 elem w -0.579∗ (0.313)
Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
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Table 3.19: Indirect Average Treatment Effects across treated individuals
Observed Bootstrap Normal-based
Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]
me03m -.0844734 .1034015 -0.82 0.414 -.2871366 .1181898
me13m -.048021 .0480886 -1.00 0.318 -.142273 .0462309
me23m .0047773 .0211703 0.23 0.821 -.0367158 .0462705
me33m .1156734 .1226193 0.94 0.345 -.1246561 .3560029
me43m .0120437 .0152942 0.79 0.431 -.0179324 .0420198
me04m -.0337388 .0766463 -0.44 0.660 -.1839627 .1164852
me14m -.0121408 .0272559 -0.45 0.656 -.0655614 .0412797
me24m .0058584 .0151691 0.39 0.699 -.0238726 .0355893
me34m .0372102 .0822599 0.45 0.651 -.1240163 .1984366
me44m .0028111 .0072691 0.39 0.699 -.011436 .0170582
me05m -.1702191 .0965041 -1.76 0.078 -.3593637 .0189255
me15m -.0585404 .0271658 -2.15 0.031 -.1117844 -.0052964
me25m .0310267 .0268503 1.16 0.248 -.0215989 .0836524
me35m .1841226 .0857774 2.15 0.032 .0160019 .3522432
me45m .0136102 .0107841 1.26 0.207 -.0075263 .0347468
me06m -.0956321 .0878547 -1.09 0.276 -.2678242 .0765601
me16m -.037293 .0292409 -1.28 0.202 -.0946041 .0200181
me26m .0158249 .0206585 0.77 0.444 -.024665 .0563148
me36m .1088925 .0891369 1.22 0.222 -.0658127 .2835977
me46m .0082077 .0084164 0.98 0.329 -.0082882 .0247036
me07m -.0369869 .0674435 -0.55 0.583 -.1691738 .0951999
me17m -.0291552 .0451443 -0.65 0.518 -.1176364 .0593259
me27m -.0049656 .0133 -0.37 0.709 -.0310331 .0211019
me37m .0609014 .0986592 0.62 0.537 -.1324672 .2542699
me47m .0102064 .0178787 0.57 0.568 -.0248352 .045248
me08m -.0164481 .0817089 -0.20 0.840 -.1765946 .1436985
me18m -.0119896 .0519691 -0.23 0.818 -.1138472 .0898679
me28m -.0009434 .0138114 -0.07 0.946 -.0280132 .0261264
me38m .025987 .1170299 0.22 0.824 -.2033873 .2553613
me48m .0033941 .0174641 0.19 0.846 -.0308349 .0376231
me03f -.1239576 .1243801 -1.00 0.319 -.3677382 .1198229
me13f -.0328852 .0297108 -1.11 0.268 -.0911173 .0253469
me23f .027637 .0329414 0.84 0.401 -.0369269 .0922009
me33f .1217515 .1058499 1.15 0.250 -.0857105 .3292135
me43f .0074544 .0108136 0.69 0.491 -.0137399 .0286486
me04f -.0253278 .068778 -0.37 0.713 -.1601302 .1094747
me14f -.0063751 .0173171 -0.37 0.713 -.0403159 .0275657
me24f .005731 .0164839 0.35 0.728 -.0265769 .0380389
me34f .0244799 .0646005 0.38 0.705 -.1021347 .1510944
me44f .0014919 .0043562 0.34 0.732 -.0070461 .0100299
me05f .0687081 .0509396 1.35 0.177 -.0311316 .1685479
me15f .0415787 .0356309 1.17 0.243 -.0282565 .1114139
me25f -.0015858 .0104186 -0.15 0.879 -.0220058 .0188342
me35f -.0971605 .0766509 -1.27 0.205 -.2473934 .0530725
me45f -.0115405 .0138457 -0.83 0.405 -.0386775 .0155966
me06f .0323267 .0642038 0.50 0.615 -.0935104 .1581638
me16f .0180261 .0365282 0.49 0.622 -.0535678 .0896201
me26f -.0018965 .0095666 -0.20 0.843 -.0206467 .0168537
me36f -.0438458 .0866248 -0.51 0.613 -.2136272 .1259357
me46f -.0046106 .0113587 -0.41 0.685 -.0268732 .0176521
me07f -.0534697 .0752558 -0.71 0.477 -.2009685 .094029
me17f -.0206909 .0264992 -0.78 0.435 -.0726284 .0312467
me27f .0082421 .0159583 0.52 0.606 -.0230355 .0395197
me37f .0608204 .0790659 0.77 0.442 -.0941459 .2157867
me47f .0050981 .0073761 0.69 0.489 -.0093588 .019555
me08f .0459586 .0887619 0.52 0.605 -.1280114 .2199287
me18f .0157106 .0319778 0.49 0.623 -.0469647 .078386
me28f -.0088347 .0182866 -0.48 0.629 -.0446758 .0270065
me38f -.049489 .0956355 -0.52 0.605 -.236931 .1379531
me48f -.0033456 .0088801 -0.38 0.706 -.0207502 .014059
Note: meijg is the IATE corresponding to the category i of the outcome variable obta-
ined for state group Sj . g = f is the effect on females and g = m is the effect on males.
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Figure 3.4: Ratios father-mother of means of time spent in childcare activities by different
demographic subgroups (hours per week).
Source: Ratios computed using data in Table 1 in (?) based on the 2003-2006 waves of the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS). Childcare activities are classified into: “Basic” childcare (breast feeding, rocking a child to sleep,
general feeding, changing diapers, providing medical care to child, grooming child, etc.); “Educational” childcare
(reading to children, teaching children, helping children with homework, attending meetings at a child’s school, etc.);
“Recreational” childcare (playing games with children, playing outdoors with children, attending a child’s sporting
event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks with children, etc.); “Travel” childcare (any travel
related to any of the three other categories of childcare). Samples include all individuals between the ages of 21 and
55 (inclusive) who had time diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child under the age of 18.
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